A Surgical Move

S.K. Sood

The impunity with which militants have carried out about a dozen attacks on army patrols and posts in Jammu region in the past last 90 days, besides raising serious questions about the overall strategy of the government in controlling militancy, raises serious questions about the planning and actual execution of these plans by the defence forces in controlling militancy in the area. Militants appear to have lot of places available to manoeuvre and regroup for action against security forces due to thinning out of troops caused by the withdrawal and diversion of Rashtriya Rifle (RR) units for deployment along the line of actual control (LAC) on the northern borders with China. This, coupled with very little deployment in remote areas, enables militants to carry out attacks and withdraw to hideouts in these places.

The Army whose primary role is to defend the nation and its territorial integrity against external threats, got involved to combating several insurgencies and militancy in the early years after independence. Initially, it was because other trained forces were not available for the task and the problems were beyond the capability of the police. With the raising of several central armed forces and their large-scale expansion over the years, the Indian Army should logically have been relieved from these tasks and sent to the borders. However, this did not happen, and the Indian Army continues to be deployed for anti-militancy operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) for the last 35 years.

It is beyond question that the diversion of defence forces from their primary task to fight militancy/internal security problems should only be as a last resort because it is at the cost of defence preparedness. Deployment of the Indian Army for a prolonged period for internal security tasks is not in the interest of national security as it leads to degradation of their war-fighting capabilities. The Indian Army is not ab initio trained for the task of handling internal security. Nor is it legally empowered to carry out independent operations, especially in those areas where the armed forces special power act (AFPSA) has not been promulgated. In fact, the lack of such legal backing is a major problem that the security forces are facing in controlling the conflict in Manipur. These are valid points and are rightly advanced by the Indian Army for resisting deployment in Maoist-affected central India and other insurgency affected areas.

Another big factor likely to adversely impact the capabilities of defence forces both in war and the internal security environment is the Agnipath scheme introduced in 2022. During my interactions with many serving and retired defence forces personnel of different ranks, the constant refrain was that Agniveers are not suitable for the Army. It was repeatedly stated that the Agniveers lacked adequate motivation because of the uncertainty about their future and also because they felt discriminated on account of salary and the compensatory package, etc. By now a large number of Agniveers have joined the Indian Army and have been posted to different units. Some of these units would also be deployed in anti-militancy duties.

The anti-militancy operations generally are small team operations where individual ini