Director general Central Reserve Police Force, Kuldiep Singh

The recent incident bears a similarity to the one that happened last year. In both, the Maoists were carrying out the Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign when the security forces mounted the operation. What went wrong?

There was no intelligence failure because the forces in this case went on an intelligence input which was being received from the previous seven to 10 days. We knew that the Maoist Madvi Hidma along with his battalion and a company from the Central Regional Command (CRC) were there in the area adjoining his home village of Puvarti. We also knew that in another place called Jonaguda, Maoists were present in large numbers.

Based on these inputs, the forces launched an assault. The forces started for Jonaguda from CRPF’s Tarrem post on the night of April 3 and reached there early morning on April 4. They combed nearly 1.5 km of the surrounding area but they did not find anything there. Not even tale tell signs of the Maoists even being there. Thereafter, they started their journey back, but from a different route. On the way back, the Maoists had laid an ambush at a place called Teklagudam. We had no intelligence about the ambush at Teklagudam. The Maoists had taken over the hillocks and other geographical obstructions. They had mounted a Light Machine Gun (LMG). They also used country-made weapons. They started firing in huge numbers; and then started closing in on the troops. After the forces were hit, they too started firing back. The fierce firefight continued for about four-and-a-half hours. Both sides were hit.

Our troops managed to break through the ambush, and brought back the mortal remains of two of our own soldiers along with one of theirs. Even when it was not possible to carry other fallen soldiers’ bodies, they managed to pick their arms and bring them along too. We had a total of 31 injured men. The fact that our forces managed all of this and actually broke the ambush is an act of bravery.

Some reports say that this operation was being planned for a few weeks, and senior officers, including some with prior experience in Bastar, had come to Chhattisgarh to oversee it. What was the objective of the operation and how much of it was achieved?

We had intelligence inputs coming in at least seven to 10 days prior regarding the presence of the Maoists in the said area. But the operation was planned only a day before. Nobody from the higher ranks