Reforms with a Purpose

An effective submarine design framework is necessary for India’s strategic maritime goals 

Cdr Shrikumar Sangiah (retd)

In a 2012 article in the Indian Defence Review titled, ‘India’s Indigenous Submarine Design Dilemma’, RAdm. K Raja Menon contrasted Indian Navy’s patchy progress in the indigenous design and construction of submarines with its impressive achievements in indigenous surface-ship design and construction. Thirteen years later, in 2025, the contrast remains as stark.

The ‘dilemma’, highlighted in the article, is that despite India acquiring conventional submarine design capability in the Eighties (through the HDW Type 209 submarine acquisition), this capability was never used to design and build, ab initio, an indigenous conventional submarine. India failed to convert the expertise acquired from Germany into a fully operational, indigenous conventional submarine. The article attributes this failure largely to policy inaction (partly owing to political scandals), contractual shortcomings, underutilised expertise, and institutional inertia.

The root of the dilemma is not technical incapacity, but our systemic inability to capitalise on the knowledge gained and institutionalise, validate, and operationalise the hard-won design capability. This has left India strategically vulnerable despite the significant investment made in acquiring submarine design expertise. This failure can be said to be chiefly arising from:

The HDW Scandal: The Bofors/ HDW controversy halted follow-on submarine design and construction. The trained team was diverted to the nuclear Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme, shutting the door on indigenous conventional submarine design. As a result, while the ATV programme (Arihant) benefited, the conventional submarine programme, critical for operational flexibility and regional deterrence, remains stuck in licensed construction.

Mismatch in Design Philosophy: The western (HDW), single-hull expertise clashed with India’s preference for double-hull submarines (for survivability and damage resilience). Little to no effort was made to bridge this gap and adapt the acquired expertise into a design aligned with Indian requirements.

The failure of the Scorpène (Project 75) to deliver on the hoped-for indigenisation goals has only made matters worse. The French collaboration did not transfer full design capability and India remains a licensed builder of conventional submarines—perpetuating dependency.

India’s Submarine Design Framework

A distinctive feature of India’s warship and submarine development process is the hands-on involvement of naval officers in submarine design through the dual Directorates of Naval Design (DND), now known as the Warship Design Bureau,—one for surface ship design and the other for submarine design.

The DND, established in 1970, from the earlier Central Design Office (established in 1964), has been the backbone of India’s indigenous warship and submarine design effort. The hands-on role of naval officers, in ship and submarine design, arises from India’s strategic goal of developing in-house design expertise.

Accordingly, beginning the Fifties, the Indian Navy embarked on long-term investments in training officers in naval architecture and engineering in the UK and the Soviet Union. Later, beginning in the Eighties, officers were deputed abroad for training courses with a specific emphasis on submarine design.

This approach, of direct, hands-on involvement of naval officers in warship and submarine design was adopted to benefit from: 

• Operational Insights: Naval officers bring firsthand operational experience to the design process. Having served on submarines and warships, they understand tactical requirements, crew needs, and combat conditions. This can lead to designs that are more practical and aligned with the navy's strategic goals (stealth, endurance, etc.). 

• Security and Control: Submarine design involves highly sensitive technology (e.g., nuclear propulsion, weapon systems, etc.). Employing naval officers reduces the risk of information leaks or espionage—when compared to relying heavily on civilian contractors or foreign firms. 

• Cost Efficiency: Training naval officers in-house (e.g., through IIT Delhi’s naval architecture programme) or through foreign programmes and retaining them within the DND helps save costs vis-a-vis hiring private design firms. Over time, it can also help build a self-sustaining talent pool.

• Institutional Memory: Officers who transition between operational and design roles within the navy, carry forward lessons from past projects/ appointments. 

• Alignment with Self-Reliance Goals: The approach supported India’s self-reliance goals by grooming a cadre of uniformed designers, reducing dependence, over time, on foreign expertise.

It is instructive to compare India’s approach to submarine design with the approaches of leading submarine building nations which have large and mature submarine building programmes. Such a comparison would help understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches.

The US Framework

The organisational framework for the design and construction of submarines in the US involves an intricate interplay of government entities, the navy, and private industry partners. The key players and their roles include:

The US Navy (Department of Defence)

• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA): This is the primary organisation, within the US Navy, responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of naval platforms, including submarines. NAVSEA oversees the entire lifecycle of submarine programmes, from research and development to procurement and maintenance.

• Programme Executive Office, Submarines (PEO [Submarines]): A subdivision of NAVSEA, PEO (Submarines) manages specific submarine acquisition programmes (e.g., the Virginia-class SSNs). It coordinates with industry partners and ensures that projects meet technical, budgetary, and scheduling targets.

• NAVSEA 05 (Ship Design, Integration, and Engineering): This technical authority focuses on the engineering and design standards for submarines, ensuring that they meet operational and safety requirements.

• Office of Naval Research (ONR): The ONR, while not directly involved in construction, funds research and development of advanced technologies that may be incorporated into future submarine designs.

Private Industry (Shipbuilders and Contractors)

• General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB): Based in Groton, Connecticut, Electric Boat is the primary contractor for designing and building US navy submarines. It has been the lead shipyard for programmes like the Virginia-class and is co-leading the Columbia-class programme. GDEB handles detailed design, engineering, hull assembly, and final system integration. 

• Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII)-Newport News Shipbuilding: This shipyard in Virginia collaborates with Electric Boat and builds specific sections of the submarines. It also contributes to design efforts and component integration.

• Subcontractors and Suppliers: Hundreds of smaller companies, across the US, supply components such as propulsion systems (e.g., nuclear reactors from BWX Technologies), electronics, weapons systems (e.g., from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon), and materials. These are integrated into the submarines by the primary shipbuilder(s).

The actual design process is organised as under:

• Initial Concept and Requirements: The navy defines operational requirements (e.g., stealth, speed, payload) through its strategic planning units like the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV).

• Preliminary and Detailed Design: Electric Boat and Newport News, often in collaboration with NAVSEA engineers, develop the submarine’s design. This includes hull shape, propulsion, and combat systems.

• Naval Reactors: A joint navy and Department of Energy programme, NR oversees the design, construction, and maintenance of nuclear propulsion systems—ensuring safety and performance. This is a critical element of the nuclear submarine design.

After finalisation of the submarine design, submarine construction involves:

• Modular Construction: Submarines are built in modules or sections at the shipyards. These sections are then assembled into a complete vessel.

• Integration and Testing: After platform assembly, subsystems like sonar, weapons, and propulsion are integrated, the navy conducts rigorous sea trials to verify performance, overseen by NAVSEA and the shipbuilders.

• Delivery: Once trials are complete, the submarine is commissioned into active service.

The oversight and funding are handled through:

• The US Congress: Approves funding for submarine programmes through the defence budget. Congressional committees like the House and Senate Armed Services Committees provide oversight.

• Defence Acquisition System: Managed by the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition and Sustainment, this system governs the procurement process, ensuring cost-effectiveness and compliance with regulations.

To summarise, the submarine US building programme is progressed as under:

• US Navy’s Role: NAVSEA’s PEO Submarines sets requirements and oversees the programme;

• Industry Role: Electric Boat (lead) and Newport News (partner) shipyards share construction, with Electric Boat delivering most boats; and

• Collaboration: The navy provides technical specs and funding, while the shipbuilders execute the design and construction, with thousands of suppliers contributing parts.

In this framework, the role of US naval officers is limited to decision-making and oversight by providing strategic direction (OPNAV), technical oversight (NAVSEA, NR), on-site supervision by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP, akin to India’s SOT), and leadership during trials and acceptance (CO/crew, Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV)). Thus, naval personnel maintain control over the process while leveraging the expertise of private industry for design and construction. Shipyard personnel undertake technical design and the actual construction, ensuring that the submarine is buildable and functional (engineering and production).

This delineation of responsibilities leverages the navy’s operational expertise and the shipyards’ industrial capabilities, ensuring submarines are both militarily effective and technically sound. It ensures a balance between military needs, technical expertise, and industrial capacity, with the navy maintaining ultimate authority whilst leveraging private sector innovation and production capabilities.

The Russian Framework

A comparison of the US Navy’s submarine design and construction process with that of the Russian Navy reveals both similarities and differences, dictated by each nation’s strategic priorities, industrial capabilities, and operational doctrines.

In the Russian system, officers from the Russian Navy’s main command (Glavkomat Voenno-Morskovo Flota) and the ministry of defence define operational requirements, based on considerations such as nuclear deterrence, multi-role capabilities, etc. The requirements could reflect a mix of strategic deterrence and regional power projection.

Design Bureaus: Rubin (for strategic submarines) and Malachite (for attack submarines) play a significant early role, providing technical expertise to refine naval demands into practical designs. The process is state-directed, with the ministry of defence overseeing a network of state-owned shipyards (Admiralty shipyard, Zvezdochka, etc.) under the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC). The key difference being that the US process is navy-led with contractors in a supporting role, while Russia integrates design bureaus earlier, reflecting a more collaborative state-industry approach.

Russian naval officers provide oversight, but their role is less hands-on compared to the US. They approve designs proposed by the bureaus and ensure alignment with operational goals. State design bureaus (Rubin/ Malachite) lead the design process, creating blueprints for hull, propulsion, and ship systems and the shipyards refine these for production. The Russian process is thus centralised under the USC, with design bureaus acting as semi-autonomous entities under state control. The US design setup is contractor-driven, while Russia relies on its state-controlled bureaus which boast of a rich legacy of submarine design. Both the US and Russian frameworks involve naval oversight of contractor/ bureau-led design efforts.

During the process of construction, while the US’ SUPSHIP monitors progress at the shipyards, ensuring quality and adherence to the approved design; in the Russian Navy, although its representatives oversee construction at the shipyards, their role is less formalised than the SUPSHIP’s. 

During trials, both the US and Russian processes rope in naval crews to operate the submarine and shipyard personnel fix the issues reported. The trials are designed to test the submarine’s operational readiness and the performance of onboard systems. Both, the US and Russian models, incorporate a step involving acceptance by the navy—after completion of trials and liquidation of defects by the shipyard. Subsequently, ceremonial handing over to the navy marks the submarine’s transition to active service.

The US and Russian processes, broadly, share a common framework—naval personnel set requirements and oversee design and construction, while shipyards design and build.

Unlike the US and Russian frameworks, where shipyards handle design under naval oversight, India’s system assigns naval officers, from the DND, the responsibility of hands-on submarine design. While the practice of directly employing naval officers for submarine design, provides India with an operationally grounded and cost-effective design, it comes with several significant downsides:

• Limited Technical Specialisation: Naval officers, trained in naval architecture or engineering, may lack the depth of expertise found in specialist civilian designers or industry specialists who work full-time on cutting-edge submarine technologies. Submarine design requires advanced skills in hydrodynamics, acoustics, materials science, system integration, etc. which evolve faster in private or academic settings.

• Bureaucratic Rigidity: The military hierarchy within the DND stifles innovation. Officers tend to go with chain-of-command decisions over creative or unconventional design solutions (a critique applicable for most government-led projects).

• Career Path Conflicts: Naval officers are typically rotated across operational, staff, and technical roles. This disrupts the design process, since officers lose the continuity needed for complex, multi-year submarine programmes. Civilian designers, by contrast, stay in one domain---building deeper expertise.

• Resource Constraints: The DND relies on naval budgets and personnel ceilings, which may limit the number of officers assigned to design tasks. This contrasts with countries like the US and Russia, where private firms like Electric Boat and state-run design bureaus (Rubin and Malachite) employ thousands of specialised engineers for submarine projects. 

• Slower Adaptation to Global Trends: Officer-led design teams may lag in adopting commercial best practices or emerging technologies (e.g., AI-driven design tools) due to the military’s inherent insularity. India’s naval programmes often trail global standards, partly due to this inward focus and slower adoption of global trends and best practices.

Comparative Analysis of the Indian Framework

India’s official narrative portrays DND’s officer-led model as successful, citing the Arihant-class as evidence of capability, even though specialist expertise and speed of execution are compromised (as may be inferred from the delays in the Arihant project). Objective critiques of the existing setup observe that project delays and technological/ design shortcomings stem from broader systemic issues, including limitations in DND’s capacity.

The critiques, as evidence of the limitations in the existing navy-led submarine design and build process, point to the ‘unrealistic’ requirements specified in Project-75I’s bid documents (that led multiple foreign vendors to withdraw from the bidding process after having initially evinced interest) as an example of compromised expertise.

India’s reliance on a small, rotating cadre of naval officers contrasts with the US and Russia’s use of large, permanent civilian workforces with deeper specialisation. India’s approach to submarine design and construction sacrifices scale and continuity and prioritises control, while the US and Russian models prioritise scale and technical depth.

In addition, India’s limited, state-dominated industrial base (comprising DPSU shipyards and DPSU firms) contrasts with the US’ privatised, high-capacity model and Russia's proven, legacy-rich, state-integrated model. India, therefore, struggles to scale production, while the US and Russia are able to build and sustain larger fleets.

So far, submarine design in India has usually begun with foreign assistance—Russian help for Arihant, German assistance for the Type-209s, and French inputs for the Scorpènes—before the design is adapted to meet local requirements. The DND, constrained by its organisational structure, budget, and limited expertise, is confined to focusing on incremental designs rather than on cutting-edge innovation. For instance, the DRDO/ DND-led AIP system being developed for retrofitment on Scorpene-class submarines (P-75) remains developmental, much-delayed, and technologically lagging contemporary AIP systems in service with the other leading navies. 

The structural deficiencies in India’s submarine design framework and the systemic weaknesses in indigenous design capability, result in platform designs that are derivative in nature and critically dependent on foreign technology transfers and external design assistance.

The structure of the US and Russian systems enables their designers to push boundaries with bold innovation—the US through private R&D and Russia though state-supported ingenuity. India’s model of a navy-centric arrangement and inward focus (prioritising control and security over speed) slows execution and global benchmarking.

Design Frameworks in Other Nations

The UK employs a hybrid model through BAE Systems’ Maritime (Submarines), a private firm that leads the design and construction of submarines, with the ministry of defence’s (MoD’s) Submarine Delivery Agency (SDA) providing requirements, oversight, and funding. British naval officers provide operational inputs, but detailed engineering is handled by BAE’s over 5,000 specialist designers.

France’s Naval Group (state-majority owned) drives submarine design, blending state direction with industry expertise. The Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) defines the specs, while Naval Group’s (NG’s) engineers drive the design and construction effort.

Germany’s thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (tkMS), a private firm, designs submarines with the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard building the submarine. tkMS Collaborates with Ingenieurkontor Lübeck (IKL), a private firm, for specialised submarine R&D, including modular designs and weapon systems. The German armed forces (Bundeswehr), specifically the Deutsche Marine, define operational requirements, performance specifications, and stealth characteristics to meet North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) standards. 

China’s submarine programme is centrally directed by the Central Military Commission and the PLAN, which set the requirements. The China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) oversees design through state design agencies—701st Institute for conventional and 719th Institute for nuclear submarines. Construction is undertaken at specialised shipyards—Bohai (nuclear) and Wuchang (conventional). Civilian engineers undertake design with naval officers providing oversight. This state-industry model enables rapid iteration and high production rates (4-6 boats/year).

Sweden’s Saab Kockums leads U212-derived A26 designs through civilian specialists, with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) providing requirements and oversight. 

Spain’s Navantia, state-owned, undertakes design and construction with naval inputs but industry-led engineering for systems integration.

South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean (formerly Daewoo) and Hyundai Heavy Industries have helped rapidly scale KSS-III designs via civilian R&D with the Agency for Defence Development providing guidance and oversight helping achieve indigenous ballistic missile capability in a mere 15 years.

Compared to India’s officer-led model (control-oriented, rotation-disrupted), all other submarine-building nations favour permanent, civilian/ industry expertise for speed and innovation in submarine design and construction—outpacing India’s incremental, dependency-prone approach that hinders rapid fleet expansion and tech leadership.

An examination of the performance statistics of the leading submarine building nations provides concrete evidence for the efficacy of their models. Construction of the US’ first nuclear submarine, the USS Nautilus, was approved in August 1951, the submarine laid down in June 1952, launched in January 1954, and commissioned in September 1954. The first Soviet nuclear submarine, K-3/Leninsky Komsomol, was laid down in June 1954, launched in August 1957, and commissioned in June 1958. In comparison, India’s Arihant was laid down in 2004 and commissioned in August 2016. The US built 62 Los Angeles-class SSNs from 1972 to 1996 at the rate of 2.5 boats per year. In the same period (1976-1997) the US additionally built 18 Ohio-class SSBNs. The Soviet/ Russian navy built seven Delta-IV SSBNs during the period 1981-1992, despite being constrained by comparatively modest budgets and political turmoil. Examination of the performance statistics of the submarine building programmes of the other nations provides further evidence of the efficacy of their models for submarine design and construction.

The ‘Indian Exceptionalism’ Argument

A common argument in support of continuing with the officer-led, DND-centric submarine design framework is the assertion of Indian exceptionalism. Why change the existing system and copy foreign models when India’s circumstances and strategic environment are unique? Factors such as a state-dominated industrial base, acute security sensitivities in a hostile neighbourhood, budget limitations, and the need for tight operational control are used to justify continuation of the existing officer-driven/ DND-centric approach rather than adopting a newer, more efficient structure.

This argument sounds principled but collapses under scrutiny. Every submarine-building nation faces ‘unique’ compulsions—geopolitical threats, resource scarcity, industrial legacies—yet none use these to justify a monopoly on design by rotating generalists. Aligning with the proven industry-led frameworks of the other nations is not ‘imitation’—it is a move toward efficiency supported by objective performance data. India’s unique circumstances do not justify design amateurism—they demand professionalism.

The US designs and builds submarines amid superpower competition and cyber threats from Russia and China, and yet trusts private firms like General Dynamics Electric Boat (with 18,000+ employees). Russia, facing Nato encirclement, relies on design bureaus (Rubin/Malachite) rather than a rotating set of officers. China transitioned from building Soviet copies to the rapid production of Type 039A/B, Yuan-class (4-6 boats/year) via state-industry institutes, not officer-led design teams. 

There is also the fear expressed that industry-led design erodes the navy’s authority. This fear is misplaced and unfounded. In the US, NAVSEA/PEO (Submarines) retain veto power and the SUPSHIP embeds naval inspectors at shipyards. Russia’s Glavkomat approves every Rubin/ Malachite blueprint.

The Way Forward

India’s submarine design structure is a child of compulsion and circumstance. It was not birthed following detailed planning or based on a thought-out rationale. In the Eighties, under the Type-209 (HDW) submarine acquisition programme, India trained a 25-member naval team to build indigenous capability in conventional submarines. The team even produced preliminary single-hull designs. However, the 1987 HDW scandal froze follow-on orders, scattered the team, and led to the team members being reassigned to the ATV project. India thus leapt to nuclear propulsion (Arihant), before fielding an indigenously designed diesel-electric submarine. 

Aristotle’s ‘golden means’ places virtue as the desirable middle ground between two extremes—one of excess and one of deficiency. For example, courage is the golden mean between the extremes of recklessness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency). For individuals and nations alike, ambition must heed this balance. Being over-cautious is deficiency, over-ambition is excess.

Historically and technically, the logical progression to indigenous nuclear submarine capability lies in first developing conventional submarines before embarking on nuclear design. No submarine-building nation ever reversed or skipped this sequence of technological progression. In its sprint to nuclear submarine construction, without first mastering conventional design, India's submarine-building journey exemplifies the excess that Aristotle advised against. By electing to run before it could walk, India bypassed building foundational capability.

India’s DND-led model for submarine design prioritises hands-on officer involvement in all aspects of design. In this model, officer rotations, which disrupt continuity, do not allow the solidification of the required depth of expertise. To address this weakness, creating a public-private joint venture (JV) for submarine design, staffed with permanent, suitably qualified, civilian engineers who serve mandated long-term tenures (say, 15-years) could be a viable solution.

Naval constructor (NC) officers trained at IIT Delhi/ Kharagpur, UK (UCL), Russia (Krylov), and other similar institutions—the only cadre of naval officers formally trained in submarine design—should also be positioned within the proposed JV. However, their roles must be restricted to providing platform specs and overseeing platform design and construction. This team of NC officers would act as the bridge between the navy and the JV for activities related to the collation of staff requirements and project oversight.

The proposed JV, co-staffed by NC officers (providing concept/ staff requirements) and civilian specialists (for platform design/ detailed engineering), would be aligned with proven submarine design structures in other submarine-building nations. Established private sector/ state entities such as Mazagon Docks, L&T, HSL and global players such as the USC, Naval Group, tkMS, etc. could be included as private partners in the JV.

India could kickstart the restructuring of its submarine design framework by establishing the proposed JV and mandating it to develop a 3,000-tonne conventional submarine with AIP that meets global benchmarks for platform performance and project execution. 

This measured approach, beginning with first mastering conventional design, will help build the foundational expertise needed for future leaps. Within the framework of the golden mean discussed earlier, clinging to a ‘unique’, but demonstrably inefficient model is not virtuous balance—it is passive acceptance of the status quo arising from institutional inertia. India’s circumstances do not exempt it from the need to aim for efficiency; they make it more urgent. India’s future submarine fleet will not be built by clinging to entrenched practices, but through purposeful reform.