Frozen in Time

Air Marshal Ramesh Rai (retd)

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has conceptualised creation of integrated theatre command structures, as part of military reforms, in the belief that these will augur jointness augmenting our war fighting capability. Clearly his contention is that in the present arrangement we operate in silos and lack the ability to fight as an integrated force.

But in reality, the present structure has always worked in the face of the many challenges of various wars. Pakistan’s first attempt to occupy Kashmir in 1947-48 was blunted by close and effective cooperation between army and the air force. In 1965 Indo-Pak War, Indian Army plans were initially not known to the IAF, but later as the army asked for help, the coordination was complete. During the 1971 conflict, the planning process was joint from the word go and India conducted one of the most successful campaigns in history with the liberation of Bangladesh and surrender of 93,000 Pakistan soldiers, a feat unprecedented after WWII. Likewise, during the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army and Air Force combined remarkably well once the initial hiccups were resolved at the Chiefs of Staff Committee and threw back the intruders by integrated combat power application. Videos of Mirage aircraft firing laser bombs on Pakistani troops on Tiger Hill still roll in our minds bearing testimony to the army-air force combine. The army-air coordination in the ongoing imbroglio in Ladakh, bereft of any theatre structure is another example.

It seems rather strange that theatres are being conceived to force a combine on military personnel, merely on the belief that a compulsory merge would integrate forces and enhance war fighting potential. In his treatise, titled ‘Has it Worked-The Goldwater Nichols Act’, the author James R. Locher III, cites that problems of jointness exist even in integrated/ theatre command structures. Problems between Gen. Wesley K. Clarke, Commander Allied Force and Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, Joint Air Force Component Commander affected campaign planning in the Kosovo operations even while under an Integrated Command Structure. Refusal of orders from Gen. Clarke by Gen. Michael David Jackson, Commander Rapid Reaction Force, had to be resolved after the Kosovo conflict. In Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan (March 2002), senior army commanders were widely criticised by their naval and air counterparts for not coordinating with them effectively even while under one command. The Indian armed forces have had a similar experience when during the IPKF operations in 1987, the army commander of the IPKF Unified Command elected to make a helicopter drop at Jaffna University, overruling the air force element’s advice of it being far too risky. Consequently, all helicopters were damaged, and a number of lives lost. These examples pointedly confirm that jointness is not implicit in an integrated command structure.

Frozen in Time

Integration implies merging of activities for warfighting by understanding concepts of joint warfighting, resolving doctrinal issues, clarity on roles and planning jointly for synergistic application of military power, as was demonstrated during the 1971 war. Joint planning requires knowledge and understanding of the core competencies of the other service and is a fundamental requirement irrespective of the structure we carve/ adopt/ retain. This is where the CDS ought to focus for evolving reforms. In his article titled ‘Theaterisation: Ar