Bottoms-Up

Smruti D

On February 23, even as India prepared to welcome US President Donald Trump in one part of the country, clashes broke out in another, making it a battleground for Hindus and Muslims. On February 25, the second day of President Trump’s visit, the two countries signed defence deals worth USD3 billion and showcased their partnership to the world, mainly to India’s neighbours who loom large on India’s threat perception.

Ironically, the damage within the country cost much more than the defence deal, with Indians waging a war against each other in northeast Delhi. The clashes continued for two days and resulted in hundreds being injured, 53 killed and untold damage and destruction of properties in Northeast Delhi. Eventually, eight companies (700 personnel) of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) were called in on February 25. They tackled over 300 incidents of fire before the riots came to a halt.

A serving RAF officer who was on deployment in the riot-hit areas and wishes not to be named, says that the reason the Delhi police could not control the riots was due to lack of preparedness. “The truth is that the present generation of Delhi Police have never faced such a situation and so were not prepared. It was only after the paramilitary forces were deployed that the situation came under control,” he says.

Adding that the police were hesitant to venture into areas which saw heavy stone pelting because they did not have protective gears and helmets, he says that it was dedication, initiative, preparedness of the paramilitary forces that saved the situation.

Meanwhile on the ground, the RAF had a tough time coping with calls for help. They couldn't deploy one company at one place for a long period because by the time they contained violence in one area, they had to rush to another location. According to the officer, there were multiple things that the RAF undertook which they did not have the primary mandate for.

“It is in the culture of the paramilitary forces that if we are faced with some situation that is not our primary mandate, we would still try to do that. In so many places we did the fire fighting also. Although that was not our primary mandate, we did not turn a blind eye to burning houses and shops. We escorted and evacuated people,” he says.

According to him, this was a simple case of basic policing. If the policing had been efficient there would have been no need for the paramilitary forces to come in. The Delhi riots, however, should not be seen as an isolated incident. While communal riots have tested India’s secular fabric at different time, incidents of mob-frenzy also pose a threat to internal security.

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In 2016, when Haryana was on the boil over the Jat community demanding reservations in government jobs, the Indian Army had to be called in as the Haryana police could not handle the unrest which caused severe damage to public property. So volatile was the situation that during a flag march, the army was seen carrying huge white placards signifying who they were in bold red letters. As per media reports, the Haryana police failed to control mob violence because the middle and junior levels of the force were dominated by the Jat community; and hence were reluctant to act against them.

“During a riot, the foremost thing required is one’s willpower to control it,” says Deepak Mishra, a retired Indian Police Service (IPS) officer. “One needs to ha