Ghazala Wahab’s column First Person in the October issue of FORCE triggered a discussion among military veterans. While some criticized her point of view as a harsh broad stroke, many thought that it deserved a conversation. As a consequence of that some people wrote to FORCE with their perspective. One such response is published below
The Easy Way? Think again
An editorial piece in FORCE magazine started doing rounds in the veteran community on October 8. It was titled ‘The Easy Way.’
The article went to great lengths to criticise the veteran community for indulging in topics of geopolitics and other international affairs and not using its vast pool of experience to deal with subjects closer home, which would benefit the armed forces of India. The article’s tagline read: ‘If the veterans only talk of geopolitics, who will talk about the military.’ The author also elaborates on the reason for indulging in vague and inconsequential geopolitical issues—‘inferiority complex’ and ‘intellectual laziness’ because it is easier to ‘rehash’ material already published in international media and put together an article than to do individual research and come out with a worthwhile original piece on a contemporary matter. And all these are supposedly done to earn accolades as a ‘scholar warrior’ or a ‘thinking general’.
This is a very harsh assessment of a community. Let us examine if the allegations are entirely true. Does the veteran community only deal in geopolitical mumbo jumbo or do they express their opinion on matters affecting the Indian military. There were a few recent issues to which the veteran community had reacted vehemently. Let us take a few of them one by one.
First, the Agniveer issue.
The fifth-largest economy in the world and the world’s largest procurer of arms introduced a scheme called Agnipath in June 2022 because it could not afford the growing pension bill of veterans. The serving personnel were not in a position to criticize the policies of the government, so the veteran community spoke up. The impact of the scheme on the fighting potential of the services, the impact of the rather short training period on technical services like the navy and the air force, the low retention rate that would affect combat strength, etc., were commented upon by many veterans up to and including former service chiefs. This predicament of the Indian military did not feature in the foreign press, so it was clearly not a case of ‘rehashing’.
Next was the creation of Theatre Commands.
When the concept of Theatre Commands was introduced in the Indian context, the three services had different reactions. The stakes were different for the three services and accordingly, veterans of all three services expressed their respective feelings—exhilaration by the army, absolute indifference by the navy, and the stout opposition by the IAF. The rushed implementation of the scheme, the uncertain returns from the structural changes to the forces, the inevitable fight over scant resources between the theatres, the suboptimal utilisation of hugely expensive multi-role jet fighters of IAF, etc were all highlighted in numerous articles in almost all of Indian media. The US, Russia or China, which are quoted as examples by the government for the creation of integrated theatre commands, could not give a rat’s posterior how India divides its not-so-large geographic entity and fritters away its military resources. So, this was entirely a matter of the Indian military, and the veteran community did react.
Lessons learned from current conflicts.
For the students of military science, thankfully, enough conflicts are going on in the world to learn lessons from. Certainly, all the war colleges in the country and the think tanks are cataloguing them for posterity. Regular features appear in different media outlets listing lessons for India. They range from strategic implications of geopolitical shifts to regional security and alliances, technological advancements like AI-driven weapon systems, real-time data analytics for making informed decisions on the battlefield, the use of cost-effective UAVs, etc.
Similarly, there were numerous reactions from the veteran community and elsewhere on the attempted politicisation of the Indian armed forces. Superseding officers for the post of chiefs and the CDS, creation of selfie points in cantonments and military institutions, etc., have harmful effects on a hitherto apolitical force and the veteran community is quite vocal about it.
Surprisingly, the author has missed all the above instances of veteran involvement in India-specific military matters. The veteran community indulges in writing on military matters not to prove their intellectual capabilities but to voice their approval or disapproval of decisions by the ruling dispensation, if any.
Last year I attended the 75-year celebration of the National Defence Academy. There, the CDS had an interaction session with the veterans attending the function. After an exchange of some polite questions by the veterans and equally evasive answers by the CDS, it was put across by the CDS that running the armed forces is best left to the serving personnel and the veterans best fade away in golf courses, wherever they are. It was missed by the officer that the veteran community could speak what he dared not. Whether it will have any effect, or not, is beyond the control of both.
Talking about the think tanks in the country, if their output is found to be unsatisfactory, the problem lies more with the government and the service headquarters. If there are conceptual issues to which a service seeks solutions, these think tanks can be specifically tasked, somewhat like the Project Air Force at RAND. Otherwise, they will meander about in geopolitics and the vast domain of military science, from subsurface to outer space, and produce papers and hold seminars that will be good optics but will help none.
‘Soldier scholars’ or whatever they may be called, I am sure they are read by powers that be, in uniform or elsewhere, and the intellectually superior variety does get an idea of what feelings their decisions have generated among the larger community. Taking cognition of these feelings is of course their call.
Air Cmde TK Chatterjee(retd)
Additionally, founder-editor of Mission Victory India, Col Vinay Dalvi sparked a wider discussion on the subject by circulating the article, The Easy Way, among several veteran networks and thereafter publishing the responses on his website. We are reproducing a selection of those responses with his permission starting with his own comments.
The Need for Critical Military Thinking
After reading First Person column titled ‘The Easy Way’ on critical military thinking, I felt the need to analyse the same from a neutral perspective and also introspect our existing systems for critical military thinking that are being followed by our training institutions of the three services right from the lowest, NDA, up to the highest, NDC, encapsulating the nurturing, training, grooming and promotion systems of our military officer leadership.
Having seen the system closely for over five decades and having interacted with several renowned and reputed officers of our armed forces, I felt that our responsible and concerned serving officers and veterans of three services must read Ghazala Wahab’s observation on critical military thinking without any personal bias and give their forthright views about the present state of affairs and the way forward to address the shortcomings highlighted by her.
Coincidentally, there was a piece written by the same author earlier too on an interesting and intricately linked subject that highlights one of the main causes for the present state of affairs. That article was also appreciated by several veteran readers and responded to.
Col Vinay Dalvi
Editor, MVI
Although the ability to question an order or belief or tactical or a strategic concept requires moral courage, it is not a very preferred quality because of our acceptance of total compliance of orders in the battlefield which also has its own merits. This has led to disallowance of critical thinking in the peace time as well. If it is encouraged, then the benefits would generate an environment of mutual trust between the leader and the led.
Col N.P. Sharma
The two articles written by Ghazala Wahab basically discuss the same issue, the intellectual capacity of the average military officer and, to a great extent, that of the officers in senior positions. This needs serious and honest introspection, and not a belligerent or an indignant response.
Right at the outset, let me state outright that every word that she has written is true. Today, almost 20 years since the day that I retired, I look back and marvel at the kind of senior commanders that I encountered during my service. Leaving aside a small minority of individuals who continue to strike me as intellectuals, the vast majority were, to say the least, men with feet of clay who could bulldoze their way through the rank and file simply because of the rank badges that they wore. Their interaction with officers and men seldom went beyond the ‘how’s the josh’ kind of rhetoric. They never discussed, nor encouraged any discussion on professional matters. Sometimes, I wonder if the reluctance to encourage discussions and debates was actually an attempt to cover-up their own inadequacies. I remember one occasion when as the Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion, the only outcome of my briefing of the Army Commander in my office was an admonishment by him regarding my failure to ensure anti-malaria precautions as there was a mosquito in the room! In every subsequent visit of the Brigade Commander to my unit, I was reminded of this unforgiveable lapse. Failure of command?
Wahab’s concern regarding the absence of the reading habit is absolutely justified. Even 50 years ago, when I was a freshly commissioned officer, reading was limited to a very select few. And matters are going to get worse now. With the advent of the tools provided by Artificial Intelligence, what little exercise the brain was being given will also come to a standstill. Why read, why study when you can produce a full-fledged military paper at the click of a button?
And this brings us to the subject of the second article, ‘The Easy Way’. She writes, ‘If military veterans spend all their intellectual capital on talking about geopolitics, who will talk about military matters?’ The unfortunate truth is that the majority of those speaking of geopolitics are not making use of their intellectual capital, but rather of the wealth of information available on the internet. Do any of the so-called ‘defence experts’ that one sees on the TV screen every night strike you as intellectuals?
The question regarding not talking of military matters is quite easily answered. Our knowledge of tactical matters is severely limited, and the internet is not of much help in this. What we know is mostly based on outdated precis and concepts. So we find it easier to pick up a few fancy terms—’kinetic and non-kinetic domains’, ‘regionally integrated converged operations’ etc.,–and talk big about international affairs.
It is sad that thinking has become an unfashionable concept. As mentioned by Wahab, a retired Army Commander who feels that social media is a better platform for learning than a book, is a symptom of the malaise that is slowly eating away our intellectual capacity.
Col Shivaji Ranjan Ghosh
Does our military leadership have the conviction to advice rightly? I have seen generals of repute once admonished, cowing down, and accepting mediocre logic as intelligent because it comes from a senior with the power of the pen.
Can we even walk up to the Prime Minister’s Office and address the anomalies in HR management? Do we have the financial knowhow to manage budgets, plan them, and ensure their implementation? Is operational leadership a part of experiences or just babudom in Army HQ with multiple tenures?
Is our operational readiness in comparison to the northern adversary even genuinely thought about and has his growth analysed? Do we have the ability to call the shots? Manifest an intent? Operationalise to prevent or even have the guts to open fire without looking behind our backs? Can we at any time tell the government that if you want an army of tigers, you need to provide the means and the technology in requirement-based timelines?
Can we think of strategies beyond our tenures and have the intelligence and the OrBat formulated to ensure implementation? Do we even indulge ourselves in military studies, that concentrate on studying militaries especially our neighbours in depth and not superficially like in the junior command course? Can the MS branch who credits itself in making generals, be more transparent on what they are promoting and why?
Does our procurement strategy involve long term maintenance and procedures? Is our leadership even training for war? Or just daily firefighting and management? In fact, the entire 18 month-tenure is spent only on projecting what they can achieve in their tenures.
The veteran community is the only community that tom-toms military progress and takes motivation of rank and file seriously. While the ones in command hardly consult you for your experiences. Veterans are the only ones who speak. But who hears? Neither the military nor the bureaucrat, nor the politicians. Points will be borrowed from intelligent thinkers and used for personal selfish professional growth, without credit.
Yes, there are some great generals who could, if empowered, take the bull by the horn. But what is empowerment? Threats of termination of service, stoppage of pay and pensions, and overall being called cynical, looms heavy.
Brig. Neil John
My post’s aim is to address the mindset of senior commanders. I couldn’t be bothered with what Nehru or Modi did but rather question what our military leadership has done. The latest being Galwan, where our troops went armed with sticks!
In 1991, one of our battalions at great risk undertook to demolish a Chinese Log Hut constructed on our side. The entire chain of command wanted the scalp of the CO even though the task was accomplished without a shot or a scuffle. Such is the mindset of senior leaders.
In 2002, on Infantry Day a team of youngsters from one of my battalions scaled a peak overlooking the Tibetan plateau, the height was around 7,500 metre or so. The Division called for an explanation, the Adventure Wing called for an explanation and the Corps was silent. It merely forwarded a letter from the Adventure Wing asking for comments. The Command and MO asked for Citations! I banged my head against the wall and sent Citations for six of the team. All were awarded GOC-in-C Commands and COAS Commendation. How could we have attempted to change the defensive mindset?
As far as jointmenship is concerned, I had attack pilots stay with us in a high-altitude area. They flew with the CO and company commanders for terrain familiarisation and target identification. I was asked for an explanation by Division Headquarters as to why the IAF pilots were allowed to stay in the brigade even though written permission had been obtained by both the IAF and the brigade!
Let’s talk of NDC and other paper tigers. We then had a yearly satellite visit over the area. On suggesting that this needs to be made quarterly–either by satellite or aircraft–and photos duly annotated be provided to the brigade, we were told to shut up and manage with what we have. A radar was provided to us without generator and battery backup. A UAV meant for deserts and plains was positioned at an airfield and tasked to cover HAA. Worse, it was under the operational command of Northern Command and administratively under Eastern Command! I had to write to Military Operations to get this corrected.
If the higher military leadership only pussy foots around politicians without giving them insights regarding military requirements at the cost of young lives and growing disillusionment amongst the young military minds, of what good is that?
Brig. Pradeep Sharma
At the outset I will not comment on what others have expressed on the article The Easy Way by Ghazala Wahab, but I will comment on the major issues she has brought out.
Firstly, on senior officers writing only on geopolitics and avoiding military subjects. This is not entirely true as she bases her argument only on what a few officers have spoken, or she has interacted with. Exceptions don’t make the rule. I have come across numerous armed forces officers who have domain knowledge and experience on issues related to defence technology, military modernisation, defence budget, and so on. These officers have contributed immensely by writing articles and policy briefs in various newspapers and journals. Many of these have been brilliantly analysed and presented. As a matter of fact, I would request all to go through the website of ET Government and other print media to get first-hand inputs. I have myself been approached by student officers whom I have never met, doing DSSC to help them with their research work on defence technology, corporatisation of OFB, make in India, etc. One of them even got the Langtaine Award for the best dissertation.
Secondly, she talks of inculcating the reading habit to be able to dive deep into understanding the nuances of strategy and art of warfare. I would tend to agree with her since most young officers remain largely occupied with operational or regimental commitments with very less time for such pursuits. Incidentally, the reading habit has to be developed right from our schooling days which unfortunately is not happening. As I have been with an educational institution since the last five years, I can state that this aspect is lacking in our younger generation. Therefore, the armed forces alone cannot be singled out.
Thirdly, she talks of the ministry of defence run thinktanks, which churn out ordinary stuff. Probably, she has a view there. There is a requirement of having closer linkages with ARTRAC and the kind. Probably, this can be best achieved through the creation of Indian National Defence University, a proposal that has been gathering dust since long.
Fourthly, she is right in saying that strategic thought and process is lacking in the forces which probably must reward out of box thinking and accept critical analysis. Therefore, there is a need to change mindsets which must flow from the top. Mediocrity must not be rewarded or encouraged.
Fifthly, she has brought in an unfair comparison between the forces and the bureaucracy and has talked about an inferiority complex. This is much farther from the truth. On the contrary, it is the other way around. Our officers are much more articulate and competent than them. They need to be encouraged to present their viewpoints rather than be restrained to do so.
Sixthly, she mentions about senior officers foraying into geopolitics. She needs to understand that we cannot be frogs in the pond. Understanding geopolitics is extremely relevant during application of military knowledge. These are not diverse fields but rather complementary. Today, defence diplomacy is playing a key role in all our missions abroad where the military/ defence attaches are actively involved. Also, better comprehension of geopolitics is important given the various ground, air and naval exercises that we undertake with the foreign militaries.
Lastly, the less said about our defence experts on national media, the better. There are probably no yardsticks applied to those who are invited to speak. Therefore, it becomes difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff. The result is for all of us to see.
In the overall summary, some important issues have been raised by her which merit introspection but not all what has been depicted by her. The narrative projection is too one-sided. Hence, there is a need to take a more balanced view.
Maj. Gen. Rajan Kochhar
What Ghazala has written is God’s own truth, and the downfall of clear thinking comes from getting it through the mobile/ internet/ social media. Why? because those who write on these platforms have to make their points very precisely without elaborate intelligible words that will be included on a written piece in a journal/ magazine/ newspaper.
The act of sliding those fingers to read it within the width of that mobile is terrific for getting the summary with data to make decisions at that moment and convey those decisions back. Written material on social media is not designed for reading it a second or third time to get the message. Mobile messages can let you make fast decisions during specific operations, engagements, medical emergencies, and accidents that need instant solutions to tide over the immediate. These messages are not for deliberation and deep analysis, which can be done at leisure, and compared with other similar writings on the same subject. Some of the veterans are wrong in their statements, Ghazala is on target!
Gp Capt. A.G. Bewoor