The Indian armed forces first need a technology acquisition roadmap before seeking more allocations
Pravin Sawhney
To understand Indian defence allocations for 2025-26, a look at some figures is necessary:
(a)Total allocation: Rs 6,81,210 crore (Rs 6.8 lakh crore). This is 1.9 per cent of the GDP
(b)Capital outlay (new acquisitions and modernisation): Rs 1,85,000 crore. 75 per cent is to be spent on procurements from domestic vendors to support Make in India. And Rs 7,147 crores is for Border Roads Organisation (BRO).
(c)Revenue outlay (salaries): Rs 3,11,732 crore which is 45 per cent of the total budget
(d)Defence pension: Rs 1,60,795 crore which is 23.60 per cent of the total budget
(e)Research and Development (DRDO): Rs 26,816 crores
(f)Agnipath scheme allocation: Rs 11,039 crores. Of this it is Rs 9,414 crores for the army.
(g)iDEX scheme allocation: Rs 450 crores
Now, my five observations to explain why Indian military is not preparing for the modern war where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), India’s identified primary threat, is at the cutting edge.
First, the salaries and pensions bill where the manpower heavy 1.3 million (13 lakh) Indian Army gets the lion’s share is 68 per cent of the total allocation leaving a pittance for acquisitions and modernisation. So, the strength of the army needs to be reduced drastically. Especially when the hot war with the PLA, given the huge gap in the capabilities of the two militaries, will be a short, swift and intense — a dramatic repeat of the US’ 1991 ‘shock and awe’ campaign called Operation Desert Storm against the Iraqi military. In military parlance, the PLA will win the decisive campaign at the strategic and operational levels of war with no need to join battles at the tactical level of war with the Indian defence services.
Second, paradoxically, even as the army will have little role in a hot war, it will be most needed against grey zone operations in peacetime on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Unlike the superior PLA, the Indian Army is required to firmly hold the entire LAC to avoid repeat of April 2020 deep incursions by the PLA whereby it (permanently) occupies over 2,000 sqkm Indian territory in east Ladakh. For this reason, the Agnipath scheme for recruitment of soldiers for a limited period of service with no pension was introduced.
Third, to project government’s Make in India campaign as a success, private domestic vendors get three-fourth of the capital allocation leaving little for procurements from abroad. Both issues don’t make sense. Given the fact that for the first time since Independence both military lines with China and Pakistan are live, the defence services need urgent acquisitions from abroad to maintain adequate force levels. This is especially true for the Indian Air Force (IAF) whose combat strength is excessively low. Regarding private vendors, none put resources into in-house research and development. The way out is to have joint ventures with foreign vendors as junior partners. Thus, on the one hand, foreign vendors do not part with their cutting-edge technologies. On the other hand, key components sourced from aboard raise the overall cost of weapon platforms. For example, a Russian Su-30MKI aircraft assembled in India under the Make in India cost Rs 100 crore more than off-the-shelf purchase from Russia.
Fourth, allocation for the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is a pittance. This needed to be hiked substantially. The most important issue is the periodic technical audit with the service representative in attendance. The DRDO rarely meets its deadlines. Take the case of Agni-5 missiles with MIRVs. The project sanctioned in 1984 has after four decades finally been operationalised. In this period what constitutes deterrence against the PLA has changed dramatically. The same is the case with the Kaveri engine; instead of the project being scrapped long ago, now it is suggested to be used in unmanned aircraft, which does not make sense in a man-unmanned teaming configuration.
And five, a mere Rs 450 crores for iDEX (innovation for Defense Excellence) for emerging technologies (for instance drones for the three defence services) shows that the Indian military believes these are meant for future warfare. The reality is that the shift from manned to unmanned systems is happening at a fast pace. For example, Artificial Intelligence (AI) at frontline in combat has two dimensions: ‘AI at rest’ which is the use of AI virtually in systems for faster and accurate decision-making to close the kill chain quicker than the enemy. And ‘AI in motion’ which is the physical manifestation of AI in the form of robots. The PLA has already inducted the ‘AI at rest’ in combat. Regarding ‘AI in motion’, PLA has (a) operationally tested military grade 5G wireless communications, and (b) is slated to start production of humanoid robots by end of this year. It is obvious that PLA would get the preference over commercial use of these robots.
In short, what the defence allocations show is lack of understanding of modern war by the Indian military leadership. Evidence of this is the comment by retired Air Marshal Anil Chopra. He says, “The capital outlay is not sufficient to address the capability gap with China. I hope more funds will be given later this year to fast track modernisation.”
This statement is putting the cart before the horse. The Indian military first needs to understand the science and art of modern war, then make its technology acquisition roadmap before seeking more allocations.