Burden of History

Brig. B.L. Poonia (retd)

India claims Aksai Chin across Ladakh and Thagla Ridge across NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency), and China claims both Aksai and NEFA. But how does the claim of a nation get justified, on any piece of territory? It has to be either by conquest or by consent. Was India ever in possession of these areas, or were these territories ever acquired by India under any treaty? The answer is no.

If that be so, on what basis have we based our claim upon these areas, and how exactly are we justified in blaming China for being in possession of Aksai Chin or Thagla Ridge? Moreover, why have we been made to believe that China had forcefully occupied these areas, and China was the aggressor, and India the victim, in 1962?

Well, the simple answer to these complex questions lies in Nehru’s desire to acquire these areas, fully knowing that India had no historical or legal claim on them. But why did such a strange desire germinate in his mind? That is a mystery. India became independent on 15 August 1947, and People’s Republic of China came into existence about two years later on 1 October 1949. Nehru considered China militarily a weak nation, incapable of facing India, and firmly believed that physical possession of territory was nine-tenths of the law.

Neville Maxwell, in his book India’s China War, writes, ‘In 1834, Gulab Singh’s Dogras invaded Ladakh, but were pushed back by the Tibetans. A non-aggression treaty was signed in October 1842, asking each other to respect “the old, established frontiers”, where the most advanced Indian post in Ladakh was at Chushul, far short of Aksai Chin.’ This formed the de facto boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, which the British printed on their maps as ‘Alignment of the British Boundary Commission 1846-47’, and later extended the same towards the northwest, naming it as the ‘Foreign Office Line-1873’. But even this was far short of Aksai Chin, running west of the Karakoram Range. Aksai Chin, the area east of Karakoram Range, had always been a part of Tibet, and Tibet was at that time unquestionably under the control of China.

Importance of Aksai Chin

Maxwell writes, ‘Aksai Chin means “desert of white stones’”. It is a high and desolate plateau, 17,000 feet above sea level, covering an area of 33,000 square kilometres, where nothing grows and no one lives, lying between the towering ranges of Karakoram and Kuen Lun. The ancient silk route lay along this. The British strategic interest lay in keeping the mighty Russian empire and the Chinese away, by having Aksai Chin as a buffer zone, since the Russians, the Chinese, and the British feared each other.’

W.H. Johnson, a British officer of Survey of India, who visited Khotan (China) in 1865 via Aksai Chin, drew a boundary line showing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. It was named Johnson Line (also known as Johnson-Ardagh Line), and the same was published in an atlas in 1868. It had no legal sanctity as it was a unilaterally drawn line, that was sought to be proposed, but the British never even communicated this as a boundary proposal to China. Interestingly, this is the line from which India derives its claim on Aksai Chin.

In 1899, the British proposed to divide Aksai Chin through the McCartney-MacDonald Proposal, a boundary line suggesting that a portion of Aksai Chin be included in the British territory. But the Chinese never replied. After 1899, there was no further attempt by the British to get China to agree to a boundary alignment across Ladakh.

So, the only ratified boundary that had legal sanctity, was the one which existed as per the ‘Ladakh-Tibet Treaty of 1842,’ which continued to be marked as the official boundary on the British maps, per which the entire Aksai Chin remained a part of China. However, the Johnson Line, which had no legal sanctity, continued to be shown as ‘boundary undefined’, thereby implying it to be one of the boundaries ‘to be proposed’. But for China, the strategic importance of Aksai Chin increased manifold, after the construction of the Aksai Chin Highway in 1957, which linked the vast regions of Sinkiang Province with Western Tibet.

Now let us move on to NEFA and examine the history of the McMahon Line. The sudden collapse of Chinese power in Tibet in 1911-12 tempted Lord Hardinge to capture the area that later came to be known as NEFA. However, a direct attack on Tibet would have resulted in a war with China. Hence Britain convoked a tripartite conference in Simla, comprising Britain, China and Tibet in October 1913. Since China exercised ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet, it still controlled Tibet’s foreign policy. But the Simla Conference did not result in any treaty to which China was a party, since the British proposals were not acceptable to China. Hence the British played a trick, and secretly signed a bilateral agreement with Tibet. However, even the 1913 Simla Convention showed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet.

But this bilateral agreement was kept a secret, since it was in violation of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, as well as the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, under which Britain was prohibited to enter into negotiations directly with Tibet except through an intermediary of the Chinese government.

Four months later in February-March 1914, the British invited Tibet to Delhi for further discussions on the Assam-Tibet border but China was not informed. A secret treaty was signed on 24 March 1914, and the alignment agreed upon was the McMahon Line, which resulted in the drawing of a new boundary alignment, marked on maps between Assam and Tibet, extending from Bhutan into Burma. It was a 1,050-kilometre-long line, of which 890 kilometres lay in India, and 160 kilometres in Burma. Essentially, it pushed the British boundary up northward by about 100 kilometres. The newly added area on the map came to be known as NEFA, covering an area of 65,000 square kilometres.

However, China was not a part of this treaty and it made it clear that since Tibet did not enjoy sovereign identity, or treaty-making powers, it would not recognise any treaty which excluded China, in violation of the Anglo-Chinese Convention 1906. Legally, this treaty was illegal.

World War l broke out soon thereafter, and the McMahon Line was forgotten, till the Survey of India began to show it as its northeast boundary in 1937, but qualifying it as ‘undemarcated’. Soon thereafter, both British and China got involved in World War II. The British left India in 1947, leaving behind two unilaterally drawn boundary lines on maps, across Ladakh and NEFA, without the consent of China. Since both these boundary lines had not been ratified by China, they lacked legal sanctity to be treated or claimed as international boundaries. That is why the British never even attempted to occupy or capture either Aksai Chin or NEFA, nor did it ever lay any claim on these areas.

The Chinese power returned in Tibet in 1950, but soon China got occupied with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. During this period, India ‘quietly’, without consulting China, annexed NEFA in1951 by sending a strong patrol under Maj. Bob Khating of Assam Rifles, who hoisted the Indian flag at Tawang on 9 February1951, forcing the Tibetan administration out of Tawang, in spite of its vehement protests. Thus, the McMahon Line was ‘unilaterally’ transported from the maps to the ground as the de facto northeast boundary of India.

India added 65,000 square kilometres of territory by annexing NEFA, which legally belonged to China, but China did not protest. This puzzling silence of China can be construed as her acceptance of the McMahon Line, since China wanted to maintain good friendly relations with India to resolve its border issues. However, Nehru misconstrued China’s quietude for its military weakness, which encouraged him further to make similar moves to acquire more of the Chinese territory.

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Despite this unwelcome and unexpected move by India, China displayed magnanimity once again, by agreeing to sign the famous Indo-China Friendship Treaty, the Panchsheel Agreement (five principles of peaceful co-existence) on 29 April 1954, and in the mid-Fifties, the slogan ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ became very popular in India. This treaty formed the basis of India's foreign policy with China.

However, in 1954, within two months of signing this treaty, Nehru unilaterally converted the Johnson Line (boundary undefined) into a permanent boundary line on India’s official maps, by removing the legend ‘boundary undefined’ and thus manufactured the Indian claim on Aksai Chin. China was not informed. In fact, it was a top-secret exercise, which was given a physical expression on the Indian maps under the personal guidance of Nehru. A.G. Noorani, an expert on legal and constitutional matters, known for the study of Indo-China boundary issues, has mentioned this incident in his book India-China Boundary Problem-1846-1947: History and Diplomacy, stating that India revised the maps unilaterally, where the legend defining the legal status of the Johnson Line, was dropped on the official maps, and a firm clear international boundary line was shown instead.

He writes, ‘It was a fateful decision. Old maps were burnt. One former Foreign Secretary told this writer how, as a junior official, he himself was obliged to participate in this fatuous exercise.’ It was speculated that the official was Ram Sathe, India’s last Counsel General in Xinjiang and later an ambassador to China. The book mentions that the new maps were printed showing Johnson Line and McMahon Line as permanent international boundaries without making any reference to the legal status of these lines (boundary undefined and boundary undemarcated).

Another significant change made by Nehru was to alter the alignment of the McMahon Line in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA, shifting it further north from Hathungla Ridge to Thagla Ridge, involving a unilateral shift of about five kilometres, thereby including around 100 square kilometres of Chinese territory in India. The importance of Thagla Ridge lay in the fact that it provided an unhindered view of the Chinese movements and military build-up, deep inside its territory.

A.G. Noorani’s book mentions that Nehru also wanted these maps to be sent to embassies abroad and to be introduced to the public in general to be used in schools and colleges. Accordingly, new maps were printed, and Indian atlases and maps started showing Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge in Indian territory. Indian youth who grew up seeing these maps and atlases since their childhood, had no reasons to disbelieve, and these boundary lines got imprinted and carved in their unsuspecting minds. Anything contrary to this became unbelievable, and anyone challenging this appeared unpatriotic. As per Noorani, even the 1950 edition of Indian maps showed the Johnson Line as ‘boundary undefined’. He writes, ‘A century old problem was neglected by a conscious decision in 1954, which in turn acquired the dimensions of boundary dispute in 1959. Unresolved in 1960 when the prospects of a fair settlement were bright, the dispute was sought to be resolved by confrontation.’

He further wrote, ‘The conclusion is hard to resist that there was a total disconnect between the facts of history and India's policy on boundary problem and later boundary dispute, and worst of all, an impermissible recourse to unilateral change of frontiers.’ It also flouted the October 1842 Lad