Brig. Ravi Palsokar (retd)

The integrated battlefield is an acknowledged reality of modern war fighting. In essence what this means is that no single combat arm can operate on its own and hope to achieve a decision. It has to be a combined all-arms operation duly supported by the necessary logistics and when feasible, the support of the other services, usually the air force and when feasible, by the navy.

That said it needs to be emphasised that the infantry remains central to the combined arms operations in the most modern of battlefields. This has always been so even as technology has evolved over the last many years. The reasons for this centrality stem from the characteristics of the infantry; its versatility – the ability to undertake any operation, by itself or in conjunction with other arms and be able to switch from one role to another with the least amount of disruption. The other major characteristic is mobility in all types of terrain and weather. It is able to fight mounted and dismounted and indeed some of our inaccessible and underdeveloped border regions demand that the infantry operates under extraordinary conditions of hardship and if necessary, on man-pack basis, that is, what it is able to carry on its own. This allows it to carry out its main tasks: to close with the enemy and destroy him and; to seize and hold ground when the situation so demands.

It is not commonly recognised that the basic unit the infantry deploys is the individual soldier. It is true that every individual infantryman is part of a team, but when battle is joined and the sub-unit goes to the ground, every man is on his own. Admittedly, other factors come into play such as leadership, training, regimental ethos and the like, but it is ultimately the individual that counts. This often tends to be forgotten and the weaknesses of the infantry emanate from treating all individuals, units and sub-units alike. The infantryman’s job is facilitated by giving him supporting firepower besides what he already has, enhancing his mobility and giving him more protection. The last three are the key attributes of the two combat arms; armour and the infantry. In the case of armour, the tank combines all three attributes and the priority given to each dictate the capability of tanks. The heavier the tank, the more firepower and protection it can provide, the lighter tank is nimbler and more mobile and there is a trade-off between the requirements. This is a subject by itself, but it has been mentioned here because the same logic can be applied to the capabilities of the infantry. A lighter infantryman will be more mobile, but then the firepower he can generate on his own is correspondingly reduced. This is the key factor, to make the infantryman more effective no matter what the task, terrain or weather. This article will address two issues: enhancing firepower and mobility of the Infantry. As the battlefield becomes more hi-tech, we need to remember that simplicity in operating that technology is what helps the individual soldier, for it can be put succinctly – where bullet meets flesh, it is low-tech that rules.

Trade-off between Firepower, Mobility and Protection

The greatest asset of the infantry is its self-reliance. An infantry unit or a sub-unit can be and is usually tasked to carry out independent missions. Given the situation it needs little logistics support, can carry sufficient ammunition and be employed in offensive or defensive tasks. Its versatility allows it to be used as easily in counter-insurgency operations in varied terrain as in, say the desert in conjunction with the most mobile of formations. Its greatest asset is also its major handicap for there is a tendency to misuse the infantry for any and every task. Effective infantry has to be equipped and trained, the latter particularly for varied tasks and while a unit may rely on its institutional memory (‘when we were in … we