An effective submarine design framework is necessary for India’s strategic maritime goals 

Cdr Shrikumar Sangiah (retd)

In a 2012 article in the Indian Defence Review titled, ‘India’s Indigenous Submarine Design Dilemma’, RAdm. K Raja Menon contrasted Indian Navy’s patchy progress in the indigenous design and construction of submarines with its impressive achievements in indigenous surface-ship design and construction. Thirteen years later, in 2025, the contrast remains as stark.

The ‘dilemma’, highlighted in the article, is that despite India acquiring conventional submarine design capability in the Eighties (through the HDW Type 209 submarine acquisition), this capability was never used to design and build, ab initio, an indigenous conventional submarine. India failed to convert the expertise acquired from Germany into a fully operational, indigenous conventional submarine. The article attributes this failure largely to policy inaction (partly owing to political scandals), contractual shortcomings, underutilised expertise, and institutional inertia.

The root of the dilemma is not technical incapacity, but our systemic inability to capitalise on the knowledge gained and institutionalise, validate, and operationalise the hard-won design capability. This has left India strategically vulnerable despite the significant investment made in acquiring submarine design expertise. This failure can be said to be chiefly arising from:

The HDW Scandal: The Bofors/ HDW controversy halted follow-on submarine design and construction. The trained team was diverted to the nuclear Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme, shutting the door on indigenous conventional submarine design. As a result, while the ATV programme (Arihant) benefited, the conventional submarine programme, critical for operational flexibility and regional deterrence, remains stuck in licensed construction.

Mismatch in Design Philosophy: The western (HDW), single-hull expertise clashed with India’s preference for double-hull submarines (for survivability and damage resilience). Little to no effort was made to bridge this gap and adapt the acquired expertise into a design aligned with Indian requirements.

The failure of the Scorpène (Project 75) to deliver on the hoped-for indigenisation goals has only made matters worse. The French collaboration did not transfer full design capability and India remains a licensed builder of conventional submarines—perpetuating dependency.

India’s Submarine Design Framework

A distinctive feature of India’s warship and submarine development process is the hands-on involvement of naval officers in submarine design through the dual Directorates of Naval Design (DND), now known as the Warship Design Bureau,—one for surface ship design and the other for submarine design.

The DND, established in 1970, from the earlier Central Design Office (established in 1964), has been the backbone of India’s indigenous warship and submarine design effort. The hands-on role of naval officers, in ship and submarine design, arises from India’s strategic goal of developing in-house design expertise.

Accordingly, beginning the Fifties, the Indian Navy embarked on long-term investments in training officers in naval architecture and engineering in the UK and the Soviet Union. Later, beginning in the Eighties, officers were deputed abroad for training courses with a specific emphasis on submarine design.

This approach, of direct, hands-on involvement of naval officers in warship and submarine design was adopted to benefit from: 

•Operational Insights: Naval officers bring firsthand operational experience to the design process. Having served on submarines and warships, they understand tactical requirements, crew needs, and combat conditions. This can lead to designs that are more practical and aligned with the navy's strategic goals (stealth, endurance, etc.). 

•Security and Control: Submarine design involves highly sensitive technology (e.g., nuclear propulsion, weapon systems, etc.). Employing naval officers reduces the risk of information leaks or espionage—when compared to relying heavily on civilian contractors or foreign firms. 

•Cost Efficiency: Training naval officers in-house (e.g., through IIT Delhi’s naval architecture programme) or through foreign programmes and retaining them within the DND helps save costs vis-a-vis hiring private design firms. Over time, it can also help build a self-sustaining talent pool.

•Institutional Memory: Officers who transition between operational and design roles within the navy, carry forward lessons from past projects/ appointments. 

•Alignment with Self-Reliance Goals: The approach supported India’s self-reliance goals by grooming a cadre of uniformed designers, reducing dependence, over time, on foreign expertise.

It is instructive to compare India’s approach to submarine design with the approaches of leading submarine building nations which have large and mature submarine building programmes. Such a comparison would help understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches.

The US Framework

The organisational framework for the design and construction of submarines in the US involves an intricate interplay of government entities, the navy, and private industry partners. The key players and their roles include:

The US Navy (Department of Defence)

•Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA): This is the primary organisation, within the US Navy, responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of naval platforms, including submarines. NAVSEA oversees the