A Taste of Glory

In October 2006, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis wrote an exclusive account of Operation Safed Sagar for FORCE. On the 25^th anniversary of the Kargil conflict, we reproduce portions from it. The full article can be read on the FORCE website

Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis (retd)

It was probably on the 9 or 10 May 1999 that the Air Force Vice Chief (VCAS), Air Marshal ‘Ben’ Brar, walked into my office for a cup of tea and a chat, just as we often did whenever we both happened to be in-station together, to talk-over issues informally. There was an uncharacteristic frown on his brow as he took a chair. “Sir,” he began without a preamble, “Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) tells me that the army may be in some sort of difficulties in the Kargil area.” On querying what sort of difficulties, he explained he was not sure but there was reportedly unusual artillery firing.

I enquired whether he had any inputs from AOC-in-C Western Air Command (WAC) and the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), who was also holding the army ‘fort’ as his Chief was away on a foreign tour. I asked my vice to find out if either of them had anything to say on the subject. AOC-in-C, WAC had later informed VCAS that Northern (Army) Command had not divulged anything to him and that his counterpart, GOC-in-C Northern Command was away in Pune; possibly to emphasise further that all seemed well. He had informed that both Northern (Army) Command and Western (Army) Command were greatly pre-occupied with preparation for the forthcoming tri-service, very complex, brain-storming exercise, ‘Brahma Astra’. If Northern Command was facing difficulties, it was hardly expected that Army Headquarters and these two command headquarters would wish to conduct the exercise in May, and a request for postponement would have been made to Air and Naval Headquarters. VCOAS was non-committal to VCAS.

A day later, because disturbing inputs continued to be brought to his notice by his staff, VCAS again approached the VCOAS to enquire whether all was well; the Army Vice Chief indicated that the army could handle the situation. The VCAS, however, also informed me that the ACAS (Operations) had received an input from Air Officer Commanding HQ Jammu and Kashmir (AOC J&K is collocated with HQ Northern Command and functions as a forward element of HQ WAC for day-to-day interaction with HQ Northern Command. He releases air effort to meet Northern Command’s demands, from within the AF units placed in J&K to the extent possible and within the authority he is delegated), that HQ Northern Command had requested fire-support from Mi-25/35 helicopter gunships and armed Mi-17 helicopters to evict a few ‘intruders’ who had stepped across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector.

AOC J&K had responded that the terrain over which the support was required was beyond the operating envelop of the gunships; for getting fire-support in the existing operating conditions HQ Northern Command needed to approach HQ WAC.

In light of ACAS (Op)’s input, this time I called up AOC-in-C WAC personally and enquired why he had not briefed Air HQ on what was happening. His response was that GOC-in-C Northern Command had still not approached him for any help and WAC had nothing to brief; I was also informed that the GOC-in-C was in fact not available at HQ Northern Command. I directed Air Marshal Vinod Patney (the AOC-in-C) to get ‘hold’ of his counterpart and get to the bottom of what was afoot.

Meanwhile, Air Marshal Brar (VCAS) had again enquired from VCOAS whether they needed help; VCOAS had expressed army’s ability to manage, but was upset that AOC J&K had not acceded to HQ Northern Command’s fire-support demand. VCAS explained that AOC J&K did not have the authority to do so and suggested that both of them discuss the issue with me. VCOAS did not consider it necessary at that juncture, but divulged that Northern Command was putting into action Army Aviation’s Cheetahs mounted with a 7.56mm gun. ‘Ben’ Brar was a ‘hands-on’ VCAS who liked to take action fastest. He suggested that we offer armed Mi-17 helicopters to Northern Command immediately.

Now there was no doubt in my mind that the situation was desperate; using an egg-shell-strong Cheetah in offensive action against certain hostile fire was like presenting a chicken for ‘sacrificial appeasement’! And my vice recommending use of Mi-17 in an environment where it would be under hostile observation and fire for several minutes before and after its attempt (I say attempt because I knew it would have been impossible to put in a successful helicopter attack without creating the necessary conditions for such an attack) at engagement.

I directed VCAS to request VCOAS for a meeting with me and advised VCAS that to enable air force to provide fire-support we needed political clearance. Also, the manner and type of fire-support will be determined by the air force. I think at this stage Lt General Chandrashekhar (VCOAS) gave me a telephonic call. I communicated to him that I appreciated his predicament and was anxious that the air force does its bit soonest. But I was not successful in persuading him to accept the essentiality of government clearance. Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar said the army will continue on its own.

Growing Urgency

Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar called on me at Vayu Bhavan. He came to the point immediately: army wanted fire-support by Mi-17 helicopters. Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar observed that the army was capable of throwing back the intruders on its own but it would take time; air support will hasten the process. He felt that political go-ahead was necessary only in case fire-support was being provided by fighters; use of helicopters, even in a fire-support role, was an in-house services’ headquarters’ decision. I was anxious to put him at ease; I attempted to extend my empathy and expressed my keenness to give support; for the moment he was my counterpart of the army (albeit acting) and an NDA course-mate. To be honest, I did not think I had succeeded in generating any confidence in him. Yet, I managed to convey to him my firm decision that government authorisation was mandatory; we needed to approach the raksha mantri together; I will support his demand for aerial fire-support.

Mirage 2000 performed miracles during the conflict

But it needed to be understood that the air force reserved the prerogative to give the fire support in the manner it considered most suitable. I explained that with the conditions obtaining in the problem area, helicopters will be sitting ducks. The VCOAS left soon after, without my having a clear indication whether he intended to approach the government.

On the next day, May 15, I called the VCAS and his two senior assistants, ACAS(Ops) and ACAS(Int) for a situation appraisal meeting. AOC-in-C also participated. The two ACsAS gave a resume of developments over the previous five days. Reportedly, around 150 intruders had occupied some high points along the LoC ridgeline in the general area of Kargil sector.

Director General Military Operations and ACAS(Ops) had conferred and reconnaissance missions by Jaguars and Canberras were launched. Air defence fighters were kept on ground-alert at Srinagar and Avantipur. Radars in Srinagar Valley were on 24 hours-vigil. Mobile Observation Posts were deployed. An additional direction and control centre was established at Leh. Mi-17 helicopters based at Srinagar were tasked to carry out air-to-ground firing practices with guns and rockets at the high-altitude firing range. I was satisfied with the initiatives taken. I gave my assessment of the situation, followed by directions of what was required to be done immediately:

(a) I observed that the ground situation was grave. Army required air force help to evict the intruders. Army Headquarters was reluctant, possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop, to reveal the full gravity of the situation to MoD. Thus, it was not amenable to Air Headquarters’ position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively.

(b) Consideration of the use of helicopters in offensive role was denied as they would be vulnerable to the extreme. This was to be projected at all levels of army-air force confabulations. The helicopters would, however, continue to carry out high altitude firing practices.

(c) Fighters deployed in the Valley were to intensify their high altitude air-to-ground firing practices. Fighter pilots manning the squadrons located/ deployed in the Valley are to be given terrain familiarisation sorties in helicopters, preferably accompanied by army officers familiar with the area.

(d) AOC-in-C, WAC was to activate HQ AOC J&K and all units in the Valley as per plans stipulated in HQ WAC Operational Instructions.

(e) AOC-in-C WAC to formulate contingency plans. May 16 was a Sunday. Soon after my game of golf, my air assistant told me that the VCOAS desired a meeting with me. I directed the AA to organise the meeting in my office and request the VCAS and AOC-in-C WAC to be in attendance. After we had assembled in my office, had given VCOAS a brief resume of the situation obtaining in Kargil, Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar reiterated his request for offensive air support by Mi-17 helicopters. Air Marshal Patney recommended that I call a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting immediately; Chandrashekhar was amenable to the suggestion.

MiG-21 changed the course of the battle

Without further ado, I telephoned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the Chief of Naval Staff, requesting an immediate COSC meeting; in the absence of Chairman COSC, Gen. Malik, Adm. Kumar would have to chair the meeting. Adm. Kumar, understandably, was mildly irritated that an impromptu meeting was being called on a Sunday. When I explained the situation, a time was set to meet in the Army Operations Room (AOR).

At the AOR, after a situation report, VCOAS expounded on the need for fire-support by helicopters. I tabled my reasons for considering authorisation by government a pre-requisite for releasing offensive air support: Unlike the practice of the army routinely resorting to firing when a situation demanded it, the air force fire power was not being used operationally in peace conditions; aerial action had far greater ‘visibility’; response of the adversary to own air attacks was indeterminate, undoubtedly at this stage; there was a high possibility of the adversary raising the ante and we had to be prepared for it. (The reader might be interested to know that the rocket fire-power of the Mi-17 can be three times more than can be brought to bear by the MiG-21). The gathering generally expressed that it did not realise/ consider the consequences of air action as outlined by me. Acting Chairman COSC enquired whether the army could continue on its own. As the given answer was in the affirmative, he ruled we maintain status quo for the present.

On May 17, without a fore-intimation of what was in offing by Army Headquarters or Chiefs of Staff Committee secretariat, a meeting was called at AOR, which, along with CNS, CAS and acting COAS, was attended by the defence minister George Fernandes; principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra; and secretaries defence, home and external affairs were also present. The army briefed, in greater detail than before, on the situation obtaining across the Kargil sector. In a briefing which I gave personally, I covered the following aspects:

(a) If air power were used offensively, the escalation could be very rapid to any level and anywhere. The IAF needed to be prepared for every contingency.

(b) In the area under consideration and the air operating conditions obtaining there, the accuracy of air attacks would be comparable to that of the artillery.

(c) There was the possibility of own aircraft crossing the LC during their attacks.

(d) There was possibility of fratricide if own troops were in close vicinity of targets.

(e) Helicopter survivability in an offence role would be very low.

(f ) The IAF pilots have commenced air-to-ground firing practices at high altitude.

Mishra said status quo be maintained. On May 18, the VCOAS and the DGMO briefed Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and members of the CCS. Present were home minister L.K. Advani, George Fernand