Counterterrorism is Cheaper than Counterinsurgency, but it Does Not Offer the Same Long-Term Benefits if Successful

What were the challenges in evolving the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine which basically told the military what they were doing wrong?

Actually, within the military there was wide awareness that reform was necessary. No one was satisfied with what was occurring in Iraq. The challenge was deciding exactly what sort of changes needed to be made. LTG Petraeus returned from Iraq with his own ideas that informed the army initiatives, and he was aware that LTG Mattis was doing the same for the Marine Corps. One of my key roles became combining and reconciling the two approaches. The biggest task for the writing team was selecting the best ideas that would meet the expectations of those two distinguished soldier-scholars.

What kind of resistance did you face?

We ran into a number of different forms of resistance, but LTG Petraeus was a master at dealing with them, usually by making the dissenters part of the process. The involvement of so many disparate groups at the big February 2006 conference insured buy-in from the interagency and human rights community, among others. He also had key media contacts there.

When someone criticised the manual in print, he had myself or his XO, Col. Pete Mansoor, pen an immediate response. The Intelligence Centre at Fort Huachuca did not like our social-cultural intelligence and some other proposals, and held up the publication of the manual by a couple months. Eventually, LTG Petraeus ordered the commander there to send a team to meet with us and resolve our differences, which we did, resulting in a better product. But that delay also gave Ralph Peters time to write a harsh article condemning the doctrine for neglecting enough killing. He was one of those critics who favoured an enemy-centric approach to COIN instead of a population-centric one. LTG Petraeus invited him to Fort Leavenworth to debate LTC John Nagl on the issue, and a few more chang