The Northern Sea Route and the new geopolitics of the Arctic

Cdr Shrikumar Sangiah (retd)

In August 2026, India announced plans for an Indian merchant vessel to undertake, in 2027, a voyage through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The announcement, made at the Arctic-regions forum in Arkhangelsk, Russia, came amid recent similar transits by Chinese and South Korean ships. 

These developments are not routine commercial initiatives. They reflect a broader recasting of maritime strategy necessitated by climate change, great-power competition, energy security, and the vulnerability of the traditional maritime chokepoints. The Arctic is rapidly emerging as a new arena of great-power competition (the new Great Game), driven by melting ice that is unlocking resources, the possibility of shorter shipping routes and strategic access. 

Readers interested in the history of the opening of the NSR and the jockeying thereafter among world powers to secure their strategic interests in the Arctic, might like to read an earlier article by me, titled ‘New Contestation’ (FORCE, June 2024). The article traced the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz’s pioneering 16th-century voyages in search of the Northeast Passage (NSR) that first opened the region to European interest; his discovery of the Spitsbergen archipelago that sparked early sovereignty contests and resource exploitation (whaling, later coal). The article also outlined how the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty awarded Norway sovereignty over the Spitsbergen, though Russia continues to retain a mining foothold for strategic monitoring of the Barents Sea and its Northern Fleet (Norway formally assumed sovereignty over Spitsbergen in 1925 and changed the name of the archipelago to Svalbard—the original Norse name).

The article also examined how climate-driven ice retreat has intensified the race for offshore hydrocarbons (Russia holds the bulk of estimated Arctic oil/ gas), disputed continental shelves (highlighted by Russia’s flag-planting at a depth of 4,200 m below the North Pole on the Arctic seabed in 2007), and control of the NSR and Northwest Passage. Other actors—China (Polar Silk Road), the US, Canada (Northwest Passage sovereignty), Norway, Denmark/ Greenland, India, Singapore, and the EU—advance overlapping economic, scientific, and security claims via the Arctic Council and UNCLOS. The article cautioned that the rising militarisation of the Arctic, arising from the high stakes involved, could undermine cooperation and increase the risk of conflict—a risk which demands careful multilateral management. The announcement now, by India, of a planned NSR voyage provides the right backdrop to re-examine the motivations for the increasing interest in the Arctic and the NSR.

The Arctic’s Strategic Importance

Interest in the Arctic is not new. Russia has been developing the NSR for decades. China published its Arctic Policy in 2018 and introduced the concept of a ‘Polar Silk Road’. The US, Canada and the Nordic states have long regarded the Arctic as strategically important. What has changed is the speed with which theoretical possibilities are becoming operationally relevant. Three developments have converged to heighten the interest in the Arctic.

Receding Arctic Ice Cover: The retreat/ thinning of Arctic sea ice is lengthening the duration of the navigable season. This is not to say that the Arctic has become ice-free. It remains an exceptionally difficult maritime environment with variable ice conditions, extreme weather, limited ports, and inadequate rescue infrastructure. Nevertheless, the commercial window is becoming more attractive. 

Unreliability of Traditional Maritime Routes: For decades, the global trading system assumed that the traditional maritime routes would remain open. That certainty has been shaken. Hormuz is the focus of an ongoing geopolitical confrontation. The Bab-el-Mandab has been disrupted by attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. The Black Sea has been rendered unsafe by the Russia-Ukraine war. The Panama Canal has experienced capacity constraints. And the Malacca strait remains a strategic chokepoint through which a very large proportion of east Asian energy and merchandise trade moves.

The lesson for global trading powers is not that any particular chokepoint will close permanently—it is that no modern economy can afford to depend excessively upon one maritime geography. The Arctic therefore acquires value as a hedge.

Changed Russian Geopolitical Position: Russia’s disengagement from much of the western economic system since 2022 has accelerated its pivot towards Asia. The NSR provides Russia with a means of connecting its Arctic and far eastern resource base directly with China and other Asian markets. This is particularly important for hydrocarbons, LNG, metals, and minerals.

The NSR provides Russia, faced with the inaccessibility of Western markets, with an enormous maritime frontage connecting it directly with the world’s principal growth markets. This explains why Russia regards the NSR not simply as a shipping route but as a national transport artery. Its 2035 development plan describes the route as a corridor of national and international importance.