India’s challenge lies in fully integrating its air defence over the 5,000 km hostile borders
Air Cmde T.K. Chatterjee (retd)
Back in the late 1970s, I joined an air defence (AD) squadron in the Eastern sector. We flew the MiG-21 FL. In the air defence role, we flew with two Ka-13 infrared missiles mounted under the wings. Equipped with an R2L radar, the pilots typically made visual contact with the targets before the radar could detect them. External jamming was unnecessary; the radar consistently jammed itself.
Moreover, even under 1G conditions, the missile’s kill envelope was smaller than the envelope in which my granddaughter flies her toy drone today. In the event of war, we were to operate from the Kashmir Valley and defend our airspace. Confidence, motivation, and valour aside, the thought that our radar-missile combination was a cause for concern always lingered in the back of our minds. We have made significant progress since then.
However, Balakot, which happened not too long ago, exposed our weaknesses in air defence capabilities. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was simply outranged in Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat. It was the first time since the Bangladesh War that the IAF engaged enemy forces in the air. In Kargil, there was no engagement as neither side crossed the Line of Control (LC). So, have we really made significant progress?
New Threats
To add to our already existing worries, China has recently exhibited its version of the 5th and 6th-generation stealth aircraft. A good number of them will invariably be deployed in the Tibet region to offset the disadvantage of operating from high-altitude airfields. Eventually, a downgraded version of these aircraft will reach Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The numerical and technological gap in military capabilities between us and China is steadily widening. With our grossly inefficient and lethargic indigenous production effort, we can never match up in adequate numbers with our 4th generation light combat aircrafts (LCAs), and our convoluted and highly politicised external procurement policies will never permit the import of state-of-the-art airborne weapon platforms in time to enable our forces to fight an offensive war on even one front, let alone two. So, where does that leave us? What are our options?
Offence or Defence
Deterrence is a must to avoid conflict. It can be deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial. The former means conveying to the enemy that the cost of their offensive will be too high for them to bear. This applies more to the nuclear scenario. The latter case is defined as creating an environment that prevents the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested area and prevents the attacker from freely operating within the region. Then, numerical and technological inferiority, which the IAF has vis-à-vis the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), can be bridged to a large extent.
Due to resource constraints in both aircraft and technology, the strength of the IAF should prioritise denying air superiority to the PLAAF rather than directly competing for it. This strategic approach reflects China’s efforts to deny US forces access to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Taiwan, too, aims to impose high costs on the PLAAF in the event of a Chinese invasion. For many years, the balance between offence and defence heavily favoured offensive strategies. However, robust networks and artificial intelligence-enabled low-cost systems are now shifting this balance toward defence.
You must be logged in to view this content.