Air Marshal Ramesh Rai (retd)

On 26 February 2019, India used its air power to attack the terror camp in Balakot in what could be termed as a classic example of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) strike prowess. The Mirage pilots demonstrated skills of meticulous planning, tactical acumen and flawless execution with utmost professionalism. The nation felt euphoric as the country delivered a befitting response to the perpetuators of the Pulwama tragedy. Hitherto, air power had never been used across borders in an undeclared war situation. The value of any weapon system lies in how it is used to deliver the overall political message. In executing the strike, in the manner we did, India conveyed that it cannot be pushed beyond a point no matter how high the risk or how loud the noise at the ground level maybe. Those involved in the decision making and execution deserve a compliment.

IAF’s Mirage 2000 taking off

There has been a lot of conjecture as to why air power was seen as an unmitigated asset for use in our war on terror. Had it acquired an aura of fear, guilt or culpability owing to the perception that air power was inherently escalatory and could trigger an unprecedented and probable nuclear response making it unworthy. Or was it owing to international and strategic ramifications of violating the sovereignty of another nation, or was it the risk to aircraft and aircrew, or the inadequacy of targets for an aerial weapon given the collateral risk to innocent civilians, or was it insufficient / inadequate actionable intelligence, or was it purely lack of political will, in the backdrop of all the above or a combination of such factors.  Be that as it may, the nation’s security apparatus had finally shown gumption and contemplated the use of air power. Probably, the leadership was compelled by the sheer audacity of the February 14 terror attack that martyred 44 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans, and driven to convey the anguish, resolve and combativeness for over decades of humiliation by Pakistan initiated terror strikes, and realised that only air power could carry the requisite bellicosity in such an exigency.

The use of 12 Mirage aircraft to target the infrastructure of the terror camp seemed an