Widen the River

Why India needs air power before theatre commands

Air Cmde T.K. Chatterjee (retd)

There is a story about a river. It began in the mountains as a small stream, flowed through rugged terrain, grew stronger in the plains, and expanded into a mighty river. It supported agriculture, generated power, and nurtured civilisation along its fertile banks. Finally, it reached the land’s end, facing the sea. The river became afraid. There was no way to turn back, and moving forward meant merging with the sea and losing its identity. The sea, seeing the river’s dilemma, said: ‘Come to the sea, and you will become more powerful as part of the mighty ocean.’

Recent articles about the creation of theatre commands in India reminded me of the story of the river. The Indian Army and the Indian Navy are keen to absorb the Indian Air Force (IAF) into their orbats, just as the sea beckons the river. It is no coincidence that all articles supporting the creation of Theatre Commands are written by veterans of the army or the navy. The reason is straightforward. Army generals are planned to command all land-based theatres, and the maritime theatre will obviously be commanded by an admiral. All of them will have an ‘air component’ headed by an air force officer, subordinated to them. Hence, the eagerness of the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Navy (IN) to get the theatre commands activated at the earliest. The problem is that land/maritime theatres will prioritise ground/naval objectives; air power risks subordination. Indeed, there will be an Air Defence Command under an air force officer, which will keep the skies over land and maritime theatres safe. 

One author (ex IN) in a recent article quotes RAND analyst Carl H. Builder and Harvard professor Stephen Peter Rosen to say that air forces worldwide suffer from ‘professional sociocentrism’ derived from technology, precision, and speed. He counters an article (by an ex-IAF veteran) that argues jointness does not require integration, because jointness means everyone is on the same page pursuing a common goal. In contrast, integration involves structural changes to the organisation. The ex-Navy author passionately argues for a unified command to fix the command structure and accountability. A unified command structure exists in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between the military and the para-military, but was any accountability fixed after the Pahalgam massacre? Within the military, the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) exists, it functions well in peace, but it has not yet been tested in battle. To my knowledge, neither has any combat air assets been permanently assigned to the ANC. 

This urge for jointness in training and operations is not new. When I attended the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) in 1989-90, those who were high on merit in the entrance examination but not good enough to do the course in a foreign land were sacrificed at the altar of joint-service training. I was one such case who landed up doing the course with the army. I, the fighter pilot, learnt to make an artillery fire plan, calculate the number of mules required to move a battalion in mountain warfare, where motorable roads do not exist, how a bridge head is formed after amphibious landings, and the shock-and-awe of the armoured corps and its ‘turning manoeuvres’. All this was education indeed, but obviously, such knowledge could not be used in real life by a career air force officer. Not surprisingly, the practice of cross attachments was stopped after just two years. 

The primary idea behind creating the joint service training institution, like the National Defence Academy (NDA), was jointness. After the NDA, the trainees spend the next 15 years learning the tricks of their own trade in the three services. Jointness is built into them from the very beginning of their military life; it does not require structural changes to the present system, which is time-tested, proven, and functioning well. Op Sindoor showed how the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) worked in conjunction with the army’s Akashteer and the navy’s Trigun networks to provide layered air defence along the entire western border. It did not need any changes in the command structure, did it? Or, did we need a Harvard professor to teach us jointness?  

Opposition to theatre commands will naturally come from the air force. The army and the navy will always support under the pretext of ‘needs of future warfare,’ etc. For the air force, it is an existential threat to the organisation, and they will invariably fight tooth and nail against such restructuring. It has happened in the US, UK, China, Australia etc., wherever this scheme was introduced. But there is a matter of geographic extent over which the armed forces of the country have to exert its influence. For Americans, theaterisation is inescapable, as they are deployed all over the world. It is not possible to centralise the air assets and control them from the Pentagon. They also have sufficient resources to equip the various operational commands adequately. The British have a joint service HQ, but they operate under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) procedures, which invariably are directed by the Americans. After the Falklands, they are unlikely to fight any war on their own, and they do not have a geographically defined concept of theatre commands. The Chinese have geographic theatres of operations dominated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but all their activities are strictly under the Central Military Commission (CMC), a politico-military body. Australia does not have hostile neighbours, and any operation in which it is involved will invariably be a coalition led by the Americans. So, their internal organisational structure will be of little consequence. The Russians have a highly centralised military organisation, directly under the President and run through the General Staff. Russian air assets are completely centralised.

None of the countries that have theatre commands, which are consistently cited as examples for India to follow, has the same geopolitical situation as India. India has permanently hostile borders, and in case India is forced into a war, India has to fight alone, with its very limited air assets. We cannot fritter them away. 

When a naval officer advocates the creation of a Maritime Command because of a futuristic increase in the area of influence of the navy, both to the east and the west, which cannot be given air cover from Delhi, my advice will be to first acquire such capabilities, demonstrate them to the world, and then we can talk about it. Right now, we can only threaten Karachi or Chittagong, for which we do not need a Maritime Command. As for being a part of QUAD and facing the Chinese navy in the South China Sea, the future of QUAD itself is very bleak. Even if QUAD evolves, Indian Ocean Region Sea Lanes of Communication (IOR SLOC) demands national air power flexibility, not theatre-bound assets. We can therefore put that idea on the back burner for now. 

As for the army, the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) displayed his ignorance by publicly stating that the air force is a supporting arm, a sort of artillery with extended reach. Under such leadership, their quest for control of the air assets is understandable. My advice to the leadership would be to go watch the movie Battle of Britain and never forget Winston Churchill’s famous quote – “never in the history of mankind was so much owed by so many to so few”. He was referring to the Royal Air Force. 

Theatre commands are always a geographic necessity. When the area of influence is huge and the country has abundant resources, it becomes necessary to create separate, independent fighting machines with land, sea, and air assets. India is not in that position. We have known enemies on our borders, and we do not have adequate resources to fight them together if that occasion arises. Then why spread thin what we do not have. We must prioritise recapitalisation over reorganisation. 

A common thread in all articles supporting creation of theatre commands is the success of the Unified Combatant Commands of the US. But after World War II, the US has not fought any war with any nation with comparable forces. All conflicts where the US forces have been directly involved were essentially asymmetric in nature, like Iraq and Afghanistan, with the US enjoying an overwhelming force advantage. Only in Korea did they face comparable air opposition, but that era is passé. As mentioned before, their EUCOM, AFRIKACOM, CENTCOM, etc, are geographic necessities. When Indian influence reaches that kind of magnitude, India too would require such organisational structures. Not now. Even though Nato has a huge 2,500 km border with Russia, it has not created geographically bounded theatres. Their command doctrine emphasises multinational cooperation, unity of command, joint operations, interoperability, and adaptability to changing threats or missions. Copy-pasting practices of other countries will not work in India. What India needs is evolution, not emulation.

Air assets are inherently flexible and national in scope, not theatre-bound like ground forces. Forcing them into regional commands risks air doctrine being overridden by army or navy priorities, especially in India’s vast geography, where air support must pivot rapidly across fronts (e.g., Ladakh to Andaman). This is the core issue over which the IAF will continue to oppose the theatre command initiative by the army and the navy. Their desire to usurp IAF assets is well understood, but that will have to wait. 

But there is a middle path. As suggested by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), let planning be centralised by the three services, and let execution be decentralised. The IAF components are already placed at every army command for coordination. In all domain warfare, jointness is inescapable in some sectors like space, nuclear, cyber, etc. Creation of a tri-service cyber command, an Indian Space Research Organisation +Indian Air Force (ISRO+IAF) Space Command must take priority, before theatre commands. Let us reach a stage where we can field 500 Tejas Mk 1 & 2, 300 SU-30s, 300 Rafales, and 100 MRFAs, along with their integral armaments, and then we can think about distributing assets. Let the river widen its banks first, then flow into the sea of integration with strength, not fear.