Un-Intelligent Operations

N.C. Asthana

The recent Naxal attack in Chhattisgarh in which 23 men of the security forces were martyred has once again brought the issue of poor intelligence into focus. The attack took place just six km away from the nearest camp of the security forces and they were taken by complete surprise. No one had any idea that hundreds of Naxals could be lying in ambush so close to the camp, not to speak of having any idea of their weaponry or ambush tactics.

Obviously, this was as massive a failure of intelligence as it could be imagined. In any case, this is not the first time that the forces have been surprised. We have a long list of such disasters since 2010.

We do not need access to any secret official document to expose this farce of intelligence. A careful analysis of the operations in which the forces suffered casualties on a large scale speaks for itself. If, for the sake of argument, they had good intelligence, it would have resulted in some good if not spectacular operations. Since there have been no good operations at all, it only means that there is no intelligence worth its name.

Need for Actionable Intelligence

I am given to understand by officers who do not wish to be named is that these days troops go regularly into jungles because they are supposed to undertake operations, and obey they do, to pamper the vanity of senior officers. The senior officers, in turn, keep on selling pipedreams to the government that one major operation would finish Naxals and Naxalism both.

This ‘jungle bashing’ is called by fancy names like short range patrol, long range patrol, area domination exercise and the like. Huge operations involving thousands of troops are conducted essentially because they can be conducted, not because they ought to be conducted—it makes the senior officers feel like generals.

Group of Naxals walking through the jungle in Chhattisgarh © Daily Chhattisgarh

Every time, the troops are given some points on the map as the target for which the intelligence might have said that Naxals are present there. In the name of operational planning, senior officers simply plot the route to be navigated with the help of GPS. The troops are supposed to touch the points where most of the time they find nothing and come back; if their luck runs out, the Naxals ambush and kill them at the most unexpected places.

Anti-Naxal operations have therefore been reduced to essentially taking chances with their luck. Most of the time, any exchange of fire in non-ambush situations is actually a cleverly executed rear guard action by a couple of Naxals to allow the main body or leaders to escape safely—an action straight from Mao’s dictums.

Since the enemy is mobile and has no intention of fighting