DefExpo Special | Fight to Win

Mandeep Singh

As the Russia-Ukraine war plods along with the air campaign largely being conducted through unmanned deep-strike systems, there is no better time than the present to reflect on the changing nature and methodology of application of air power and how it will affect India. The lessons of the Ukraine air war may take some time to crystallise, but it is important that a look from the ground up be given due import as the application of air power affects surface operations as well.

This is important due to the divergent views held by the army and the air force on the application of air power. Air forces consider themselves as a strategic service and give primacy to the control of the air, with support to surface operations almost as an adjunct. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is no exception as its doctrine notes that “priority must be given to the achievement of control of the air so that the enemy air force’s ability to interfere with own surface force action is blunted.”

Surface force actions are thus given indirect support. One of the roles of the IAF, which is ‘applying direct pressure on the enemy’s power of resistance by attacking his crucial centres of gravity,’ also refers to indirect support. The role of the air force to ‘synergise the combat potential of air power with that of the surface forces’ is the one reference to close air support (CAS) but it is given a lower priority. This has serious implications for the conduct of military operations, especially in the mountains, and it needs a closer look. Before doing so, it will be advisable to try and understand the lessons of recent conflicts, including the Ukraine operations, as they will affect and shape the wars of the future.

To be upgraded Mi-17

Ukraine Lessons

Some initial lessons can be drawn from the Ukraine war, particularly from the conduct of air operations. One of the primary lessons is the need to question the established theories of application of air power, of gaining air supremacy and control of the air. Though the last round has not been fired in Ukraine and it may be premature to draw final lessons, it is apparent that neither side has been able to control the air or gain air superiority and yet has been able to conduct ground operations with varying degrees of success. Gaining control of the air may well be a thing of the past as the two sides settle down to a state of denial of air.

As observed in other recent conflicts also, the means of exploiting the air have proliferated. They are no longer only the manned platforms but include Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, deep-strike large calibre rocket and tube artillery. This has been so since decades but in recent times there is an increasing importance being accorded to the employment of unmanned platforms to project air power. The recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has demonstrated the potential of using the UAS in supp