Strategic Reality After Galwan

The Indian Army’s mental map of conflict with Pakistan and China needs a mindset shift 

Maj. Gen. Neeraj Bali

Since the Galwan clash of 2020, India’s northern borders have witnessed an unprecedented acceleration in military infrastructure. The operationalisation of the Nyoma airbase, capable of handling heavy transport aircraft just 35km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is emblematic of this shift. The Sela Tunnel, the Darbuk-Shyok Daulat Beg Oldie (DS-DBO) Road, and the Border Roads Organisation’s (BRO’s) record construction pace (12,000 km in 2023-24) further reflect a system preparing for sustained high-altitude contingencies.

Yet, these material improvements raise a deeper question: has the Indian Army’s mental map of conflict shifted as decisively as its infrastructure? For decades, Pakistan shaped the army’s institutional memory, operational reflexes, and doctrinal instincts. The challenge now is not merely redeployment or logistics, it is a fundamental reorientation of strategic thinking.

From Pakistan to China

There is little doubt within the army’s top and middle leadership that China is India’s principal long-term military challenge. But recognition is not the same as reorientation. The army’s strategic intuition—honed through wars with Pakistan and years of counter-insurgency—still gravitates toward assumptions of short, bounded conflicts, predictable escalation ladders, and familiar operational patterns.

China presents a qualitatively different problem. It disputes almost the entire border and claims large parts of Arunachal Pradesh. It enjoys numerical superiority, industrial depth, and technological integration across domains. Its strategic intent is opaque, co