Capt. Jawahar Bhagwat PhD (retd)

“Responsibility is a unique concept… You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you… If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else… The Devil is in the details, but so is salvation.”

— Admiral Hyman Rickover, Father of the US Nuclear Navy

In the nuclear domain the Indian Navy operates the nuclear ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant (SSBN) and the nuclear attack submarine INS Chakra (SSN) on lease from Russia. On 29 December 2019, the Press Trust of India reported that a Parliamentary panel was informed that in order to strengthen its underwater fleet, the Indian Navy plans to build 24 submarines, including six nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).

In its report to the Parliamentary panel tabled in December 2019, the navy stated that there are presently 15 conventional submarines and two nuclear submarines in its fleet. The Arihant (SSBN) project for building follow-ons to INS Arihant continues to be delayed. According to a media report, the Arighat, which is a sister class submarine of INS Arihant, will be ready for induction in the Indian Navy by mid-2020.

In November 2018, the PMO’s office stated that INS Arihant carried out its first deterrent patrol. Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated, ‘In an era such as this, a credible nuclear deterrence is the need of the hour. The success of INS Arihant gives a fitting response to those who indulge in nuclear blackmail.’ It may be relevant to recall here that it was agreed during the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks to keep the nuclear warheads de-mated from the actual missiles and also for the ‘No First Use’ policy. According to Bharat Karnad, ‘Jaswant Singh also agreed for India to be ‘strategically restrained’. There was the a priori commitment by the Vajpayee government to abstain from further testing followed by its decisions based seemingly on agreement in the Jaswant-Talbott talks to maintain the small, basic and insignificant Indian nuclear deterrent in a ‘de-mated, de-alerted’ mode and not to embark on designing and testing an ICBM.’ No strategic autonomy was or is being adhered to by the government. As stated earlier by this author, this remains a concept on paper. Thankfully, the government has made an exception to this policy for nuclear submarines or else the deterrent patrol for a SSBN would have been nothing but a public relations exercise as reported in the media.

The declaration of the Arihant deterrence patrol was a surprising announcement as the commissioning of Arihant in August 2016 was a closely-guarded secret. It was also reported that the PM received the 100-man crew of the INS Arihant at his 7, Lok Kalyan Marg residence. Pictures on the PM’s Twitter handle showed the submarine’s commanding officer Captain Mukul Surange presenting a ship’s cap and a model of the Arihant to the PM. Disappointingly, the PM could not spare the time and effort to visit the submarine at its base. This would have been more appreciated by the crew of INS Arihant and the entire submarine fraternity. The degree of information revealed to the media (including the number of days spent on patrol) on what should normally be kept under cover and the ease of satellite surveillance on even these submarines in harbour is reflected by the Google map representation of the Ship Building Centre (SBC). Unfortunately, adequate arrangements have not been made towards concealment of SSBNs, making it yet another case of infrastructure lag.

According to the 2018 India Today report: ‘The Arihant, which commenced construction in 1998, was launched in 2009. The deterrent patrol illustrates its rapid return to active duty after she was laid up after a flooding accident in 2017. A second SSBN, the Arighat, was launched at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam on 19 November 2017 by defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman. The Arighat is on harbour trials and is expected to join the navy in a few years. Two more submarines, the S-4 and the S-4* are also being assembled and are likely to be launched by 2020 and 2022. The last two submarines are over 1000 tonnes heavier than the Arihant and the Arighat and can carry eight K-4 missiles.’ This information could not have been given other than by an official government source. Such information, if authentic, would be classified top secret and should never have been divulged to the media.

In another more recent report in the Mail Today, it was stated that, ‘S4 is ready for its sea trials by end of this year. S4 is an extended Arihant class design that has twice the weapons carrying capability than the Arihant class. S4 can carry 8 K-4 SLBM with a range of 3,500km or 24 K-15 SLBM with a range of over 800km in its eight vertical launch tubes… S4 sister class ship called S4* (Star) will be ready for sea trials by 2022 and induction by 2024. S4 and S4* will be SSBMs which largely will be getting K-4 and K-5 SLBM missiles, while Arighat and Arihant will be limited to shorter K-15 SLBMs. K-5 SLBM is a new missile which is yet to be tested and reportedly has a range of 5000km. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has already got approvals to design and develop K-6 SLBM. It has a range of 8,000km with MIRV weapons payload to be armed on S5 class nuclear ballistic missile submarines which India plans to construct after completion of S4*.’

Meanwhile, the Economics Times reported that a DRDO spokesman informed the media in 2020, that the 3,500km missile was ready for induction after two successful tests. All advanced navies follow a rigorous programme of testing for any missile due to the inherent risks, both of the possible loss of unintended civilian casualties as well as due to the loss of crew and platform in case of a misfire in flight or fire on the platform.

A Long Journey

The nuclear submarine programme has been progressing surely, albeit slowly. There have been numerous delays due to the large-scale change in equipment from Arihant to Arighat with the thrust on indigenisation. Consequently, even more delays can be expected for future platforms due to issues during trials and integration between equipment belonging to different vendors.

However, an area of concern is the lack of long-term support contracts for important equipment vendors. More often than not, the suppliers of original equipment have to compete in an open tender for support or supply of equipment to follow-on platforms due to the insistence of the defence ministry on an open tender. This is not being supportive of companies who have already invested in manufacture and support of equipment despite the much-touted ‘Make in India’ policy of the government. This is likely to create a technical and logistic holdup for future platforms if the defence ministry/ DRDO and Headquarters Advanced Technology Vessel Project (ATVP) do not realise their folly. Luckily so far, this has not affected Larsen and Toubro (L&T) which continues to be the lead shipbuilding partner. The spin-offs of the nuclear submarine programme in terms of manufacture of equipment and sub-systems by Indian original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have unfortunately not been made available in a systematic manner to the conventional submarine programme due to the inherent secrecy and compartmentalisation of the nuclear submarine programme. This is an area which needs focus by the navy.

For the SSN programme the design phase will be critical. Because unlike other nuclear submarine building navies, India does not have sufficient natural uranium and consequently enriched nuclear fuel unless there have been new discoveries which have gone unreported in the public domain. Therefore, it may be more prudent to look at a smaller displacement submarine like the Arihant which would not only be cost effective but also save time and effort in validating the design, construction of a new submarine and a new reactor. This would enable the builder to leverage the existing SSBN building line, more importantly a proven reactor and the lessons learnt from the first and second of the class. This will also provide more flexibility for berthing the platform in case of contingencies, which is presently extremely limited.

Unfortunately, as