Diplomacy is the way forward, not prolonged wars and endless destruction

Lt Gen. Harminder Sachdev

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

— Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The idea of victory has always been central to warfare. States go to war in the expectation that fighting will bring them closer to achieving political objectives they could not secure through diplomacy. Yet in the 21st century, the very notion of victory has grown blurred. Based on well-defined ‘national aim’, it once meant the conquest of territory, the defeat of an enemy’s army, or the imposition of a favourable treaty. Today, however, the national aims by themselves are often defined in terms so abstract, ‘destroying terrorism,’ ‘eliminating extremism,’ ‘teaching a lesson,’ or ‘guaranteeing long-term security’ etc., that it becomes unattainable through military means alone.

As a result, modern wars have taken on a paradoxical character. They are technologically more destructive than ever before, particularly through the aerial domain, where precision-guided weapons can cripple a nation’s infrastructure within days. Yet despite this destructive capacity, they are also more prolonged, grinding on for years without resolution. Civilian populations are left to endure economic collapse, social trauma, and displacement, while external powers feed the conflict for their own strategic ends.

The problem lies in the misalignment between aims and means. Victory has been redefined in cognitive and ideological terms, but war remains a material instrument. Aims that belong in the domain of diplomacy or politics are instead pursued through missiles and tanks, producing wars that destroy without concluding. To understand this dilemma, it is necessary to revisit classical theories of war, examine contemporary conflicts, and reflect on how alliances and external actors exacerbate the problem.

Classical Theories of Victory

For classical strategists, victory was always a matter of clarity. Chanakya, in his work Arthashastra, writes that war is just a means to a durable end state! He defines victory is not a battle won but a purpose fulfilled. Clausewitz emphasised that ‘war was a continuation of politics by other means.’ Its conduct had to be subordinated to the political aim, and that aim had to be both clear and proportionate. If the political objective was limited, the war should be limited (Kargil War); if the objective was existential, total war might be necessary (World War II). In both cases, however, the aim defined the measure of victory.

Basil Liddell Hart carried this logic further in the twentieth century. ‘The object in war is a better peace, even if only from your own point of view,’ he wrote. In other words, the true test of victory was not the destruction of an opponent’s forces alone, but also the quality of the peace that followed. Philosophically speaking, a war that exhausted the victor and destabilised the postwar order is more a ‘pyrrhic victory’ (a victory so costly that it tantamount to defeat!).