Multi-Domain Warfare

Gen. B.K. Sharma (retd)

Operation Sindoor, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and hybrid conflicts across West Asia together illuminate the evolving character of Multi Domain Warfare (MDW)--a paradigm marked by operations across the spectrum of hybrid operations, technology integration, AI-driven OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), drone and missile warfare, integrated use of cyber, space, and cognitive dominance. This leads to strategic ambiguity that reshapes the character of modern warfare.

These conflicts demonstrate the convergence of kinetic and non-kinetic actions, involving both state and non-state actors, across multiple domains, including land, air, sea, cyberspace, space, and cognitive domains. For India, confronting collusive multi-domain threats in a grey-zone environment and complex escalation matrix dictates urgent doctrinal, strategic and operational lessons.

Operation Sindoor

The India–Pakistan confrontation since the Pahalgam terrorist attack, culminating in Operation Sindoor, alongside the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the conflicts in West Asia, marks a defining moment in the evolution of contemporary MDW. Operation Sindoor signalled a doctrinal shift in India’s counterterrorism strategy, elevating state-sponsored terror to an act of war and collapsing the line between sub-conventional and conventional deterrence. Simultaneously, the Ukraine and West Asia theatres reinforce the strategic impact of proxy warfare, digital kinetic attacks, urban combat, information dominance, and multi-domain contestation. These conflicts accelerated the recalibration of India’s key instruments of national power, which include diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and technological (DIME-T) elements.

A Doctrinal Watershed: Operation Sindoor was India’s calibrated military response to the 22 April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, which targeted Indian tourists and was attributed to Pakistan-based group, The Resistance Front, an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Marking the most assertive use of force since the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, India launched multi-domain precision strikes on May 7 against nine terrorist camps deep inside Pakistan. These were followed by escalatory strikes on eight critical airfields, including the Nur Khan airbase, in response to Pakistani drone and missile incursions. Under intense military and diplomatic pressure, Pakistan proposed a ceasefire on May 10, which halted further hostilities. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his address to the nation, darkened the contours of India’s red lines by clearly clubbing the Pakistan establishment with the terrorist ecosystem and stating that terror, trade and the flow of Indus water will not go together. He called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and reiterated India’s resolve for future strikes in the event of acts of cross-border terrorism. 

Key Takeaways
Strategic Paradigm Shift: The operation was grounded in a clearly defined political directive of a proportionate and time-bound response, primarily to target terrorist infrastructure, including in the very heart of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. India challenged two long-standing assumptions in Islamabad that nuclear threats would deter Indian military action, and that terrorism occupies a separate category from conventional conflict. India, in effect, demonstrated that future terrorist attacks may be treated as the initiation of traditional hostilities, placing the burden of de-escalation on Pakistan. India no longer accepts that the burden of proof lies with it to establish the Pakistani state’s complicity. The continued anti-India activity of terrorist groups on Pakistani soil is seen as a sufficient justification for a military response. Operation Sindoor should be viewed as India’s resolve and the military capabilities to punish Rawalpindi, disregarding its nuclear bluff.

Pre-emptive Precision Strikes: By precisely hitting nine terrorist infrastructure nodes while avoiding civilian and military installations, India reaffirmed its capabilities of a measured and calibrated response. India’s ability to undertake retaliatory action without releasing granular proof of Pakistani involvement was internationally accepted, indicating a shift toward intent-based legitimacy in counterterrorism. However, this approach highlighted the concerns about compressed decision-making windows and heightened risks of rapid escalation with a rogue state and its non-state actors. The need to institutionalise rapid attribution frameworks and maintain diplomatic flexibility in the escalation domination matrix becomes evident.

Dynamic Responsive Escalation Doctrine: India demonstrated sophisticated integration of air, land, naval, and informational assets. The Indian military employed fighter aircraft, BrahMos and SCALP cruise missiles, HAMMER bombs, Harpy and Sky Striker drones, Akash surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), D-4 missiles integrated with the S-400 air defence (AD) system, and electronic warfare (EW), demonstrating a high-precision, stand-off warfare capability. The Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and supported by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) Centre for Artificial Intelligence (CAIR), enables real-time detection, tracking, and neutralisation of airborne threats. Technological advancements, human intelligence, GIS mapping, satellite-guided targeting, terrain contour matching, inertial navigation systems, and India’s regional satellite navigation system, Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC), developed by Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), were utilised.

The coordinated deployment of an array of assets showed a shift toward the Dynamic Responsive Escalation Doctrine and Multi Domain Operations (MDO). Strikes on sensitive targets like the Nur Khan and Bholari airbases displayed a willingness to penetrate Pakistan’s strategic depth, signalling a shift from tactical retaliation to strategic coercion. The widespread use of drones and missiles introduced ambiguity in intent and scale, risking misinterpretation in a jittery nuclear environment. It emerged that India must develop robust counter-UAV systems, real-time drone attribution technologies, and rules of engagement for sustained grey-zone scenarios.

Collusive MDW Threat: The recent conflict once again reinforced China’s open support for Pakistan, be it Rawalpindi’s narrative on terrorism, toning down the UNSC resolution on terrorism, or overt military support. China supplies 81 per cent of Pakistan’s military hardware and satellite imagery, from the BeiDou satellite constellation, as well as cyber and electronic EW capabilities. Pakistan effectively utilised the Chinese digital ecosystem for electromagnetic dominance for network-centric warfare. India’s acquisition of imagery from foreign companies, such as Maxar and Sentinel, for satellite surveillance data raises concerns about achieving aerospace domain awareness. Operation Sindoor merits a weighty introspection to identify asymmetries and competitive advantages in the aerospace balance. The efficacy of PAF JF-10 and JF-17, equipped with PL-15 missiles, their AWACS, and the proposal for the induction of fifth-generation J-35 vis-à-vis our aerial platforms requires a critical analysis. This aspect warrants additional attention in light of the statement made by India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, which alluded to initial tactical setbacks that may have resulted in some aircraft losses. 

China’s Future Aid: Additionally, China may supply antiship ballistic missiles, the Yaogan remote satellite system (designed for sustained intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions), KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft with extended range, the HQ-19 Air and Missile Defence system (comparable to the US THAAD system), guided multiple rocket launchers, and the FK-400 microwave weapon system. Likewise, with the induction of Chinese Hangoor-class submarines and additional Type 054A frigates, the Pakistan Navy will enhance its maritime operations. Beijing finds it lucrative to use Pakistan as a laboratory for testing its military technology, thus not only using it to fix India but also enhancing its stature as an arms exporter to other countries. China may not be averse to adopting an aggressive military posture or initiating military actions to tie down Indian troops at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to relieve pressure on Pakistan. India must discard its flawed assumptions of keeping the Northern front dormant through diplomacy and invest earnestly on a war-footing to prepare for a two-front, multi-domain, high-tech war.

Circumventing Terrorism Trap: The Pahalgam attack exposed gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and threat prediction. Strengthening internal security mechanisms, including AI-driven analytics, border monitoring, and multi-agency intelligence fusion at the sector and sub-sector levels, is critical when India faces a collusive multi-domain threat. A robust counter-terrorism ecosystem is sine qua non to deter and defeat cross-border terrorism. Prevention of sensational acts of terrorism needs no emphasis to ensure the success of a zero-terrorism tolerance policy. It is worth noting that the repeated punitive trans-border military strikes must be objectively weighed against the imperative of focusing on developing denial and deterrence capabilities against China, the principal adversary.

Diplomacy: The optics of the ceasefire announcement were dampened by US President Donald Trump and the White House press claiming credit for brokering the ceasefire. Pakistan’s immediate violation of the truce further complicated the situation. The tone and tenor of statements from the Trump administration were mired in false hyphenation and equivalence of Pakistan and India, offering mediation on the so-called Jammu and Kashmir dispute, besides uncalled-for preaching. This led to a strong rebuttal from the high-level Indian political authorities, thus causing unease in bilateral relations. India rightly took recourse in sending all-party delegations to several countries to put the matter in its correct perspective.

Strategic Communication: India’s centrality of narrative dominance was a dominant feature of conflict. A democratic environment inherently limits the stitching together and propagation of a cohesive national narrative. Nonetheless, daily professional briefings provided clarity and built international legitimacy, countering Pakistan’s hyper-disinformation efforts through doctored images, etc. While India’s communication strategy was coherent and professional, real-time counter-messaging capabilities need enhancement to pre-empt adversary propaganda in a dynamic information environment. Likewise, in times like these, when emotions are running high, misplaced jingoism, particularly in the electronic media, needs to be moderated. India must formulate a proactive communication strategy, supported by robust structures, effective systems, and skilled personnel, to ensure responsible reporting and control of information flow and dissemination.

Whole of Government and Nation Approach: Operation Sindoor showcases robust civil-military coordination and an effective synergy between the armed forces, DRDO, defence public and private sector industry. This response shattered the long-standing perception of bureaucratic inertia and risk aversion, reflecting a maturing defence ecosystem under Aatmanirbhar Bharat. The operation exemplified a true ‘whole of government/ Nation’ approach. India demonstrated unprecedented readiness across domains, from coordinated civil defence preparedness to strategic communication and inter-ministerial planning. A bold highlight was the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty—one of the most decisive moves in independent India’s history, taken despite anticipated legal and diplomatic pushback. It conveyed India’s resolve to impose costs on cross-border terrorism.

Russia-Ukraine and West Asia

The Russia-Ukraine war and the protracted conflicts across West Asia have become defining laboratories for the evolution of MDW.

Proxy and Subterranean Warfare: Both regions exemplify warfare conducted through indirect means. Iran’s strategic depth—achieved through proxies like Hezbollah, Houthis, and Iraqi militias—and Russia’s reliance on private military contractors, mercenaries and North Korean troops, illustrate how state actors wage war through surrogates to stretch adversaries without formal escalation. This model complicates attribution, delays international response, and sustains deniability. Combat in Mariupol, Bakhmut, Mosul, and Gaza demonstrated the enduring complexity of fighting in dense urban environments. Subterranean infrastructure, such as tunnels, provided actors with tactical surprise, mobility, and resilience. These conditions neutralised many conventional military advantages, prolonged engagements, and increased civilian vulnerability.

Drone, Cyber and IW: The use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in both theatres, from Houthi drone swarms to Ukrainian kamikaze drones, has expanded the reach and impact of irregular forces. A case in point is Operation Spiderweb, a debilitating drone raid launched by the Ukrainian Special Forces from the lorries placed in the proximity of Russia’s critical airfields, leading to the destruction of several strategic bombers. ISR-enabled precision strike systems, such as HIMARS, glide bombs, and AI-guided artillery, have transformed the role of long-range fires. Real-time data fusion allows accurate targeting, efficient ammunition usage, and disruption of command-and-control nodes. Both conflicts have shown the centrality of cyberspace and digital influence operations. From Russian cyber-attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure to Iranian-Israeli cyber skirmishes and digital propaganda by non-state actors has emerged as a core combat function. Israel’s strikes targeting the pager and walkie-talkie systems used by Iran-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah in Gaza, southern Lebanon, show a deliberate strategy to cripple the leadership of Iran’s regional proxies. These low-tech communication tools, valued for their simplicity and ability to function in contested environments, turned into liabilities when Israel leveraged advanced electronic warfare tactics. By intercepting, jamming, and even falsifying messages, Israel sowed chaos, disrupted real-time coordination, and issued misleading directives, effectively paralysing proxy command structures during pivotal moments. In the broader Iran-Israel covert struggle, this approach signals a shift toward conflicts decided by digital sabotage and information dominance as much as by traditional military force.|

Escalation Management and Nuclear Signalling: Russia’s use of nuclear signalling to deter Nato involvement—through rhetoric, posture changes, and deployment ambiguity—reveals the utility of strategic deterrence in limiting escalation. Similarly, states like Iran’s ability to calibrate proxy activity without inviting full-scale retaliation reflects refined escalation control mechanisms embedded in a hybrid strategy. Accidental or deliberate targeting of nuclear facilities, deployment of nuclear weapons in a third country and false flag nuclear sabotage have added new complexities to atomic safety concerns.

Civil-Military Synergy and Innovation Ecosystems: The mobilisation of civilian technological infrastructure and non-traditional actors has been critical to operational resilience. Ukraine’s widespread use of tech startups, volunteers, and civilian coding communities for battlefield ISR, logistics coordination, and drone production is unprecedented. Similarly, Israel’s integration of private-sector innovation into defence platforms demonstrates the value of a whole-of-nation warfare ecosystem. The key to success is the appropriate mobilisation of reserves, deployment of civil defence, intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence personnel. Integrating civilian industry, innovation ecosystems, and technological infrastructure into the operational core of defence enhances agility, redundancy, and sustained warfare capacity.

Implications for India’s National Security

The evolution of MDW, as witnessed in Operation Sindoor, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the conflicts in West Asia, presents India with a complex security calculus. These conflicts underscore the need for doctrinal, technological, and institutional transformation to address emerging threats across both kinetic and non-kinetic domains.

Doctrinal Recalibration: India must reassess its military doctrine to align with the realities of collusive multi-domain conflicts. This shift to a new response threshold demands the institutionalisation of an evolved multi-domain operational doctrine and a well-defined escalation matrix that ensures balanced military posturing and dynamic military actions with calibrated escalation control. Simultaneously, the need to accelerate theatrisation becomes imperative. Integrating land, air, maritime, cyber, and space components, unified theatre commands will ensure faster, synchronised responses and optimal force deployment. Moreover, grey-zone threats—ranging from proxy actors to cyber incursions—must be embedded into planning frameworks, recognising that future conflicts may unfold without formal declarations of war.

Technological Modernisation: A technology-first approach is crucial for maintaining a strategic advantage. Indigenous capability development under the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative must be intensified, particularly in AI-enabled command systems, drone warfare, next-generation munitions, and space-based surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Platform interoperability across India’s heterogeneous arsenal, sourced from Russian, western, and indigenous suppliers, must be resolved through standardisation and standard data protocols. Additionally, India must build scalable inventories of expendable drones, electronic warfare kits, and precision-guided munitions to sustain high-tempo operations. As the West Asian theatres have demonstrated, integrated drone defences—combining hard-kill and soft-kill layers—are now indispensable in countering swarms and saturation strikes. India needs its version of the Iron Dome.

Internal Security: The success of proactive defence lies in predictive, real-time intelligence. India must establish national and state counter terrorism centres. Integrating human, signals, open-source, and satellite intelligence to facilitate early threat detection and time-sensitive targeting needs urgent attention. Border surveillance in vulnerable regions, such as Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, should be overhauled through AI-powered smart fencing, sensor networks, and autonomous patrol drones. India’s internal security forces must have tunnel detection tools, robotics, and real-time ISR solutions to operate effectively in dense, contested environments. Securing lines of communications and control of communal flare-ups, insurgency, organised crime, and organised protests are to be considered in the national doctrine/ policy.

Information and Cyber Warfare: Strategic messaging and narrative control are as critical as battlefield manoeuvres in the information age. India should establish a dedicated Strategic Communication Command tasked with synchronising civil-military messaging, shaping public narratives, and conducting psychological operations. At the same time, offensive cyber capabilities must be developed to degrade adversary infrastructure, delay mobilisation, and disrupt command-and-control systems. Concurrently, India’s cyber resilience must be enhanced by hardening encryption protocols, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and developing continuity-of-operations plans in the event of sustained digital conflict. A special focus must be placed on data preservation and data integrity as society transitions into a fully digital society.

Diplomacy: Operation Sindoor demonstrated the importance of proactive diplomatic engagement during times of crisis. India must sharpen its narrative diplomacy by leveraging forums such as the G21, BRICS plus, and the Quad to expose the duplicity of state sponsors of terrorism and reinforce its responsible nuclear posture. Strategic autonomy must be maintained through a careful balancing act—deepening defence cooperation with like-minded democracies while preserving flexibility in dealing with Russia, West Asian powers, and ASEAN nations. Narrative coherence in the face of foreign mediation attempts, particularly those that undermine India’s position or draw false equivalencies, is essential to safeguard sovereign agency in conflict resolution.

Civil-Military Fusion: Modern warfare increasingly necessitates a whole-of-nation approach. India must foster deeper integration between the armed forces, industry, and academia. Institutional mechanisms, such as iDEX and defence industrial corridors, must be empowered to bridge the innovation gap between battlefield requirements and technological solutions. Start-ups and research establishments should be encouraged to develop dual-use technologies, ranging from AI-enabled logistics platforms to advanced battlefield sensors. Additionally, India must enhance civilian resilience, especially in border areas. Initiatives like civil defence training, emergency response planning, and psychological preparedness programmes will enable communities to absorb shocks and support national security objectives in protracted conflicts.

Conclusion

The lessons from Operation Sindoor, the Russia–Ukraine war, and hybrid conflicts in West Asia underscore a pivotal truth: future conflicts will be fought as much in the cognitive and technological domains as on physical battlefields. For India, the imperative lies in translating tactical agility into strategic deterrence. This demands doctrinal boldness, technological self-reliance, real-time intelligence fusion, and proactive narrative shaping. As the regional and global security landscape becomes increasingly volatile, India’s ability to deter, dominate, and de-escalate across various domains will define its stature as a credible and future-ready power.

(The writer is director general, United Service Institution of India)