Pravin Sawhney

One year ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had travelled to Wuhan for the informal summit with President Xi Jinping. Sold in India as Modi’s initiative to ‘reset’ or normalise ties with China after the 72-day Doklam stand-off, the Wuhan summit was the consequence of China’s successful military coercion. The summit paved the way for China’s entry into South Asia. And with India’s assistance.

Speaking on Doklam at the Institute of Chinese Studies on 27 September 2018, former eastern army commander, Lt Gen. Praveen Bakshi who oversaw the stand-off said that compelling the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to build defence habitat and forward deploy its troops in harsh climatic conditions of North Doklam and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a gain for India. Hitherto, while Indian troops held the LAC round the year, the Chinese, with excellent infrastructure on their side, came in vehicles to patrol the LAC.

What escaped Gen. Bakshi was: What if the PLA’s military objective for starting the Doklam face-off was to create conditions for permanent forward deployment and training of its troops? Doklam was carefully chosen by the PLA in the hope that Indian Army would escalate matters, which it did. This made it easier for the PLA to