A Surgical Move

S.K. Sood

The impunity with which militants have carried out about a dozen attacks on army patrols and posts in Jammu region in the past last 90 days, besides raising serious questions about the overall strategy of the government in controlling militancy, raises serious questions about the planning and actual execution of these plans by the defence forces in controlling militancy in the area. Militants appear to have lot of places available to manoeuvre and regroup for action against security forces due to thinning out of troops caused by the withdrawal and diversion of Rashtriya Rifle (RR) units for deployment along the line of actual control (LAC) on the northern borders with China. This, coupled with very little deployment in remote areas, enables militants to carry out attacks and withdraw to hideouts in these places.

The Army whose primary role is to defend the nation and its territorial integrity against external threats, got involved to combating several insurgencies and militancy in the early years after independence. Initially, it was because other trained forces were not available for the task and the problems were beyond the capability of the police. With the raising of several central armed forces and their large-scale expansion over the years, the Indian Army should logically have been relieved from these tasks and sent to the borders. However, this did not happen, and the Indian Army continues to be deployed for anti-militancy operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for the last 35 years.

It is beyond question that the diversion of defence forces from their primary task to fight militancy/internal security problems should only be as a last resort because it is at the cost of defence preparedness. Deployment of the Indian Army for a prolonged period for internal security tasks is not in the interest of national security as it leads to degradation of their war-fighting capabilities. The Indian Army is not ab initio trained for the task of handling internal security. Nor is it legally empowered to carry out independent operations, especially in those areas where the armed forces special power act (AFPSA) has not been promulgated. In fact, the lack of such legal backing is a major problem that the security forces are facing in controlling the conflict in Manipur. These are valid points and are rightly advanced by the Indian Army for resisting deployment in Maoist-affected central India and other insurgency affected areas.

Another big factor likely to adversely impact the capabilities of defence forces both in war and the internal security environment is the Agnipath scheme introduced in 2022. During my interactions with many serving and retired defence forces personnel of different ranks, the constant refrain was that Agniveers are not suitable for the Army. It was repeatedly stated that the Agniveers lacked adequate motivation because of the uncertainty about their future and also because they felt discriminated on account of salary and the compensatory package, etc. By now a large number of Agniveers have joined the Indian Army and have been posted to different units. Some of these units would also be deployed in anti-militancy duties.

The anti-militancy operations generally are small team operations where individual initiative and quick reflexes are extremely important. The commanders therefore will find it very difficult to adjust an inadequately trained and motivated Agniveer into their plan of operations thereby degrading their capabilities even in these tasks. An ill-motivated Agniveer not seeped in the ethos of ‘Naam, Namak and Nishan’ will probably be the first to abandon his comrade in the eventuality of coming under fire from militants. Another issue is that with only 25 per cent of them to be retained, the Agniveers may resort to sycophancy to impress their superiors. This will have an adverse impact on the camaraderie and team spirit which is likely to compromise operational performance.

CRPF personnel during an operation in Baramulla

Having realised the importance of keeping the Army war ready and ensuring that its warfighting abilities are not adversely impacted, a new force called Rashtriya Rifles was raised as a counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism force in 1990, to specifically serve in the J&K region. The RR also maintains public order by drawing powers from the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990. The RR was raised by the Indian Army by reconstituting two corps (about 75,000 troops). Its personnel are provided by the Indian Army on deputation. Thus, RR battalions were raised by pooling in soldiers from different arms and services. They were put through specialised training for this task. Regular turnover of troops after three to four years in the RR ensured that troops did not suffer from fatigue, besides ensuring that the profile of troops always remained young. The RR has performed fairly w