Maj. Gen. Raj Mehta (retd)

National security adviser A.K. Doval represented the quiet self-assurance of emerging India in his diplomatic jousting at Beijing with Chinese Counselor Yang Jiechi on 27 July 2017. Asked by his Chinese counterpart whether the Doklam Plateau was Indian territory, Doval replied that British India had concluded an important treaty with Thimphu in 1910 by which Bhutan was to pursue its foreign policy in consultation with India.

Doklam was part of Bhutanese territory but longstanding treaty obligations demanded that Bhutanese territorial sovereignty be protected by India. Doval ended the exchange by asking the Chinese Counselor: “Does every disputed territory become China’s by default?” There was no response.

What was noted by China and the watching world was that India had refused to be brow-beaten yet combined her newly demonstrated strength with skilful diplomacy by foreign secretary S. Jaishanker and India’s ambassador to Beijing, Vijay Gokhale. Good diplomacy has no winners or losers but what did emerge is something China and the watching world noted: India stood up to China but did so subtly and without loss of face for China. India’s diplomacy, political savvy and military astuteness had invited favourable comment world-wide.

Doklam, a Strategic Red Line for India

Doklam is an issue that has the potential of mutually destructive limited war on its bare, high altitude ridges that, if occupied by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will threaten India’s and Bhutan’s core interests. Doklam is a red line that China should not cross, nor India-Bhutan stretch to breaking point. In other words, tripartite diplomacy and realpolitik is the way ahead, not military confrontation.

Doklam is clearly an area of great significance for all three protagonists involved in the dispute. Its continued and unchallenged possession due to legitimate ownership claims (Bhutan’s stand); occupation by force due to ‘disputed territory’ claims (China’s stance) or overriding compulsion to retain oversight over inimical military activity centred on and around this high altitude plateau due to treaty obligations and threat to core Indian strategic interests (Indian stance) needs to be deciphered objectively and maturely. To do so, we need to start at the very beginning and understand why the Doklam stand-off took place and why resolving it is in tripartite, if not world interest, since it involves a potential military conflict that could escalate from local/ limited conventional war to general war between two nuclear powers of substance and ability.

Before we examine the origins of the dispute, the topography of the conflict area needs to be placed in context. This article covers Chumbi Valley, its domination by India; Doklam and how China plans