Joint Asset

Air Cmde Nitin Sathe (retd)

It was in 1984 that the first attack helicopters were inducted into the Indian Air Force. It was also the year I got commissioned as a helicopter pilot. Disappointed at not been selected to fly the fighters because of shortage of vacancies, the next best option, I was advised, was to work hard to become an attack helicopter pilot.

With God’s grace and some luck, a couple of years later I was at the 125 Helicopter Squadron based at Pathankot, learning to fly the deadly Mi-25. The helicopter flew as any other helicopter, but one had to change gears to think ‘offensive’ and learn to use the machine as a weapon delivery platform rather than just transporting troops and rations.

Around the same time, the Indian Army was asking for ‘control’ and subsequent ownership of the attack helicopters. There were heated discussions in crew rooms as well as official parleys at the headquarters.

The IAF was in no mood to hand over the assets. The army was relentless in it demand. And we, the operators, were caught in the crossfire. Rumours were that we would soon have to shed our blue uniforms and don the OG’s (olive greens), or sadly, be sent back to ‘normal’ helicopter units after handing over these fighter helicopters to the army. The only attack helicopter squadron of the IAF was under threat.

The Army Aviation Corps was formed in 1987 post the Joint Army Air Implementation Directive of 1986 (JAAI-1986) wherein the erstwhile air observation post (AOP) units started operating independently, slowly moving to new army bases closer to their HQs. The army had little or no experience in flying operations, especially offensive operations, and also of the complexities of fleet management and logistics. With the IAF reluctant to share its knowledge/experience for obvious reasons, they were forced to start from the scratch.

As far as the attack helicopters were concerned, with both parties reluctant to let go, a middle path was worked upon although everybody knew that this arrangement of dual control was doomed to failure. While the attack helicopters were to be operated and maintained by the IAF personnel, the operational control over the machines was to be exercised by the army. There was a mixing of appraisal channels, funding and budgets, and many SOPs (standard operating procedures), leading to confusion in the ranks.

The HQs on both sides, not geared to handle the ‘change’, passed down orders both difficult to digest as well as execute. In the centre of this storm were the Commanding Officer and the Flight Commander who had to ensure that feathers on both sides were not ruffled. The pilots of the squadron trained as well as they could in this scenario (we used to call it SFCS [super fast changing scenario] in jest!) to be operationally available for the multitude of tasks that both sides wanted to be executed.

In this ‘dual duel’ we went around displaying our aircraft at various army bases, flew many a gen