America’s Hubris Trap

From Caracas to the Arctic, Trump’s bulldozer foreign policy

Air Cmde TK Chatterjee (retd)

If I were to summarise the international events of the last month, I would go thus. As the United States (US) special forces spirit Nicolás Maduro into custody and Venezuela stumbles into a perilous ‘transition’ shaped more in Washington than in Caracas, the Trump administration is simultaneously rattling the foundations of Arctic security with open threats to annex Greenland, prompting Danish leaders to warn of nothing less than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO’s) unravelling.

Together, these crises expose a new era in which territorial ambition, resource competition, and alliance fatigue collide, forcing NATO to confront a question it was never designed to answer: not how it will deter its adversaries, but whether it can survive the behaviour of its most powerful member.

To explain this clearly, I will address each event separately.

Venezuela

The US has maintained a long tradition of interventionism across Latin America and the Caribbean. Venezuela was only part of a wider pattern till January 2026, not singularly in the US crosshairs. For much of the 20th century, US-Venezuela ties were pragmatic and often cooperative, especially around oil, and only turned openly antagonistic with the ‘Bolivarian’ turn under Hugo Chávez and the subsequent authoritarian drift under Nicolas Maduro. So, effectively, since the rise of Hugo Chavez, successive US administrations have treated Venezuela as a hostile regime, subject to sustained economic warfare with multiple sanctions. The decade-wise breakdown in relations is as follows.

Late 1990s–2000s: Hugo Chávez’s election and the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ shifted Venezuela from a relatively reliable oil partner into an openly anti‑US, anti‑neoliberal pole in Latin America. Early clashes over oil policy, US criticism of Chávez’s internal politics, and the shadow of the 2002 coup attempt laid the emotional and political groundwork in Washington for viewing Caracas as a hostile regime.

2000s–early 2010s: As Chávez deepened alliances with Cuba, Iran, Russia, and later China, and used oil diplomacy to support left‑wing governments, the US foreign‑policy establishment increasingly bracketed Venezuela with other ‘problem states’, even while outright military options remained off the table.

Mid‑2010s: Under Maduro, economic collapse, repression, and contested elections allowed Washington to recast the relationship from ‘strategic nuisance’ to ‘authoritarian crisis’, justifying escalating sanctions. Each new round of financial and oil sanctions normalised the idea that coercive tools were the primary means of dealing with Caracas.

2019–early 2020s: Recognition of an alternative president, overt support for opposition figures, and talk of ‘all options on the table’ embedded regime‑change logic in policy. Even when direct intervention did not materialise, the Overton window had shifted: the notion that Venezuela’s leadership was illegitimate and removable by external pressure became mainstream in Washington.

The question arises, if the hostility was long-standing, what triggered this sudden escalation, wherein an armada of warships and a host of fighter jets was deployed all around the small nation? The pretext was drug smuggling, which was termed as narco terrorism and viewed as an act of war against the US. But facts prove otherwise. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assessments summarised in multiple fact‑checks agree that the vast majority of cocaine consumed in the US originates in Colombia and transits primarily through Central America and Mexico, with Venezuela playing a secondary or minor role in US‑bound flows and a more important role as a platform for Europe‑bound shipments. Fentanyl consumed in the US is overwhelmingly produced in or by Mexican cartels, using precursor chemicals from China and, to a lesser extent, India; Venezuela is not identified as a producer or significant transit point in DEA or UNODC reporting.

Just a change in terminology, from drug smugglers to narco-terrorists, turned the occupants of the boats from ‘smugglers’ to ‘combatants’, which in turn authorised the US to take lethal action against the terrorists and blow up their boats in international waters, continuing to strike until all occupants were confirmed killed. It also turned a law-enforcement issue into a quasi-war framework, reducing legal and political obstacles to military action. The more Venezuela was depicted as a criminal, terrorist linked regime rather than a problematic government, the easier it became to argue that normal diplomatic rules did not apply and that special operations, targeted killings, or cross-border raids were acts of ‘self-defence,’ not aggression. There was no effort to seize the boats, their occupants, or their cargo because the US of today does not need to justify its actions to the world.

As long as America does not wean its population off cocaine and Fentanyl, drug supply chain will continue to exist. According to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health of 2024, about 27.7 million Americans aged 12 and above were reported to be using illegal drugs, excluding marijuana. That roughly equals 9.6 per cent of the US population. A World Population Review report stated that in 2025, the US led all countries in illicit drug consumption. They never focus on killing the demand; they only try to eliminate the supply. History proves the futility of their efforts.

Since Maduro did not take the not-so-subtle hints that Trump and Hegseth were giving him, and did not flee the country, leaving the world’s largest reservoir of oil for the US to plunder, direct military intervention became unavoidable. The smoke screen of drug trafficking, democracy, nation building, and human rights fell apart, exposing naked greed, and the US will now send its oil companies to Venezuela, screaming ‘drill baby drill’. Did Genghis Khan do anything different when he invaded any country except plunder its resources?

The broader picture is that this move gives the Cuban-born Marco Rubio, the face of the Trump administration’s brazen foreign policy, his dream chance to set the terms for Latin America. As a Times of India editorial says, ‘to understand Trump’s Venezuela policy, one has to understand Marco Rubio’s boyhood’. It goes on to say, ‘Maduro was not removed simply because Venezuela failed. He was removed because in Marco Rubio’s worldview, Venezuela had become Cuba. And for half a century, that has been one story that he has never stopped trying to finish.’

The idea that the US will dominate the Western Hemisphere and block any other power from interfering is a bit outdated. The Chinese are already heavily involved in the continent. China is a key economic partner of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. They are a major trading partner of Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Additionally, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua are high-exposure borrowers and political allies. China is now South America’s top trading partner and the second largest for Latin America overall, with bilateral trade around USD 518–520 billion in 2024 and growing. More than 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries have signed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation agreements, creating strong commercial and financial ties, including in Central America and the Caribbean. Latin American nations are deeply divided between Left- and Right-leaning governments. They don’t speak in a unified voice, making them easy to exploit. The Chinese have already taken advantage of this; Rubio has a long way to catch up.

PEOPLE’S POWER Protests in Greenland against US President Trump’s threat to take it over. Picture from al Jazeera english X account

The interesting part of this Venezuelan episode is that Maduro’s vice president, who is not an elected leader, is now the interim President. The legitimate winner of the last election and the main opposition leader are both in the wilderness. So, the US has now chosen to do business with the same authoritarian, undemocratic, human rights-violating legacy that led to Maduro’s removal. This was not unexpected. Trump, the businessman, will deal with the devil himself if he can profit from the deal. Be that as it may, for the US, Venezuela is not a done deal—a lot of prime-time drama should unfold soon. It is the ‘day after’ a regime change that requires greater planning and foresight than the regime change itself. Such a lack was evident in Iraq and Afghanistan. It may get repeated in Venezuela, too.

I may disagree with the reasons for the strike and disapprove of the kidnapping of a sitting president of a sovereign state, but being a soldier, I do acknowledge the excellent pre-strike Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and the surgical precision with which the strike was planned and carried out.

CLOSING RANKS Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov (L) shakes hands with his Cuban counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, in Havana, 
on 19 February 2024

Greenland and NATO

Emboldened by the Venezuelan adventure, the US government has begun officially announcing, through its various spokespeople, the takeover of Greenland as a strategic priority. The US justifies its urgency in the mistaken belief that if it doesn’t act, Russia or China will. Evidence does not indicate that the Chinese or Russians have territorial ambitions in Greenland. The Chinese have bid on infrastructure projects and mining rights, which are purely commercial interests. 

Russian interests in the region are different. Russia is the largest Arctic nation by far, with 53 per cent of the Arctic Ocean coastline, and it has long-standing geopolitical, strategic, and economic stakes in the Arctic. The Arctic is vital to Russia’s economy, supporting jobs, investments, and growth through the oil, gas, and mineral industries, as well as fisheries and infrastructure-related logistics, especially the Northern Sea Route—a major Arctic shipping corridor between Europe and Asia. Additionally, Russia keeps its sea-based nuclear deterrent in the Arctic and maintains numerous military bases and airfields in the area, along with a fleet of icebreakers to facilitate trade, transportation, and resource extraction.

Both Russia and China currently recognise that pursuing territorial aims in Greenland would provoke a response from NATO. Expert analyses of Chinese and Russian activities suggest that, while both seek influence and access in the Arctic, there is no solid plan or capacity in either capital aimed at taking over Greenland’s territory or sovereignty. Therefore, the US claim appears quite exaggerated, similar to ‘drug trafficking’ by Venezuela. The US already has a military base in Greenland and can undoubtedly establish more bases without threatening European and NATO stability. They can also negotiate mining rights with Denmark and Greenland, and cooperation is likely, given the alternatives. 

But if the mineral wealth of Greenland is the main idea behind this step towards its annexation, then hopefully the planners have considered that most of the island’s mineral wealth lies above the Arctic Circle, where the polar ice cap is a mile thick. Greenland lacks both the infrastructure and the people to undertake such tasks. Experts estimate that mining in the Arctic Circle would be five to10 times more expensive than mining anywhere else. So, it remains to be seen whether mining in Greenland can really break China’s stranglehold on rare earth minerals. 

This direct threat of invasion likely comes from the belief that if the US invades, no one will oppose it militarily. Denmark is too small, and Europe too fragmented, to mount any significant resistance. By the time NATO figures out what protocols to follow if the situation escalates, and the UN Security Council drafts a resolution (that the US would veto), the US might have a free hand. Most other so-called ‘global players’ will probably just elevate ‘monitoring the situation’ to the highest level. 

Undoubtedly, Russia would be the ultimate beneficiary of US belligerence over Greenland, having achieved its main goal of breaking up NATO—established 75 years ago ‘to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.’ Though the President of the US (POTUS) has assured the world at Davos 2026 that force will not be used to overrun Greenland, the damage has already been done. It’s too little, too late. According to The Arctic Institute, even purchasing Greenland is illegal. No nation can sell part of the country to another without the consent of its inhabitants. As it turns out, the Greenlanders are not inclined to become Americans.

When a nation gets drunk on power, it risks falling into a hubris trap. This arrogance of the US will accelerate the formulation of alternative alliances and give a firm push towards de-dollarisation of the global economy. It will certainly unravel the trans-Atlantic alliance for good. One scenario often flagged by analysts is a de facto split: the US plus a few followers on one side, and a European‑led defence framework (built around the EU and non‑EU NATO members) on the other. Another is a hollowed‑out NATO that formally survives but loses political trust, with minimal real cooperation and a long‑term shift of Europe toward strategic autonomy and new security arrangements. Adversaries such as Russia and China would see US aggression against an ally as proof that extended deterrence and Article 5 guarantees are no longer reliable, inviting more pressure on Europe’s eastern and Arctic flanks.

The European Dilemma

The continent that should have gone ballistic on the suggestion that Greenland can be invaded militarily is Europe. But it did not do so. Hurried meetings in Paris and joint statements notwithstanding, there has been, and likely will be in the future, very little action on the ground. What bound European militaries together was NATO, but when NATO itself is in disarray, it is indeed a situation of despair. Besides the NATO countries, there are about 40 other countries that have different levels of defence treaties with the US, including the Rio Treaty for the Americas, bilateral treaties with Japan, the Philippines, ANZUS, and Major Non-NATO allies. All these countries will perhaps start looking for other options.

France is the only European country to have been calling for strategic autonomy for the continent. It is the only nation that has historically stood up to the US. This stance was initiated by Charles de Gaulle after he became president of the Fifth Republic. So much so, historian William R Keylor wrote a book titled Charles de Gaulle: A Thorn in the Side of Six American Presidents’. The title alone illustrates the Franco-US relationship. French President Emmanuel Macron himself, though not a leader hostile to the US, has embodied this spirit through his repeated calls for European ‘strategic autonomy’ and his desire to build Europe into a bloc capable of defending itself without relying on America. But that is no simple task. As a French media commentator laments, “The problem, of course, is that Macron isn’t De Gaulle, this isn’t the 1950s and 1960s, and Donald Trump isn’t Kennedy. Or Eisenhower. Or Roosevelt. Or Truman. Or Johnson. Or even Nixon.”

By hitching its wagon to the American gravy train, the EU was always riding a tiger. In its effort to keep the US appeased, it did not raise its voice when the world order was challenged by the US and Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria, Syria, and Venezuela. They went along with the eastward expansion of NATO, despite their Russophobia. They woke up only when unilateral tariff on the EU was imposed and when Greenland became an issue. Europe, as a continent, has only itself to blame if it feels orphaned today.

A non-European country likely to make its presence known in this shifting world order is Canada. It makes less noise but quietly negotiates its trade and strategic options with Europe, China, India, and others. It has also publicly expressed support for Denmark and Greenland, as it shares their Arctic shoreline. If Mark Carney’s speech in Davos 2026 is any indication, he has raised a flag of rebellion against the US.

Conclusion 

What has happened in Venezuela and what is now threatening Greenland are not isolated incidents, but two sides of the same coin: a US that is so confident in its dominance that it ignores laws, alliance commitments, and even long-standing rules when they stand in the way of immediate strategic benefits. In Latin America, this has resulted in a 20-year escalation from sanctions and proxy conflicts to outright regime-change efforts; in the Arctic, it has evolved into a willingness to threaten a partner’s territory to secure bases, minerals, and strategic advantages. In both cases, the unspoken message to friends and enemies alike is that the US views itself as too vital to be constrained—and that very mindset is prompting others to imagine a world where the US is no longer so essential.

This is the ‘hubris trap’—a great power so intoxicated by its own influence that each successful display of strength encourages the next, riskier move, until confidence turns into overreach and counter-coalitions. Nazi Germany had fallen into this trap, too. The Monroe Doctrine notwithstanding, the Western Hemisphere has, after all, only 13 per cent of the world’s population and a shrinking economy. Additionally, Chinese trade, finance, and infrastructure have already established a parallel web of dependencies, providing Latin American governments with imperfect but real alternatives to Washington’s mandates and the dollar-centred financial system. Over the next five to 10 years, it’s easy to imagine this evolving into a loosely connected, China-backed Latin American financial structure: more yuan-denominated contracts, regional development banks aligned with BRICS, and swap lines that lessen the impact of US sanctions, even if the dollar remains dominant.

WHO’S THE BOSS Photographic collage of European leaders’ meeting with US President Donald Trump in early 2025
shared by the latter on social media

Across the Atlantic, an American attempt to pressure Greenland would reinforce every European doubt about relying on a security guarantor willing to threaten one ally to impress others. There would be concerns about the 13 overseas countries and territories linked to the EU. That would speed up ongoing debates about ‘strategic autonomy’ into real initiatives: joint EU command structures in the Arctic, European-funded surveillance and ice-capable fleets, and possibly a de facto EU-led security framework for the High North that functions alongside, and eventually somewhat independently of, a weakened NATO. None of this would mean a clear, Hollywood-style ‘end of the American century’; instead, the next decade would resemble a slow, persistent partial shift away from US dominance—less reliance on the dollar, more regional defence alliances, and a world where Washington still plays a huge role, but no longer automatically gets the benefit of the doubt when it uses force.

The current idea in the Trump administration is that maybe forced compliance is better than forming alliances. However, no matter how much the US wants to remain the world’s only superpower, it’s unlikely to happen. Leadership in science and technology, which are key to economic and national security, will determine the global leader. China is growing at a formidable pace: the Chinese economy is already 30 per cent larger than US’ by purchasing power, its industrial base is twice the size, it generates twice the amount of power, and its naval power is projected to increase by 50 per cent within the next decade.

At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Europe was split between the Allies and the Axis. This division was agreed upon by exhausted nations after the war. The choice was either accept or face more conflict. During the Cold War, this division was maintained by the parties. American leadership and its security assurances were accepted by the Western world, which kept many nations like Canada, Germany and Japan from going nuclear. They had the money and the means to do so. 

Today, the situation is different. China, Russia, and the US will develop their spheres of influence, and if foreign policies turn into a might-is-right approach—as seen in Crimea, Ukraine, Gaza, Venezuela—the world faces very unstable times. They must stop believing the old saying—great powers must expand or die. The more erratically the US behaves, the more China will offer itself as a wise alternate leader and gain wider global acceptance. Despite the differences among these spheres, the Earth will face challenges like future pandemics, climate change, AI weaponisation, transnational terrorism, and more, which will require everyone’s effort. With the former leader of the free world, the US, losing the trust of both friends and foes, it will take a long time before any progress is visible.

Abraham Lincoln said, ‘To test a man’s character, give him power.’ Americans put Donald Trump to the test by giving him power, and the results are for the world to see. Single-handedly, he has changed the world for good, the only person to do so after Adolf Hitler. As the EU Commission president said in Davos, “The world has changed, and the change is permanent”.