Brig Ravi Palsokar (retd)

The Indian experience of counter insurgency operations proves one point repeatedly, that such operations are invariably prolonged. The insurgencies in the Northeast and Kashmir have been festering for a long time and show no sign of ending. This is not to say that there are no lulls or periods when insurgency or militancy appears to be on the wane, only to flare up again.

In both the areas, the situation at times has shown improvement and then relapsed into worrying activity. In many Northeast states the situation has improved considerably without doubt, such as in Tripura where insurgents have joined the mainstream of society. This has been more due to the enlightened political leadership rather than successes by security forces. Indeed, when the security forces operate in close cooperation with the political executive, as in Tripura, Mizoram and parts of Assam, the results are positive and enduring. Kashmir is a different story altogether, where there is active involvement and interference by our inimical neighbour. In both the cases, the security forces, particularly the army, have to organise themselves to suit local conditions.

The one out-of-area operation experience of the Indian Army, the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, with the other two services is notable for a number of reasons, mainly negative. The organisation there may have appeared successful but there are still many unlearned lessons that need to be studied. The IPKF experience lasted approximately three years and the decision to withdraw was political, catering to the changed political situation and leadership in both countries. It had nothing to do with the so-called perceived success of the IPKF. During this period many organisational issues were thrown up, some were tackled successfully but many were not.

The army, which provides the bulk of the manpower for counter-insurgency operations, has to consider its organisational and command structure when deployed for such tasks. It is natural to depend on the standard organisation initially, only to be tweaked as and when required. Whether this can be done in any other way is a matter of discussion.

One counter argument is that if there is no prior knowledge of what is required on the ground, then how can any advance preparation be made? This needs examination and answering. Each zone has its specific requirements and problems. Even in a particular zone, sectoral challenges will usually be different and the force has to be organised accordingly. Take the example of Jammu and Kashmir, the Valley has different requirements than Jammu. Jammu has both hills and plains with urban areas. These are matters that merit attention but they have never been examined.

CI Force

The army, when it is first deployed for any task, be it counter insurgency or any other, obviously relies on existing structures and command arrangements. There can be no arguments against such an approach. But unlike conventional operations, in counter insurgenc