Lt Gen. Z.U. Shah (retd)

The armed forces are not like a limited liability company to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing like a house to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner. It is a living thing. If it is bullied it sulks; if it is unhappy, it pines; if it is harried it gets feverish; if it is sufficiently disturbed it will wither and dwindle and almost die. And when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived through lot of effort and lots of money

—Sir Winston Churchill, former soldier and statesman

The Indian armed forces have always been the nation’s instrument of last resort. They have remained apolitical and steadfastly carried out allotted missions with dedication and élan. Handling of these onerous responsibilities has been achieved by professionalism and protracted, regular training.

The strength of the armed forces flows out from their traditions and long-term bonding between all ranks. A well-known maxim stresses that ‘anything that works (and works well), don’t try and fix it’. Militaries need to constantly evolve; institute changes according to the situation, but only after due deliberation by experienced stakeholders based on their wisdom and long-term experience. Any radical measure foisted on the armed forces, without in-depth analysis, will have adverse impact on their battle readiness and performance.

We need to learn from the experience of Short Service Commissioned Officers, whose tenure of service was, quite rightly, increased from 5 to 10 years. Despite government assurances, a large number, on release, had to struggle to find re-employment. The original dispensation of less demanding terms of entry, extended by the government, for their lateral entry into the Central services was withdrawn after a few years, under pressure from the Central Services. The same applied to Emergency Commissioned (EC) Officers. I remember the case of a BSF officer, in my Brigade in Nagaland, who was an Inspector before he responded to the call of duty and was granted an EC. When he was released after five years’ service he had no option but to accept reversion to his original rank of Inspector.

The underlying rationale for the Agnipath scheme is to reduce the mounting defence pension bill, estimated to be over a third (including MOD civilians who are the major recipients) of the defence budget and lower the age profile of the armed forces. This aim of reducing funds currently under the head of pensions, is undoubtedly a challenge, but there are many other ways to achieve it. The strength of the Indian military is about 1.4 million. This includes about 3.75 lakh civilian employees, paid out of the defence budget. Though they are around 25 per cent of the strength of the defence forces, in terms of pay and allowances, their take h