Cost-effective drones are changing the economics of warfare
Mohammad Asif Khan
Asymmetry often plays a decisive role in conflicts, particularly when one side holds a significant power advantage over the other. Throughout modern history, technological progress has mainly favoured militarily superior nations, widening the gap between them and their adversaries. In response, less powerful nations seek asymmetrical tools to level the playing field. Low-cost drone warfare emerges as a critical means to bridge this capability gap, offering a strategy to offset the dominance of more powerful forces.
On 13 April 2024, Iran launched a retaliatory drone and missile strike named Operation True Promise in response to an alleged Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus on 1 April 2024. The attack reportedly included over 180 Shahed drones, more than 120 ballistic missiles like Kheibar Shekan and Emad, and over 30 Paveh cruise missiles. While most of the drones were intercepted by the combined effort of Israel’s air defence system, United States’ (US) military, United Kingdom’s (UK) Royal Air Force and French fighters shot down some missiles. Even Jordan reportedly shot down some missiles that entered their airspace.
Iran’s drone assault on Israel highlighted the emerging paradigm of warfare, demonstrating that from Iran to Ukraine, the current era is characterised by the prevalence of cost-effective drone warfare. The attack did not cause any significant damage to Israeli infrastructure, but it highlighted the economic benefits of cheap drones for countries like Iran which is under heavy economic sanctions and the challenges it poses for Israel and US bases in the region.
The combined expenditures of the United States and Israel in countering the Shahed drones likely totalled approximately USD 1.5 billion. In contrast, the overall cost for Iran to deploy the Shahed drones was estimated to be around USD 3 million. This vast difference illustrates how adversaries can strain their military budgets by compelling them to constantly replenish and reinforce their air defences and air force at considerable expense.
Both Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades and Hezbollah have adopted the same strategy of using relatively inexpensive rockets and drones to impose a high cost on Israel’s sophisticated and expensive air defence systems. Hezbollah can deploy swarms of drones simultaneously against a single target to overwhelm Israel’s air defence systems. The group has an arsenal that includes unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, anti-air, anti-tank, antiship missiles, mortars and drones. The bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal consists of short-range and unguided projectiles, mostly ‘Katyusha’ variants.
Al-Qassam Brigades has used drones for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes but also to neutralise the Iron Wall’s CCTV cameras in simultaneous attacks. They have also relied on fixed-wing kamikaze Al-Zawari drones to contribute to the numerous rocket launches to the saturation of the Iron Dome system.
Iran’s Economics of Cheap Drones
This strategy is not only cost-effective for these groups, but it also poses a significant challenge for Israel’s air defence systems. Despite the advanced capabilities of systems like the Iron Dome, the sheer volume of incoming threats can be difficult to manage. This strategy effectively turns Israel’s technological superiority into a potential weakness, as each successful penetration of the air defence system by a cheap rocket or drone inflicts damage out of proportion to the cost of the weapon used.
Even if Israel shoots down most drones, some may get through, potentially causing damage and achieving the attacker's goals. This creates an asymmetric cost equation—a successful drone attack can be much cheaper for Iran than Israel’s defence. The prevalence of these cheap drones could potentially change the conduct of warfare.
Iran has successfully developed cost-effective versions of drones based on captured US and Israeli models, such as the Predator, Reaper, Sentinel, ScanEagle 5 and Hermes drones. While Iran has replicated the physical designs of these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), they may not have fully reproduced all the advanced onboard electronics and capabilities. Nonetheless, their ability to create affordable alternatives underscores the country's determination to leverage drone technology for strategic purposes, despite potential limitations in sophistication compared to the original models.
Drones come in a full spectrum. Most of the drones that are used by the West, like the Reaper drone, which has been somewhat the iconic drone that has been used since 9/11, cost in the range of USD 30 million. The drones that are developed by Iran are the drones that called kamikaze drones. All they do is carry a payload of explosives and they ram into a target and blow up. In military circles, they're called lawnmowers on wings. Shahed drones are called Iran’s AK-47 because it is extremely versatile and can be produced in high quantities at a low cost.
Iran’s extensive use of drones goes back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Iran initiated its use of UAVs in 1985, deploying the Ababil-1 and Mohajer-1 for reconnaissance missions on Iraqi positions beyond the front-line trenches. However, after the US Navy inflicted significant damage on Iran’s air and naval forces during Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, Iranian strategists acknowledged their inability to confront the US on open waters.
This realisation led Iran to significantly increase its investment in drone technology. Since then, the Iranian government has been transparent about its interest in UAVs. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force is the main entity managing Iran’s expanding UAV fleet, although other Iranian military services also utilise them. This initiative was fuelled, in part, by the nation’s limited access to advanced Western technology necessary for acquiring, developing and sustaining a sophisticated air force.
Iran has now achieved self-sufficiency in the production of drone engines. It has revealed that its arms exports have surged four to five times over the past two years, as the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported. Iran’s primary drone manufacturer, Shahed Aviation Industries, is reportedly designated by the US as a subsidiary of the Revolutionary Guards. To evade sanctions, they’ve engaged with numerous small companies and established global smuggling networks to procure necessary components.
Tehran’s utilisation of drone diplomacy not only generates foreign currency to support its defence industry but also reinforces its strategic alliances with countries like Russia and China, positioning it as a formidable player in the arms trade. Shahed drones have been deployed in various countries including Syria, Russia, Ethiopia, Tajikistan and Venezuela, with the Shahed-136 being particularly notable. With a payload capacity of up to 50 kilograms and a range of 2500 kilometres, this drone enables Iran to target locations within Israel directly, eliminating the need for proxy forces in neighbouring areas like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Gaza.
Reports indicate Russia has been replicating attack drones it obtained from Iran in 2022, deploying them in military operations against Ukrainian forces. Russian replicas of the Shahed-136 drone are designated as Geran-2 or Geranium-2 in Russian. While Iran has consistently denied selling drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, it has acknowledged sending a ‘small number’ before the February 2022 invasion. Russia uses several other cost-effective drones in its military operations. One of these is the DJI Mavic 3 from China, which is used by both Russia and Ukraine for surveillance and bomb delivery. This drone is priced at around USD 2,000, making it a cost-effective choice compared to more expensive military equipment.
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