How geopolitics and obscurity robbed Tibet of its autonomy. An extract
Dilip Sinha
India’s main priority in the UN during this period was to secure China’s seat for the new Communist regime, displacing the Nationalists who had taken refuge in Taiwan. Nehru informed India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Benegal Narsing Rau, that the invasion of Tibet did not affect India’s position on China’s claim to UN seat. Rau in fact claimed that India’s support for Communist China’s case was aimed at deterring any potential invasion of Tibet. In an interview with the Columbia Broadcasting System, he contended that had Communist China been made a UN member, it would not have invaded Tibet: ‘The very fact that it might have been called upon to account for its actions before a world tribunal might have deterred any invasion.’
India’s reaction to Tibet’s appeal underwent change as it further crystallized. On 16 November, the external affairs ministry communicated to its New York mission a preference for the matter to be considered by the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. It asked the mission to approach Britain and the US—and if they agreed, to impress upon El Salvador the need for postponing the matter. The ministry then directed the mission to endorse the proposal for consideration but avoid using recrimination or strong rhetoric that could impede a peaceful settlement.
India ultimately decided not to support Tibet’s appeal and limited itself to urging China to respect Tibet’s autonomy—not independence—and peacefully resolve the issue without resorting to arms. Foreign Secretary Menon rationalized this about-turn in an internal note, stating that ‘in the first flush of our indignation against the Chinese invasion of Tibet, we said that we would support this appeal, though we would not sponsor it’. But the idea for such a debate was dropped because it was deemed to be not helpful. This rationale was further elaborated in a telegram to the political officer in Sikkim explaining India’s policy: ‘[I]t must be realised that neither we nor U.N. can give active help to Tibet and a heroic policy of condemnation can do Tibet little good.
El Salvador’s resolution, invoking Article 1 of the UN Charter, stated that ‘the peaceful nation of Tibet has been invaded without any provocation on its part by foreign forces proceeding from the territory controlled by the Government established at Peiping’. Condemning the ‘unprovoked aggression’, it called for the formation of a General Assembly committee to recommend measures. Tibet had also demanded that the Chinese forces withdraw to the east of the Yangtse River, which marked the traditional boundary between China and Tibet.
On 24 Noember, El Salvador proposed that the General Committee include the Tibetan question on the agenda of the General Assembly. Britain requested a postponement, which was supported by India’s representative, Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, advocating for peaceful talks. The Soviet Union wanted the item to be deleted, viewing it was China’s internal affair. The American delegation agreed to the adjournment, following the Indian lead. Nationalist China, occupying the China seat, did not oppose the postponement as the use of force was against Chinese interests and had been prompted by the Soviet Union. The motion for postponement was adopted unanimously, and no date was fixed for further consideration. The issue never came up for discussion again.
According to the UN Charter, the Security Council bears the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, encompassing a broad mandate to counter any threat, regardless of its origin. In fact, the UN’s primary focus was the threat from World War II enemy states Germany and Japan, who were not members. Despite no international recognition, Tibet’s right to self-determination, promised to all ‘peoples’ under the UN Charter, remained valid—a principle recently acknowledged by India in Jammu and Kashmir. And in 1950, the UN had authorized its first military action against North Korea for invading South Korea, carried out by a coalition of nations led by the United States. North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union and China, and neither faction in Korea was a member the UN.
India’s stand on Tibet was out of sync with its own emerging foreign policy, as were its arguments against raising the matter in the UN. It regarded adopting a resolution in the UN as a heroic but futile policy of condemnation. This stance was at variance with India’s regular sponsorship of resolution against apartheid, disdainfully ignored by South Africa. The argument that Tibet could not receive military assistance because of its remoteness did not fly, as Lhasa was more accessible from India than any part of China.
There was internal disagreement over India’s policy. Bajpai was unhappy with Nehru’s decision believing it was not in accordance with India’s earlier decision to support Tibet. He thought the matter should have been discussed in the General Assembly, since it was the world’s forum, and even contemplated resigning. When he spoke to Menon, the latter reported it to Nehru, who wondered if such a situation could be averted by getting Tibet to withdraw its appeal.
The Empires Stay Aloof
According to a report of the British High Commissioner to India, the United States had considered recognising Tibet’s independence during the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists. But the idea was abandoned as such recognition would seem ‘indecent to the Nationalist and ‘provocative’ to the Communists.
The first official statement by the US on the status of Tibet, in 1943, had been favourable to China:
‘[T]the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised the question regarding either of the claims.’
However, when the Communist Party seized power in 1949, the US position somewhat changed, stating: ‘The United States Government believes that Tibet should not be compelled by duress to accept violation of its autonomy and that the Tibetan people should enjoy the rights of self-determination.’
The Soviet Union’s policy on Tibet, like Britain’s, was based on the Convention of 1907 recognizing Chinese suzerainty over the country. This was the foundation for Stalin’s advice to Mao Zedong in 1950 to annex Tibet. Records from the declassified archives at Wilson Center in Washinton DC reveal that during their meeting on 22 January 1950, Mao thanked Stalin for sending an air regiment to China, enabling the PLA to transport provisions for the invasion of Tibet.
Russia also supported China’s claim to Bhutan, citing its declared sovereignty over Tibet. In 1951, the official newspaper Pravda reported that Britain had unlawfully taken the province of Bhutan and the neighbouring Sikkim princedom from Tibet in 1890. The paper praised China for its peaceful liberation of Tibet and had, earlier, also listed Ladakh among the Tibetan territories conquered by the British.
Later UN Resolutions
The Tibetan question would not come up again in the UN General Assembly until the Dalai Lama’s exile and the 1959 uprising. In October that year, Malaysia and Ireland sponsored a resolution referring to the ‘distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet’ and to the ‘autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed’ in its preamble. The resolution demanded respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life’. It did not mention their demand for independence or China’s occupation. In fact, it did not mention the People’s Republic of China at all. The resolution was adopted forty-five votes in favour, nine against and twenty-six abstentions. India abstained.
Two years later, Malaysia and Ireland were joined by El Salvador and Thailand in sponsoring another resolution that also did not mention China but, in addition to calling for the protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet, called for ‘their right to self-determination’. This solution received fifty-six votes in favour and ten against. India was one of twenty-nine abstentions.
The third and last resolution came in 1965 with the same four sponsors, along with Nicaragua and the Philippines. It deplored the continuing violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet but without any reference to self-determination. It received forty-three votes in favour and twenty-six against, with twenty-two abstentions. India voted in favour, with its representative accusing China of genocide and violating the seventeen-article agreement of 1951. This change became possible because China had invaded India three years earlier, and there was new leadership in India: Jawaharlal Nehru had died the previous year and Lal Bahadur Shastri had succeeded him.
After Communist China replaced Nationalist China in the UN in 1971, prospects for another resolution on Tibet faded. The only one to be adopted within the UN system was in 1991, in the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities—a subordinate body of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The resolution criticized China’s policy in Tibet and urged it to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Tibetan people.
IMPERIAL GAMES IN TIBET: THE STRUGGLE FOR STATEHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY
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Macmillan, Pg 287, Rs 373