Brotherhood of Interests

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Pact is not a cause for concern for India

Air Cmde T.K. Chatterjee (retd)

The recent attack by Israel on Hamas leadership in Qatar had one immediate fallout: the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan military pact. The pact establishes a new phase in bilateral defence relations, transforming decades-old informal security cooperation into a binding, formalised collective defence agreement. It ensures collective security in that any external aggression against either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia will be considered an act of aggression against both, requiring mutual consultation and coordinated military response.

The agreement promises joint efforts in intelligence sharing, weapons procurement, military technology transfer, defence-industrial collaboration, co-production of advanced systems, capacity-building, and training. As expected, it has left the nuclear aspects ambiguous. Pakistani officials have suggested that ‘all military means’ are included, which has led to speculation—though not official confirmation—about a potential Pakistani nuclear umbrella for Saudi Arabia. Pakistani defence officials later backed away from explicitly confirming nuclear sharing, but outside analysts believe the pact at least implies extended deterrence.

This is not the first time that two or more Islamic countries have tried to come together to form a military alliance. The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), founded by Saudi Arabia in December 2015 and headed by a retired Pakistan Army Chief, initially included 34 Muslim nations and later expanded to 41. IMCTC’s headquarters were established in Riyadh, with the primary mission of coordinating joint efforts against terrorism, including intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism operations, and narrative-building. IMCTC remains active but has been relatively limited in conducting large-scale military operations.

A Historical Perspective

While the notion of Muslim unity in the face of non-Muslim threats is central to Islamic thought and remains a powerful rallying cry, history shows it has been inconsistently realised, with brief periods of cooperation overshadowed by recurrent political and sectarian divisions.

 Pakistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar with the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal bin Farhan. Pic/ X

In an article in Center for Pluralism, titled ‘Top Reasons for the Lack of Unity Among Muslim Countries’, the author blames the colonial powers for the lack of Islamic unity and quotes the British Lord Curzon who stated after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, “We must ensure that Muslims will never arise again in unity, whether it be intellectual or cultural unity.” To this effect, the author claims that the creation of Israel in 1947 was not a humanitarian act, but a Western outpost in the resource-rich but politically divided Muslim region. It goes on to say that presently, in the Middle East, those countries that sing the Western tune are rewarded with Western benevolence, and those who do not, face crippling economic sanctions, regime change operations, and invasions like Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, etc.

That line of justification for the lack of Islamic unity is not entirely correct. Fragmentation of the Islamic society started long ago. Though the Prophet Mohammed is ranked amongst the most influential persons in human history for bringing together warring tribes into a cohesive nation, the fragmentation of Muslim society began with his death over the question of his succession. What started as a political dispute evolved into a theological and sectarian divide, creating the Shia and Sunni Islam, a divide that has hardened over centuries and been exploited too. Over centuries, doctrinal differences grew involving theology, religious law, and ritual practices, although core beliefs about God and the Prophet Muhammad remain shared. Political competition and dynastic rivalries further deepened the schism and shaped social identities in the Muslim world. This divide has created more fragmentation amongst the Muslim Brotherhood than any colonial power could have engineered.

A stark example of this disunity is in the many Arab Israeli conflicts. The Arab nations did try to come together as a unified force but failed every time to achieve a common aim. Starting in 1948, when Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon attacked the newly formed state of Israel, their unity was more aspirational than practical, and intra-Arab rivalries, diverging interests, and coordination failures critically hampered military effectiveness and political objectives. Subsequently, during the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur War, Arabs mounted joint military operations against Israel but suffered from poor coordination, rivalries, and a lack of trust, resulting in military defeats and significant territorial losses for Arab states.

Attempts like the creation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or the IMCTC represent institutional efforts to promote unity in the face of external threats, but internal divisions, geopolitical rivalry, and differing priorities among member states have often hampered these alliances. Muslim scholars and political leaders continue to urge the creation of Islamic alliances to counter external pressures—drawing comparisons to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) or the European Union (EU)—but point out that such unity is more the exception than the norm in Islamic history, with the spirit of cooperation regularly challenged by sectarianism, national interests, and outside influence.

By the Nineties and Noughties, Arab collective action shifted toward symbolic support for Palestinians at international forums, rather than concrete military or economic measures. Changing geopolitics led to the normalisation of ties by some Arab states with Israel, undercutting the unified Arab front. The same pattern continues today: rhetoric of unity, limited practical collective action, and rising national agendas among Arab states. The Saudi-Pak pact is yet another attempt to forge an Islamic union against a non-Islamic enemy. Its success will have to be seen to be believed.

Be that as it may, now that the Saudi-Pak pact is a reality, what are the implications for India?

Since India insists that Operation Sindoor is not over, any terrorist activity on a significant scale on Indian soil can reignite the border between the two nations. If the terrorist act is proven to be orchestrated by any Pakistan-based group, India is bound to respond militarily. In such a case, what role will such a pact play?

India-Saudi Arabia Relations

The total trade volume between India and Saudi Arabia in 2024-25 stood at USD 41.88 billion. India exports food and manufactured goods worth USD 11.76 billion and imports USD 30.12 billion worth of crude and other hydrocarbons. In contrast, the overall trade volume between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is only USD 5.2 billion. Though Bloomberg highlighted potential regional ramifications, noting that ‘a mutual defence pact risks pulling Saudi Arabia into a confrontation with India, with which Pakistan has fought four major wars’, however, to expect Saudi Arabia to come to support Pakistan in case of military conflict between India and Pakistan is far-fetched. It will not make any economic sense, let alone military sense.

Diplomatic relations between India and Saudi Arabia are robust, multifaceted, and have continued to strengthen, despite recent strategic developments in the region. The relationship is rooted in centuries-old economic and cultural ties and has grown dramatically in the last two decades with high-level visits, strategic agreements, and institutional mechanisms. As per the Embassy of India, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has pledged substantial investments in India, including a potential USD 100 billion investment, and both nations have fostered strong cooperation in areas like energy security, infrastructure, defence, IT, and health.

Therefore, the Saudi-Pakistan military pact signed in September 2025 is widely understood as a response to the heightened sense of insecurity in the Gulf following Israel’s bombing of Qatar earlier that month. While the pact does not explicitly mention Israel, analysts, officials, and commentators agree that its timing, scope, and public presentation have clear deterrence implications aimed at Israel, especially in the wake of the attack on a US-allied Gulf state.

As per an Atlantic Council report, Saudi Arabia’s rapid move to sign the agreement is interpreted as a message, not just to Israel, but also to the United States and other regional actors, that Riyadh is pursuing alternative security partnerships and is not entirely reliant on Washington for protection from external threats. While the agreement does not explicitly mention Israel, experts agree it functions as an extended deterrence arrangement—warning Israel and other regional actors that any attack on Saudi interests could trigger direct Pakistani military support, up to and including nuclear deterrence.

Additionally, the pact signals Saudi frustration with the US security guarantees and serves as a broader strategic hedge against both Israeli and Iranian threats. The Saudis must remember that Pakistan has, to date, done nothing to help any Muslim country in despair, including Palestine, except to make hollow noises in international forums. They do not have the economic bandwidth to undertake any such operation away from their shores. Moreover, their engrossment over Kashmir and the never-ending proxy war against India keeps them busy. So, if the Iranians, Houthis, or the Israelis come after the Saudis, how much help would come from Pakistan is a matter that the Saudis must consider seriously.

While India needs to remain vigilant to this new geopolitical aspect, however, if India needs to chastise Pakistan in the near future for any terror activity on Indian soil attributable to Pakistan, it is most unlikely that Saudi Arabia will intervene in any capacity, the pact notwithstanding.