Accountability is the keyword to speed up indigenous defence production 

Gp Capt. A.K. Sachdev (retd)

According to the 2026 Global Air Power Rankings published by World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft (WDMMA), the Indian Air Force (IAF) is at the sixth position, just ahead of China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Pakistan stands at 18th rung. 

While that tidbit is something to revel in, the delight it offers is tempered by concerns summarised in the theses listed here: government pushes (and shoves)—with all good intent—have supported ‘Make in India’ since 2014, and its latter avatar aatmanirbharta since 2020; in pursuit thereof, the public sector has not been able to assimilate and learn to the same level as China has, and its inherent inefficiencies have not produced globally competitive products in many sectors, including aerospace; private industry has been permitted a (near) level playing field in that domain only in recent years; the IAF is currently down to 29 (or 30) combat squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42, and its needs and wants are in urgent need of being quenched. This article examines how ‘Make in India/ Aatmanirbharta’ are serving the IAF and how they are likely to sustain it in the near future.

India’s Self Reliance Ambitions

Defence production in India touched Rs 1.78 lakh crores during the last financial year which is almost a sixth more than the last year’s figure. The government points out that this is four times the figure of 2013-14 (prior to BJP coming to power) and has set for itself a target of Rs 8.8 lakh crores by the year 2047, a six-fold increase from the current level. This laudable prognostication encompasses R&D, design, production and export of leading edge weapon systems, including in the technology dominant arena of aerospace industry. 

Another cheering statistic is that defence exports reached a high of Rs 38,424 crore during the last financial year, a figure representing a 62.66 per cent jump from the previous financial year. The increase signifies growing global demand for Indian-made military equipment and technologies. The public sector accounted for a little more than half of the exports.

A little less cheer emerges from a June 2026 PwC report entitled ‘Accelerating aerospace and defence manufacturing through operational excellence and supply chain resilience’. The report is optimistic about strong demand and acknowledges steady rise in exports but is glum on the subject of execution at scale as the order backlog trails up to a decade in some cases. The backlog-led growth is in need of enhanced performance, something that has niggled industry’s failure to meet IAF’s urgent and critical needs, especially of combat aircraft.

Combat Aircraft

Combat aircraft are the teeth of an air force; a current holding of three-quarters of its sanctioned strength renders to the IAF a great handicap. So why has this sorry state come to pass? The first ‘indigenous’ combat aircraft was the HF 24 Marut as far back as the Sixties (with a still-borne HF 73 that tragically died on the drawing board!) but the momentum was lost thereafter for two decades until the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, or Tejas, was initiated in the Eighties. Forty Tejas Mk1s were ordered and the first one entered service in 2016. Thirty eight are in service currently but they are not combat aircraft and serve more as a testbed for the improved Tejas Mk1A which will have weapons capability. 

However, the Mk1A is far behind schedule. With 180 of these untested, yet to be inducted aircraft on order, the IAF is understandably getting fidgety. Over the last decade successive chiefs of air staff (CAS) have publicly expressed their displeasure over the delays in Mk1A delivery to the IAF. The Tejas programme was intended to replace the ageing fleet of MiG 21s which has retired in toto but the first delivery of the Mk1A is yet to take place. While Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has the convenient alibi of delay in receipt of the aero engines for the Mk1A, that is not the only reason for the inordinately delayed Mk1A deliveries. The engine story is also a sordid saga and is covered later in this article.

It may be mentioned that even if the GE engines had been supplied on time, the Mk1A could not have been ready on time as the integration of the EASA radar and Electronic Warfare (EW) suite, et al is still ‘work in progress’. The aircraft is not expected to be ready soon despite the availability of adequate engines from GE. Any first flight dates for the fully integrated Mk1A are to be taken with a pinch of salt.