Brig. Ravi Palsokar (retd)

The decision to commit troops to counter insurgency in any part of the country should presumably be a difficult one, arrived at after much deliberation and after all other options have failed. However, our experience shows that not enough attention is paid to all the facets of such a decision, and the use of the army ostensibly in aid of civil authority is done as a matter of course. That the senior military leadership succumbs to such request is another matter altogether. Such decisions can lead to prolonged unrest and much hardship to the local population and in extreme cases, worsen the situation.

‘What are we doing here?’ was the question asked repeatedly in initial stages of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) deployment. Each one of us who directly commanded troops handled such a query in his own way. After some initial irritation, I developed a stock answer that we had not joined the army only to march down Raj Path on Republic Day; and if our government had given us a task that seemed outright stupid, well we had no choice but to carry it out to the best of our ability, trusting our superiors to make sense of what was actually happening on the ground.

Note two points, one that it was obvious to the most dim-witted person in the IPKF that we were in a lose-lose situation and two, that my irritation stemmed from the fact that I agreed with the question except that as a front-line brigade commander, I did not have the latitude to think about this question without sapping my own resolve. Fact is we had no business in involving ourselves in the political and military situation in Sri Lanka and that is why I was moved to title my Sri Lanka memoir as, ‘Ours Not to Reason Why’.

The decision to deploy troops must emerge from carefully thought considerations, war-gaming the situation and other tactical as well as administrative matters. Such a decision should also consider what is the end result sought and an exit strategy, and the uncontrollable outcomes that can occur.

This article discusses the factors governing decision-making to commit troops, whether within the country or, as in the case of the IPKF, outside. The role of decision makers to include political, military and bureaucratic leadership and whether parliamentary sanction and oversight is needed. The discussion also includes the consideration of strategic, operational and tactical aims and the manner of implementing them. There is the necessity of legal sanction and cover and also the urgent need of a clear-cut policy directive.

Indian Army personnel performing counter-insurgency ops

Strategic Aims and Considerations

The army lays much stress on selection and maintenance of the aim as the master principle of war. This assumes even greater importance in an amorphous situation such as counter-insurgency tasks. It is the experience in our country that the political executive is only too content to pass the responsibility to the army and then let them deal with the situation as they deem fit. It is convenient for everyone to convert an essentially political and administrative problem to one of security or law and order.

Analyse what is the end result sought, is it the restoration of the political process or create conditions for restoration of civil administration or is it to brow beat the local population to conform to the status quo ante? Returning to the main question, what is required to be achieved? In the absence of a clear directive, the army does what it is best at—eliminate the insurgents by using all the force at its disposal with little regard to the long-term damage. This is one of the reasons for the smouldering insurgency in the north-eastern part of our country since the late 1950s and the insolubility of the Kashmir problem.

Senior officers of the army who have been long involved in such operations will readily admi