DisTech and the IAF

Gp Capt. Ram Ithikkat (retd)

The term ‘revolution’ is not meant to insist that change will be rapid – indeed past revolutions have unfolded over decades – but only that the change will be profound, that the new methods of warfare will be far more powerful than the old. Innovations in technology make a military revolution possible, but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of operations develop and, in many cases, new military organisations are created.

Andrew W Marshall, ‘Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions’ Office of the Net Assessment Memorandum, 27 July 1993

The phrase ‘Disruptive Technologies’ coined by Prof. Clayton M. Christensen has become decidedly fashionable in military circles. In a report for the Centre for New American Security, Ben FitzGerald and Shawn Brimley defined Disruptive Technology in the defence sector as ‘technology or a set of technologies applied to a relevant problem in a manner that radically alters the symmetry of military power between competitors’ which then ‘immediately out-dates the policies, doctrines and organisation of all actors.’ For ease of reading and comprehension, the term DisTech is used to describe this technological surge that, unlike the situation after World War I and II, has largely originated from the non-military world.

Quite like DisTech is the term ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA). These terms are often used to describe the major changes in the way states prepare and wage war. The pace of technological and social change and the continuing antagonisms between states makes it certain that war, military revolutions, and revolutions in military affairs will play a central role in the foreseeable future. Foresight is vital to the Indian armed forces in their efforts to adjust to the restructuring of world order, combating the continuing insurgencies and terrorism, our unresolved territorial disputes, and the rise of China. These issues spread across a wide canvas ranging from addressing shortcomings in organisational structures to the procurement of weapon systems with which the forces will fight throughout the next decades of the twenty-first century.

The Silver Bullet

Information warriors today advocate DisTech and high-tech weapons as the proverbial ‘silver bullet’. They believe that the technological surge will bring about dramatic changes in military operations. The use of low-observable aircraft (stealth) to negate air defences, smart weapons for precision conventional-strike operations, development and refining of UAVs, the miniaturisation and weaponisation of drones and their use across a broad spectrum and so forth are indeed spectacular technology-driven breakthroughs. They will continue to bestow a military advantage on the first nation to develop and use them.

However, the opposing view is that a force must be restructured and made effective through superior tactics, training, and leadership. The success of the USAF in the watershed war of Desert Storm has been attributed by many analysts to the leadership of visionaries like General W.L. ‘Bill’ Creech. Savaged by a top-down management structure favoured by men like Robert McNamara and General Walter Sweeney and ravaged by the ‘ghosts of Vietnam’, the US armed forces underwent a metamorphosis from a faction-ridden outfit battling drug abuse and favouritism into an efficient, result-oriented fighting force.

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Is There Another View?

Let us carry out a brief analysis of Case Yellow (Fall Gelb). France fe