FORCE is 19 | Politics of Peacekeeping

Smruti Deshpande

Indian contingent leaving Haiti in 2019

While researching for this story, FORCE spoke to a number of veterans who shared their experiences of being a part of the UN missions in the early and mid-nineties in Africa. After the research concluded, the one thing that stood out was the world’s journey from the prism of the United Nations. From peace keeping the world has now moved to peace enforcement.

The difference?

Under the UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII show the way to the UN Collective Security System. While Chapter VI requires states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, by undertaking negotiation, mediation and confidence-building, Chapter VII enables the Security Council to take coercive action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

Peace-enforcement, ironically, requires the use of arms and military paraphernalia. While the UN abides by consent of all parties involved before deploying of troops in a country, “Peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.”

In addition, the UN describes the use of force as, “UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.” It was during the 1990s that the term ‘peace enforcement’ came into being. This was to use force against elements who carried out ‘acts against humanity’.

A brief guide on peacekeeping by Thomson Reuters Trust Foundation stated, ‘The Security Council passed several resolutions invoking Chapter 7, including to provide protection for humanitarian aid in Somalia in 1992, and protection for civilians in Bosnia and Rwanda.’ It added that in 2005, the UN World Summit issued a statement saying that if states cannot or will not protect their civilians and there are massive and systematic violations of human rights or denial of humanitarian access, the United Nations can intervene under Chapters VI and VII.

In the decade of 1990s, when in the Central African country, Angola, a civil war was ongoing, and the country saw a power struggle between two former anti-colonial guerrilla movements—the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and anti-communist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—the UN established several peacekeeping operations. UNAVEM I, II and III and MONUA were the operations that the UN carried out. The Bicesse Peace Accords, mediated by Portugal with the assistance of the US and Russia, were signed on 31 May 1991 by representatives of Jonas Savimbi and President Eduardo dos Santos.

Maj. Gen. Pradeep Goswami (retd) of the Indian Army, who now serves as the Deputy Director of the United Services Institution (USI) was deployed in Angola as the United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) in 1991-1992. Recalling an incident that took place in one of the regional headquarters in southern Angola, he says, “The UN troops were housed in the southern part of the country called Mavinga, where the UN’s regional headquarter was based. During one of our patrol duties in the jungles, we found that they had deployed guns in the area. The regional headquarter was close to Savimbi’s area of dominance so we knew that those guns belonged to him. In addition, they were of American make. The situation was such that Savimbi enjoyed indirect support from the US through South Africa, while the government in power was supported by the Russians. After coming back from the recce, we reported the incident to the UN headquarters in New York. The same night, Savimbi’s men surrounded the regional headquarters and made sure nobody was allowed to move out of there for nearly three days. By blocking