Launched with much great fanfare, the Agnipath Scheme, has two major aims: to reduce the age profile of the armed forces, and to curtail the rising pension component, utilizing the savings for modernization.

The second component is not being accepted by the political class openly. This hesitation was visible during the press conference when the defence minister quashed the query of a journalist on the subject. Anyhow, there is no room for ambiguity and opaqueness when it’s a question of national security. The major takeaways of the scheme are as follows:

The Agnipath scheme is a major change in the recruitment pattern in the armed forces. It is likely to bring in combat effectiveness, human resource management and psychological displacement especially in the initial years. To focus on key issues, I have reduced the scope of analysis to army and infantry as it is the most affected. The Indian Air Force and the Navy being platform-based and relatively small in numbers are the least affected.

But before any analysis, it is imperative that we understand the current status, structure (of a combat unit) and system in vogue. The current authorized strength of the army has been taken as 12.5 lakh with an average yearly outgo of approximately 60,000 and corresponding intake of the same number. For the last three years no recruitment has taken place due to the pandemic. Hence, the current strength is in deficit by 1,80,000 (approximately 14 per cent). It has also been conveyed to the military that this deficit is unlikely to be filled thereby reducing army’s strength to 10.70 lakh.

The recruitment age before Agnipath was 18 to 21 years, nearly matching the newly announced scheme. However, under Agnipath, the soldier will actually become a regular after four years and serve as per the conditions thereafter; implying that his retirement age will be four years more in the rank he retires, as compared to today.

The strength of an infantry unit is 763. After the 3^rd Cadre Review, this includes 60 JCOs, 131 Havildars and 206 Naiks resulting in a total of 397 higher ranks (rounded to 400) and 366 (rounded off to 370) riflemen/ sepoys. A rifleman serves for a period of 15 plus 2 years i.e., 17 years before retiring. Higher ranks retire in a graded manner from 22 years to 28 years of service.

For a soldier to be assumed as fully trained and experienced (to be a guide or senior partner to a novice), six-year service is a reasonable period during which he would have served in at least two different types of field areas as well as gone through one tenure at a peace station. He would have also undergone sufficient training in all specialist weapons at sub-unit/unit level.

Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness is a product of various factors and not just age and fitness alone. They are the starting point and prerequisite for any army, but it includes numbers, the weapon systems in service, training, experience and lastly, but importantly, morale and motivation. Since the launch of the scheme all proponents for the scheme including the national security advisor, the defence minister, the serving military, senior veterans, some media channels and civil society, have been harping only on age and fitness.

Numbers: The Agniveers will have little effect on the overall numbers, however, their component will keep increasing from 60,000 in the first year to 2.4 lakh in the 4th year i.e., 2026. It’s the classic ‘Push Model’ on display. After 2026, the intake will follow the ‘Pull Model’ since to keep the strength of the army at 10.70 lakh, there will be a necessity to compensate for the 75 per cent I (45,000) going out. Since this will continue to have domino effect, the total strength of the Agniveers will increase from 2.4 lakh (22 per cent) in 2026 to 4.2 lakh (39 per cent) in 2030 and 5.55 lakh (52 per cent) in 2034 as seen in the accompanying table. The peak strength will be reached in 2036 with 6.06 lakh. A whopping 57 per cent! Any attempt to cap the intake will impinge on the overall strength of the army.