Ajay Singh

Quad began innocuously enough—almost by accident—when the navies of India, the US, Japan and Australia came together to coordinate rescue and rehabilitation operations after the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004.

Around the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, articulated the concept of an ‘Asian Arc of Democracies’ in the Indo-Pacific—a strategic geography extending from the East Coast of Africa to the waters of East Asia. The idea almost died on the vine when Australia withdrew just a year later over Chinese concerns. India and Japan, too, were diffident of promoting Quad actively. The idea gathered momentum once again when the foreign ministers of the four nations met on the sidelines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit and agreed to revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, holding five meetings over the next two years.

Quad sputtered along without a clear charter or aim. Most of the members, especially India, were reticent to push forward the concept of a security grouping that would be seen as a directed against China. China itself was wary of the idea but dismissed it as “nothing more than foam on the sea which will soon dissipate.”  But it was China that gave it impetus by its actions in the China Sea and along the Himalayan frontiers. That seems to have galvanised the members and Quad is now slowly taking shape as a tangible alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

The recent meeting of foreign ministers of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in early October gave a hint of the direction that Quad could take. It was one of the few in-person meetings and not a virtual one and fittingly, the agenda was focused on the International Order in the post-Covid era—one in which Quad could be a major component. Yet, at the end of it all, no joint statement was issued, and only a vague call was made to “uphold a rule based on international order to advance the security and economic interests of nations.”

China w