Counterterrorism is Cheaper than Counterinsurgency, but it Does Not Offer the Same Long-Term Benefits if Successful

What were the challenges in evolving the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine which basically told the military what they were doing wrong?

Actually, within the military there was wide awareness that reform was necessary. No one was satisfied with what was occurring in Iraq. The challenge was deciding exactly what sort of changes needed to be made. LTG Petraeus returned from Iraq with his own ideas that informed the army initiatives, and he was aware that LTG Mattis was doing the same for the Marine Corps. One of my key roles became combining and reconciling the two approaches. The biggest task for the writing team was selecting the best ideas that would meet the expectations of those two distinguished soldier-scholars.

What kind of resistance did you face?

We ran into a number of different forms of resistance, but LTG Petraeus was a master at dealing with them, usually by making the dissenters part of the process. The involvement of so many disparate groups at the big February 2006 conference insured buy-in from the interagency and human rights community, among others. He also had key media contacts there.

When someone criticised the manual in print, he had myself or his XO, Col. Pete Mansoor, pen an immediate response. The Intelligence Centre at Fort Huac