Brig. Ravi Palsokar (retd)

An insurgency is countered at many levels. The ultimate aim is to defeat the insurgents in the minds of the local populace on whose behalf they claim to be fighting. Doing so is difficult at all times and success follows only when information about the insurgents is gathered and acted upon decisively.

The fact that most insurgencies tend to get prolonged suggests that security forces are not able to act effectively for various reasons. Among these, a major factor is lack of actionable information and intelligence. In this article we examine how security forces do this, what are the common pitfalls and what action is necessary to overcome these.

The Battlefield

The counter-insurgency battlefield is different from that of conventional warfare. The terrain and weather remain the same as also the soldiers who are to carry out the task, but the critical difference lies in the fact that the aim of counter-insurgency operations is different. This is to wean away the local population, sympathisers and finally the insurgents from trying to secede from the country or overthrow the government to establish their own, to suit their ideology.

In conventional war the soldier is trained to use maximum force at his disposal. He is little concerned about damage to enemy civil property or other harm. In counter-insurgency operations, unnecessary violence or collateral damage cause more harm than good. The necessity for and use of minimum force, good intentions and above all a concern for the public good are the base requirements for providing aid to civil authority. Essentially, the battle is for the hearts and minds of the affected population.

This is the main reason why regular soldiers do not like being deployed for counter-insurgency tasks and will always complain that they are forced to fight with one hand tied behind their backs. Immature or misguided commanders concentrate more on territory domination or eliminating insurgents and consider every kill as a blow against the adversary. This is a short-sighted understanding of the problem. Excessive use of force will often drive the militants underground or force them to relocate. But they remain active resorting to even greater violence and just bide their time to reactivate themselves. This is like a snakes and ladders game but with a vengeance.

In counterinsurgency, the security forces must aim to create conditions for the political process to begin so that administration can act without let or hindrance for the betterment of the people. Expecting to defeat the insurgents like a regular enemy is wishful thinking and rarely attainable. The Sinhala Sri Lankan government exterminated the LTTE but not many countries can hope to or would want to emulate their example.

Background Intelligence

Except in the rarest of cases, basic information about insurgency is available in the public domain. The insurgents put it out themselves by seeking support for their cause and laying out in detail why they have been forced to resort to arms to achieve their aims. Most of this is publicised in newspapers and other media. As social media has proliferated, so has the information overload. Security forces have to make a start by understanding the background and the manner in which