IAF cannot afford any more delay in its modernisation

Grp Capt. A.K. Sachdev (Retd)

One constant refrain in the context of the Indian Air Force (IAF) is the lament about how its present-day combat squadron strength has dropped to 29 (or 30, dependent on the source one consults) against a sanctioned strength of 42. Interestingly, a prominent national security expert --- rather unkindly --- iterates that the IAF uses the figure of 42 as a “cover for importing more foreign fighter aircraft”. Subdued voices within the IAF and the strategic community have been raising the flag that 42 is an outdated figure in need of an upward revision in view of altered geopolitics and the spectre of a two-front war. While IAF officials have been quoted in media as projecting 2040 as the year when the figure of 42 squadrons would be reached, this author is not aware of any IAF exercise to review the 42 figure itself. 

However, a study published in August this year in a Sage Journal (‘The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation’) questions the rationale behind the 42 figure and uses the Monte Carlo model to analyse the IAF’s requirements to conclude that “India’s requirements vary between 67 and 79 squadrons to achieve a high probability of air superiority in a two-front conflict” (the variation is on account of uncertainty about China’s role). This figure has not been granted official recognition by the IAF but does underscore, on the one hand, its critical shortfall, and on the other, the challenges of modernisation. This article looks at the current plans for the IAF and, keeping in view India’s own experience as also lessons from the Russia-Ukraine and the US-Israel-Iran wars, makes some suggestions for the future of the IAF. 

Present State

In the context of squadron strength, it is pertinent to note that numbers are not an absolute mode of comparison. In the first battle of Panipat, a Timurid army of around 15,000 soldiers defeated the Lodi empire’s army which had more than double those numbers because of the qualitative edge rendered by two-dozen artillery pieces (and some other factors). Similarly, an exercise to predict outcomes of air battles by arithmetically weighing one air force’s aircraft numbers with its adversary’s is ineffectual. 

World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft (WDMMA) tracks air services the world over to draw up Global Air Powers Ranking annually; it uses a formula that considers overall strength, modernisation levels, logistical infrastructure, offensive and defensive capabilities etc to produce the TruVal Rating (TVR) --- a comprehensive assessment for comparison purposes. It places the IAF at the sixth place after US Air Force (USAF), US Navy, Russian Air Force (RAF), US Army and US Marines. 

Another analytical resource GlobalMilitary.Net uses a more complex index called Air Inventory Rating of Strength (AIRS) for air forces and places India fourth after USAF, Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and RAF. The site lists the IAF inventory as 258 Su-30s, 112 Jaguars, 59 MiG-29s, 46 Mirage 2000s, 36 Rafales, 26 Jaguars and 35 Tejas Mk1s (which are not operational combat aircraft). The total number of operational aircraft is 537 which, at 18 aircraft per squadron, indicates a squadron strength between 29 and 30. However, the numbers are, once again, deceptive. 

IAF Jagaurs, MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s are already operating on extended lifecycles and, while the last of the Jaguars would be de-inducted by 2032, the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 squadrons would start reaching the end of their productive life by 2040. 

The Mirage 2000 was inducted in 1985 and India was offered the opportunity twice to manufacture it in India --- once at the time of initial induction, and later again in 2000. However, India passed up on those opportunities. The Mirage 2000 is not being given another extension but as it has been retired by the French Air and Space Force, India has contracted to acquire 24 phased out Mirage 2000s from France for the purpose of cannibalising spares and components, thus giving the ageing IAF fleet a second (albeit feeble) wind. The last of these would be out of service by 2040.