Instead of wasting time and resources, India needs to develop indigenous capabilities for its long-term defence needs
Air Cmde T.K. Chatterjee (retd)
The global tender for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) floated by India in the first decade of the 2000s ended in a complex and protracted process that ultimately did not result in the intended acquisition. Here’s how it unfolded:
The Indian Air Force (IAF) projected a requirement for about 126 aircraft in 2001. After several delays, the Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued in August 2007. Six fighter aircraft competed: the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Lockheed Martin F-16, the Mikoyan MiG-35, and the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. After technical evaluation, the IAF shortlisted two finalists in April 2011: the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale.
On 31 January 2012, Dassault Rafale was announced as the winner due to its lower life-cycle cost. The deal was estimated to cost USD 28-30 billion in 2014. Contract negotiations stalled due to disagreements over costs, technology transfer, and production guarantees. As happened in the case of the Mirage 2000 upgrade programme, Dassault also refused to give a warranty for those aircraft that were to be produced by Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) after the initial few fly aways.
Despite efforts to finalise the deal, including expectations of signing by March 2015, the original MMRCA tender was eventually scrapped. Instead, in 2016, India opted for a direct purchase of 36 Rafale fighters in flyaway condition, moving away from the original plan of 126 aircraft with technology transfer and local production.
The MMRCA saga underscored the complexities of India’s defence procurement process and the challenges of balancing cost considerations with strategic objectives. If that initial process had been completed, the IAF would now have a fleet of over 100 Rafales, perhaps only an upgrade needed sometime in the next decade.
The New Players
Sadly, we are back at the starting block again, with a slight change in the nomenclature. It is the Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) instead of the MMRCA. The contenders are the usual suspects, with variations of their previous offerings.
Two new toys add to the confusion. The Lockheed F-35 and the Sukhoi Su-57 are vectored thrust stealth aircraft. Their presence at Aero India this year caught media attention and sparked speculation. Media reports of the US offer for the F-35 fuelled the fire. The US government dangles the F-35 carrot, possibly to balance its trade deficit with India, while its counterpart, the Su-57, has always been available from our good old friend in need, Russia.
If that was not enough, lurching in the background is the indigenous Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) effort of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth-generation 25-ton class twin-engine stealth aircraft. Its first flight is planned for 2028, and its induction is planned for 2034, using the LCA benchmark, give or take another 25 years.
With so many options, it would not be surprising if the government acted like a child in a toy store, backed by its all-knowing bureaucracy. Due to its practiced and perfected art of indecisiveness, it may ultimately end up with nothing, leaving the IAF perpetually chasing HAL to fulfil its production promises of the LCA so that the IAF can fulfil its promises to the country’s national security.
Changed Geopolitical Global Order
If the uncharacteristically polite and accommodating attitude of the President of the United States (POTUS) towards the visiting Indian Prime Minister is any indicator, it seems obvious that big promises have been made by either party. Many in the media are wondering what has caused the US fear of exposing the radar signatures of the F-35 to the Russian S-400 system being used by India to suddenly become a non-issue! In a drastically changed geopolitical order of the world, since Russia is no longer the bad guy, such fears are indeed out of place. India should stand by to welcome F-35s, Teslas, and Harley Davidsons, without having to worry about Russia because, in today’s scenario, they will certainly look the other way.
Make in India
India is a wealthy nation with significant purchasing power; however, it has seldom leveraged this power for the country’s strategic benefit. The government’s offset policy, which requires vendors to reinvest a considerable percentage of the contractual amount back into the country, has not yielded any significant long-term strategic advantages. China placed orders with Airbus, in turn, got them to establish domestic manufacturing and assembly lines, acquired the necessary technologies, and now has its own version of single-aisle, medium-range commercial aircraft. Meanwhile, we remain limited to producing doors and windows for aeroplanes despite ordering hundreds of aircraft from both Boeing and Airbus. This situation is not the fault of the Tatas, Mahindras, or Ambanis. It arises from the absence of strategic thinking by successive governments that have ruled the country, whose vision extends only as far as the next election.
In India, our indigenous design and development progress is incredibly slow, forcing our nation to constantly look outward to close the capability gap with our immediate adversaries. The more we invest in foreign acquisitions, the less we allocate to fostering indigenous R&D, leading to an ever-widening capability gap, forcing more foreign acquisitions. This perpetuates a vicious cycle. The system of piecemeal acquisition, from rifles to fighter jets, whenever a threat is perceived reflects a lack of long-term strategy. I know that perspective plans are diligently made at every service HQ, but unfortunately, I have not seen, or read in the media, about any of them reaching their logical end.
Aircraft with vectored thrust and high thrust-to-weight ratios are excellent for airshows. Their astonishing agility and capacity to perform manoeuvers that defy the laws of aerodynamics are impressive to watch and are the dream of any fighter pilot. However, based on my experience, I have not seen any of them utilize these extraordinary manoeuverability features in engagements in beyond visual range (BVR) scenarios. Air combat today is more between systems (and system operators’ skills) than between aeroplanes (and pilot’s flying skills). What is more necessary is better sensor and data fusion, a more resilient data network, and longer-range weapons. All of this can be achieved with electronic upgrades to our current fleet. We do not need to introduce new platforms, certainly not as expensive as the F-35, every time we attempt to close the so-called capability gaps and become reliant on nations, especially those whose consistency, coherence, and certainty of foreign policy are highly unreliable.
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