Brig. Dinesh Mathur

Our long history of repeated border clashes or border intrusions or transgressions have been a major flashpoint in Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of 1962. The Chinese have successfully managed to prevent India from building any major infrastructure on the Indian side of the border, while they have built an extensive array of military infrastructure on their side, commencing with their Western Highway on our territory Aksai Chin.

Reduction of seven military regions to five theatre commands and the merger of Xinkiang and Tibet into one Western Theatre Command has already taken place. Airfields facing Ladakh, Hotan and Garunsa, are now operational with a squadron each of J7 and J11 fighters and much improved ground facilities. The airlift capability for inter theatre move, confers the capability to build up to eight divisions in a timeframe of one month. Gormo-Lhasa oil pipeline is also operational. Beijing’s decision to aggressively patrol along the Indo-Tibet border should be seen from the perspective of China’s grand strategy of grabbing as much territory as it can, in the garb of protecting its interests, territory, and sovereignty.

All along the 4,057km Line of Actual Control (LAC), especially the fresh claims on Galwan Valley, has now reached a very critical stage. Any misperception, miscalculation, or error along the tense border could easily escalate into a full-blown conflict. Thirty years of the same map to map alignments and varying interpretation of the LAC have made the agreement out of reach of both sides. The paramount fact is that China is already in possession of large chunks of our territory; so what is there to negotiate? In Ladakh Sector, the LAC runs up to the line where the Chinese forces had advanced in 1962. In the Middle Sector it marked the extent of fictitious Chinese territory and also the line that marked the limit of their administrative control as it existed in November 1959. In Arunachal Pradesh, except for Thagla Ridge and Longju, the LAC ran through the e