Military modernisation post Sindoor must focus both on indigenous weapons and futuristic technologies

Maj. Gen. Atanu Pattanaik

There are many ways of looking at Operation Sindoor, how it was conducted, the outcomes it delivered and the impact it has had on theories and practice of warfare. At one level, one may summarise lessons learnt from this landmark operation and evolve equipping norms and training modules based on them. At another level, it can also be viewed as a validation of many paradigm changes in equipment philosophy and warfighting tactics that the Indian armed forces would have adopted in the days and years leading to Operation Sindoor for it to be so spectacularly successful.

However, before delving into the pros and cons of these viewpoint at two ends of the spectrum and pontificate on what the Indian armed forces must take-away from this operation in order to plan its future equipment profile, training modules and doctrinal outlook, some plain speak on the nature of Operation Sindoor in the overall matrix of warfare must be laid bare. It must be recognised that Operation Sindoor was not a full-blown war involving mass mobilisation, preparation of defences followed by outbreak of hostilities that entailed intense contact battles which test the limits of the forces, their equipment, command structures, logistics and operational resilience. 

Launched as a retribution for the horrific attack on Hindu tourists in Pahalgam that left 25 dead, Operation Sindoor was limited in scope at the time of launch, anti-terror in nature that targeted terrorist camps and support structures. But India was cognisant about the possibilities of escalation even to a full spectrum warfare between the two nuclear neighbours. Noting this backdrop, it must be acknowledged and lauded that for the first time, India executed a calibrated, multi-domain, and tech-enabled operation below the nuclear threshold with clearly defined objectives and tight escalation control. It also signalled a doctrinal shift from reactive deterrence to proactive compellence. 

Operation Sindoor, an open-ended operational posture that it has morphed into since, was in essence a non-contact hybrid war with both sides constantly assessing the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop to cease operations earliest. India responded with the desired alacrity to the Pakistani Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) request on 10 May 2025 afternoon to announce cessation of active operations.

As the operation unfolded, India hit Pakistan back at times and places they least expected. Never in their imagination did the Pakistani establishment think that India would attack airbases like Nur Khan, Sargodha, Rahim Yar Khan or Bholari which were considered their fortresses. Apart from the surprise factor, Indian armed forces carried out punitive and methodical destruction of the enemy military assets. After 88 hours of intense-pause-intense cycles, the day was won largely due to the precision and lethality of the indigenous BrahMos and Akash missile systems.