The Soldier’s Dilemma | Leadership Key to CI Success

Brig. Ravi Palsokar (retd)

Counter-insurgency operations tend to be protracted and the main reason is that most problems are intractable as neither adversary is prepared to compromise. The state has the force and weight of law behind it and the insurgents, besides the cause which they deeply believe in, often have the backing of external forces. These combine to allow the movement to sustain over long periods of time.

Occasionally an initiative by the government will seem promising and may gain traction only to be nullified by the lack of resolute follow-up or change in political circumstances. There are so many ifs and buts in conducting counter-insurgency operations that leaders at all levels of command are presented with a new set of challenges and yet overall, the situation remains the same. Additionally, there are turnovers in the troops deployed and the new troops must reorient themselves, get familiarised and learn to operate before they become effective.

Above all, the quantum of progress is difficult to measure. Soldiers tend to measure success by the damage caused to the insurgents, that is primarily in terms of kills and capture of warlike material. But as experience has shown, these gains are ephemeral and one usually has to get back to the start. What can really make a difference is the political will to deal with the insurgents on a socio-political plane so that the disaffected parties are brought back into the mainstream of society. Place now the role of the army and its leaders in this context and the challenges at once become apparent.

Senior commanders, this includes unit as well as field formation commanders, on arrival or appointment to a post inherit a situation that has developed over time. They do not have the latitude to change the basics whether in terms of deployment, methods of operations and the overall aim, and yet they are required to perform and show results. At the heart of such operations is leadership. It must be said at the outset that this is not a dissertation on leadership per se, for many eminent persons have written on the subject. This attempt is to highlight leadership requirements in counter-insurgency operations and the experience of those who have been involved.

Know Yourself, Adversary

Any unit or formation or its commander who takes over responsibility in a counter-insurgency environment has available to him the knowledge bank that has been built up over the years by those who have served in the area. Rarely does one move into a vacuum of information of terrain or the adversary, as in the case of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which was inducted hurriedly into Sri Lanka in 1987. Hopefully, that was a one-off.

Returning to the main point, any commander who is briefed about the situation on taking over needs to first of all familiarise himself with the terrain, current