Training Not Enough

S.K. Sood

The central armed forces of India, namely Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashashtra Seema Bal (SSB) and Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) play a vital role in the security matrix of India. These armed forces have created a large and modern infrastructure to train their personnel to ensure that they are able to properly execute the specific tasks expected of them.

While the border guarding forces train to prevent trans-border crimes, they are taught the drills for ambushes, patrols, etc. On the other hand, the forces responsible for internal security train to ensure the security of the public and installations. Thus, they are trained in carrying out patrols in buildup areas, cordon and search operations, etc. The personnel responsible for industrial security are trained to control access, carry out frisking, etc. at the industrial unit they are deployed at. Training is thus focused and restricted to teaching drills to tackle specific situations.

Therefore, the training in these forces aims to equip the personnel with skills to carry out tasks allotted to them at the tactical level. Emphasis on imparting knowledge about the circumstances under which these tactical operations will have to be undertaken is very limited. The training in these forces focuses on moulding the attitude of a raw civilian into a disciplined soldier who will unquestioningly obey the orders of superiors. This type of training results in curbing the initiative of individuals and trains them to respond mechanically to an emerging situation or threat.

The contents of training include only limited inputs in the form of knowledge about the larger strategic aspects beyond the immediate area of operation. While this to an extent is understandable for lower functionaries, the higher supervisory and policy level leadership must acquire knowledge not only about the area where they are operating—area of influence, but also about their area of interest—the aspects which may influence their area of operation and hence affect their operational philosophy.

The only education that was imparted in these forces was for the constabulary initially inducted in these forces as most of them were uneducated, hence they were required to acquire a minimum standard of education to rise up in their careers. These personnel underwent formal classes to achieve what were called Education Standard I, II and III which were mandatory for promotion. However, this education was restricted only to academics and included no inputs about professional education.

The service training programmes introduced of late in these forces also fail to address this deficiency as they merely aim at enabling the officials to perform duties of the next level. There is very little strategic, thought-provoking content even in these upgradation programmes.

In fact, there is very little clarity on the difference between training and education in the armed forces and these terms are more often than not used interchangeably. An ancient truism says that if you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day, and if you teach a man to fish, you feed him for life. Educating him about the art and science of fishing enables him to fine-tune to the changing ground situation.

BSF Centre for Officer Training

The planners don’t realise that education is a p