The Next Level

Collaboration will define India’s defence partnership with Russia in the future

Junaid Suhais

India’s defence relationship with Russia has long been framed as a supplier-recipient arrangement. Over the last two decades, however, that relationship has acquired industrial depth: joint ventures such as BrahMos, phased co-production of frigates, and operational arrangements like submarine leases have created a hybrid model where capability transfer and domestic capacity matter as much as platform acquisition. 

Here we trace that trajectory, examine the naval thread in granular detail, and outline realistic pathways for the relationship to evolve into a strategic industrial partnership. The naval sphere offers a microcosm of the opportunities and challenges inherent in this evolving partnership, from high-technology leasing to complex, multi-site manufacturing projects.

Historical Trajectory

The foundation of India-Russia defence cooperation was laid during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union emerged as India’s principal, and often sole, supplier of advanced military hardware. This relationship, formalised by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was driven by geopolitical alignment and enabled India to access technology that Western nations were reluctant to share. The Indian military’s arsenal became heavily dominated by Soviet-origin platforms, including MiG fighter jets, T-series tanks, and Kilo-class submarines. This era was characterised by a straightforward buyer-seller dynamic, establishing a deep-seated dependency for platforms, spares, and maintenance.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a ‘lost decade’ for the relationship, marked by uncertainty, disrupted supply chains, and a decline in engagement. However, the strategic imperative for both nations to counterbalance a unipolar world order led to a revival. The signing of the ‘Declaration on Strategic Partnership’ in October 2000 marked a turning point, institutionalising the relationship beyond simple arms sales. A key innovation was the establishment of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC), co-chaired by the defence ministers, to oversee the entire spectrum of defence engagement. This framework shifted the focus towards joint research and development (R&D), licensed production, and joint ventures, moving away from the old dependency model.

The 2010s saw this trend accelerate under India’s ‘Make in India’ initiative. Russia demonstrated a greater willingness than many Western partners to facilitate technology transfer and co-production. Landmark agreements for the S-400 Triumf air defence system, the licensed production of AK-203 rifles, and the co-production of Kamov Ka-226T helicopters exemplified this new phase. While Russia's share of India’s total arms imports has declined, from 72 per cent in 2010–14 to 36 per cent in 2020–24, as India diversifies its sources, the relationship’s character has deepened industrially. It has evolved into a pragmatic partnership where India leverages Russian technology to build its own defence industrial base.

Naval Cooperation Deep Dive

The naval dimension of the India-Russia partnership is the most compelling illustration of its evolution from direct sales to intricate industrial collaboration. It encompasses high-stakes operational leases, complex multi-site frigate construction, a world-class missile joint venture, and now, a foray into dual-use aerospace manufacturing.

The INS Chakra Saga: India’s ambition to operate a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) fleet has been critically enabled by Russia. Lacking the indigenous capability to build SSNs until recently, India has relied on leasing Russian submarines to train crews, develop operational doctrines, and maintain a strategic deterrent. The first such lease was a Charlie-class submarine, christened INS Chakra, which served from 1988 to 1991.

The modern chapter began with the 2004 agreement to lease a Project 971 Akula-class submarine. After extensive refits and Indian-funded construction completion, the K-152 Nerpa was commissioned into the Indian Navy as INS Chakra (II) in 2012 under a 10-year, approximately USD 900 million lease. This platform was instrumental for India, providing invaluable experience in operating a nuclear submarine, which directly supported the development of its indigenous Arihant-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Despite suffering accidents in 2017 and 2020, the submarine was extensively used for training and operational patrols, including a deployment to track a Pakistani submarine after the 2019 Balakot airstrike.

To bridge the capability gap, India signed a new, larger deal in 2019, worth approximately USD3 billion, to lease another Akula-class submarine, to be named INS Chakra III. This submarine is expected to be delivered after significant modernization, though the timeline has reportedly slipped from 2025 to post-2028 due to the war in Ukraine and technical complexities. Reports suggest Russia may equip this submarine with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles, significantly enhancing its strike capability. This leasing model represents a unique form of strategic cooperation, providing India with a critical operational asset and training pipeline while its indigenous SSN programme (Project 77) matures.

Project 11356 and ‘Make in India’: The Talwar-class (Project 11356) frigates are a cornerstone of the Indo-Russian naval industrial relationship. The programme began in 1997 with an order for three frigates built in Russia (Batch I). This was followed by a 2006 contract for three more advanced ships (Batch II), also built in Russia but featuring the co-developed BrahMos missile.

The most recent phase demonstrates the shift towards co-production. In 2016, India agreed to acquire three more frigates. This deal was structured innovatively: two ships (Batch III), originally intended for the Russian Navy but stalled after Ukraine halted the supply of their gas turbine engines, were to be completed in Russia for India, while two more (Batch IV) would be built under license in India at Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL). The deal for the two Russian-built ships was finalised in October 2018 for approximately USD 950 million.

This arrangement showcases both the opportunities and risks. India cleverly navigated the geopolitical fallout of the 2014 Crimea annexation by directly procuring the necessary Ukrainian Zorya-Mashproekt engines for the Russian-built hulls. Despite delays, INS Tushil was commissioned in December 2024, and INS Tamala followed in July 2025. The GSL-built frigates, meanwhile, feature significantly higher indigenous content, including Indian-made sensors and weapon systems, embodying the ‘Make in India’ spirit. This 2+2 model serves as a template for future collaboration, blending direct acquisition with licensed production to boost domestic shipbuilding.

BrahMos Joint Venture: The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile is the crown jewel of India-Russia defence cooperation. Established in 1998, BrahMos Aerospace is a joint venture between India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia. Based on the Russian P-800 Oniks missile, BrahMos has been extensively co-developed and adapted for Indian requirements.

The missile is a world-beater, capable of speeds up to Mach 3.5 and featuring land, sea, air, and submarine-launched variants. It has become the primary conventional strike weapon for all three services of the Indian armed forces. The JV has been a model of successful technology absorption and indigenization. While the core ramjet engine technology is Russian, India has progressively developed and integrated its own components, including the booster, airframe, power supply, and seeker. The missile’s range has also been extended from the original 290 km to 450 km, with an 800 km variant currently under trial. 

The scale of its integration is immense, with total orders for the Indian military crossing Rs 58,000 crore (approximately USD 6.9 billion). A single deal in March 2024 for over 220 missiles for the Indian Navy was valued at Rs 19,519 crore (approximately USD 2.3 billion). Furthermore, BrahMos is a major export success. In 2022, the Philippines signed a USD375 million deal for coastal defence batteries, with the first units delivered in April 2024. Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia have also expressed strong interest. This JV demonstrates how the partnership can create a globally competitive product that serves India’s security needs, builds its industrial base, and generates export revenue.

HAL-UAC SJ-100 MoU: As October 2025 marked 25 years of the India-Russia Strategic Partnership, a landmark development at the same time broadened the scope of cooperation beyond the purely military domain. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to produce the Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SJ-100) passenger aircraft in India (HAL, 2025). This marks India’s re-entry into complete passenger aircraft manufacturing for the first time since the Eighties.

The deal is strategically significant for several reasons. First, it aligns perfectly with India's goal of Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the civil aviation sector, a domain currently dominated by Boeing and Airbus. With Indian airlines having placed historic orders for over 1,100 aircraft, domestic manufacturing could save billions in foreign exchange. HAL estimates a domestic and regional market for over 550 jets in the SJ-100’s category. Second, it provides a lifeline for the Russian SJ-100 programme, which has been heavily impacted by Western sanctions, by giving it access to the large and growing Indian market. Third, it establishes a precedent for dual-use industrial partnership, creating a more resilient and economically diversified relationship that is less susceptible to the political sensitivities of arms sales. This move could pave the way for deeper collaboration in areas like engine technology and avionics, with benefits spilling over into the defence sector.

Key India-Russia Naval and Related Industrial Agreements

Graphical representation of the key India-Russia naval & related industrial agreements

Constraints, Risks, and Geopolitical Context

Despite its successes, the India-Russia defence partnership faces formidable headwinds. The most significant external pressure comes from the United States’ Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which threatens sanctions against countries engaging in significant defence transactions with Russia. While the US has so far granted India a de facto waiver for its USD 5.43 billion S-400 purchase, the recent 50 per cent tariff package on India announced in late 2025, explicitly tied to India’s continued intake of discounted Russian crude, signals that the economic cost of maintaining deep energy ties with Moscow is now a complex bid.

Additionally, the war in Ukraine has introduced severe practical constraints. Russia’s own military needs have forced it to prioritise domestic production, leading to significant delays in the delivery of equipment and, crucially, spare parts for India's vast inventory of Russian-origin hardware. This has raised serious concerns in New Delhi about the reliability of Russia as a supplier. Furthermore, Western sanctions have crippled Russia’s access to key sub-components and disrupted payment mechanisms, further impeding its ability to fulfil export commitments. These supply-chain fragilities have accelerated India's ongoing diversification of defence suppliers.

Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) clearly illustrates this trend: Russia’s share of Indian arms imports fell, while France’s share rose significantly. India is increasingly turning to France, Israel, and the United States for critical technologies. This diversification is not just a risk-mitigation strategy but also a reflection of India’s desire for access to the most advanced technology, which Russian industry, hampered by sanctions, may struggle to provide. The long-term challenge for Moscow is to remain technologically competitive and prove it can be a more reliable partner than its Western rivals, particularly in its willingness to genuinely transfer technology without restrictions.

Future Scenarios and Policy Recommendations

Looking ahead five to 15 years, the India-Russia defence industrial relationship could evolve along one of three primary trajectories, contingent on policy choices made by both New Delhi and Moscow.

Scenario 1: Status Quo (Transactional Decline). In this scenario, the relationship continues its current path. India procures select Russian platforms where they offer a unique capability or value proposition (e.g., SSN leases, S-400), but persistent payment issues, supply chain delays, and geopolitical pressures lead to a gradual erosion of Russia’s market share. Co-production projects like the frigates face continued delays, and new large-scale JVs fail to materialise. Russia becomes a legacy partner, important for sustainment but increasingly peripheral to India’s future modernisation, which becomes dominated by indigenous and Western systems.

Scenario 2: Deep Industrial Partnership (Strategic Realignment). This is the most optimistic scenario. Both countries make a concerted effort to overcome existing constraints. They establish a robust Rupee-Ruble payment mechanism, insulating their trade from Western financial sanctions. Russia commits to deep, unrestricted technology transfer on next-generation platforms like the Su-57 fighter jet, including its engine, as a pathway to co-development of India’s AMCA fighter. The HAL-UAC SJ-100 project becomes a successful model, leading to further JVs in dual-use areas. A joint export body is created to market co-produced systems, turning the partnership into a revenue-generating enterprise. In this future, Russia solidifies its role as India’s primary partner for building a self-reliant industrial base.

Scenario 3: Pragmatic Diversification (Cherry-Picking). This is the most likely scenario. India pursues a ‘multi-alignment’ strategy in defence procurement. It continues to ‘cherry-pick’ high-end systems from Russia that are not available elsewhere or come with better technology-transfer terms (e.g., nuclear submarine technology). Simultaneously, it deepens its ties with Western partners for other critical capabilities (e.g., jet engines from France/ US, advanced sensors from Israel) and aggressively pushes its own indigenous programs. The relationship with Russia remains important and strategic in specific niches but does not regain its former primacy. Cooperation is project-based and pragmatic, driven purely by India’s calculated national interest.

Policy Recommendations

To steer towards the more beneficial ‘Deep Industrial Partnership’ scenario, the following policy actions are recommended:

1. Formalise a Sanctions-Proof Financial Architecture: India and Russia must move beyond ad-hoc solutions and institutionalize a bilateral financial mechanism. This should involve designated banks, an expanded scope for rupee-rouble trade beyond oil and potentially exploring a digital currency interface to ensure seamless and predictable payments for defence and industrial projects.

2. Embed Phased Industrialisation into Contracts: Future agreements must have legally binding clauses for phased technology transfer and indigenisation. Instead of vague promises, contracts should specify clear timelines, component-level transfer schedules, and joint R&D milestones. This would apply to the Su-57 offer, future submarine projects, and upgrades to the existing fleet.

3. Prioritise Joint R&D in Next-Generation Technologies: The IRIGC-MTC should identify and fund joint research projects in future-critical areas such as hypersonic systems (building on BrahMos-II), advanced materials, artificial intelligence for combat systems, and next-generation submarine propulsion. This would shift the relationship from co-production of existing systems to co-invention of new ones.

4. Leverage Dual-Use Projects for Resilience: The SJ-100 project should be treated as a strategic pilot. Its success can build a resilient economic and industrial foundation for the relationship, insulating it from the volatility of purely military sales. Both governments should provide sovereign guarantees and facilitate supply chains to ensure its success as a template for future collaboration in shipping, electronics, and energy.

Final Thoughts

The India-Russia defence relationship has demonstrably evolved from a state of near-total dependency during the Cold War to a complex, pragmatic, and increasingly industrialised partnership. 

The naval domain serves as the clearest testament to this transformation, where submarine leases have built critical human capital, frigate programs have blended direct acquisition with licensed production, and the BrahMos joint venture has set a global benchmark for successful co-development and export. The recent foray into civil aircraft manufacturing with the HAL-UAC MoU signals a potential new chapter in dual-use industrial collaboration. This evolution is not linear but is increasingly influenced by India's growing indigenous capabilities, its diversification of defence partners, and the profound geopolitical shifts following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The geopolitical fallout from the Ukraine war, the persistent threat of Western sanctions, and Russia’s own industrial constraints have introduced significant friction and unreliability. In response, India has pragmatically accelerated its diversification towards Western and, most importantly, indigenous defence solutions. While Russia’s willingness to share critical technologies remains a key advantage, its ability to deliver on its promises will be the ultimate determinant of its relevance. For India, the path forward lies in skilfully leveraging this legacy relationship to achieve its Aatmanirbhar Bharat ambitions, transforming residual dependencies into strategic industrial capabilities for the 21st century. With careful policy choices and sustained political commitment on both sides, the defence partnership is well-positioned not merely to endure but to grow stronger in the decades ahead.