How politics, domestic imperatives and self-image coalesced to become Modi’s foreign policy. An extract
Dhruva Jaishankar
Perhaps the most radical new relationships in this period were forged in West Asia (the Middle East). Hosting Abu Dhabi’s crown prince (and later president of the United Arab Emirates) Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (popularly referred to as MbZ), for Republic Day in 2017 contributed to major breakthroughs in India’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Gulf States. On regional issues, there was a meeting of the minds and shared concerns about radical Islamism. Outreach to the UAE also facilitated better relations with Saudi Arabia, which for many years had been a close partner of Pakistan. Regional developments following the ‘Arab Spring’ and the economic imperatives had gradually elevated India’s importance for the Gulf Arab states. The relationship between India and the Gulf was no longer about just the diaspora and fossil fuel energy exports, but increasingly also about trade, investment, technology, security, and education. The sizeable Indian diaspora also helped ensure strong cultural links, including the building and inauguration by Modi of a temple—BAPS Hindu Mandir—in Abu Dhabi in early 2024. In other regional developments Modi also used his political capital to further elevate relations with Israel. In 2017, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel, following reciprocal visits by the two countries’ presidents.
A final major development of Modi’s first term involved shifts on nuclear and climate diplomacy. As part of capitalizing on the India-US civilian nuclear agreement, India became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (which governs the export conventional and dual-use weapons) and the Australia Group (which control the spread of chemical and biological weapons). Membership at the Nuclear Suppliers Group continued to be blocked by China. In terms of climate negotiations, while India had earlier worked with the ‘BASIC’ coalition—including China, Brazil and South Africa—to negotiate with the West at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, a different outcome was managed at the Paris Climate Summit in late 2015. This time, India worked with hosts France not only to commit to a nationally determined contribution (NDC)—helping to ensure that the Summit was a success—but announced the co-development of an International Solar Alliance (ISA). The ISA was somewhat new territory for Indian diplomacy, in that it involved the establishment of a treaty-based international organization. India’s experience in this respect brought a new angle to its multilateral diplomacy and was replicated with the founding of a Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and other issue-specific international institutions.
New Mandate: Domestic and Foreign Policy, 2019-2020
Modi and the BJP won re-election in 2019 with an even larger political mandate. For the first ten months, his government focused on major domestic objectives, some of which had been longstanding BJP positions. The first—in August 2019—involved nullifying Article 370 of the Constitution, a temporary provision that had granted Jammu and Kashmir special status. Furthermore, Jammu and Kashmir was made into a Union Territory and divided, with the region of Ladakh becoming autonomous. The move elicited criticism from Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, China, and India expended diplomatic capital to explain to the international community that this was a strictly domestic matter. (For its part, Pakistan had more than once changed the status of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.) Some of the international criticism related less to India’s actual action as the means it employed, such as the detention of Kashmiri political leaders, localized Internet cut offs, and the use of president’s rule to bypass the assembly. Over the subsequent years, improvements in the Kashmir Valley such as local elections, higher tourism, and improved law and order were seen in New Delhi as a vindication of its move.
No sooner had the controversy over Article 370 died down than India passed a Citizenship Amendment Act. CAA did not affect existing citizen’s status, but created a fast-track for religious minorities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. These minorities were specified, with Muslims noticeably excluded. Defenders saw this as rectifying some of the wrongs of Partition and the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. Critics argued that it would set a bad precedent and be used alongside a proposed National Register of Citizens to discriminate against Muslims. CAA resulted in sizeable protests in India, which also invited international attention, but India took the view that other countries—including the United States and Europe—had regularly created selective pathways for citizenship.
Finally, the government passed Farm Laws intended to reduce corruption in agriculture by giving farmers more access to markets, and marginalizing middlemen. Ironically, such measures had long been requested by developed economies who believed India’s agricultural policies were distortionary. Nonetheless, the Farm Law generated protests led by some farmers, especially some communities in North India in and around Punjab and Haryana. It became an issue in already divisive local politics and also led to the mobilization of diaspora groups, including some Sikh communities in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Much of the international coverage mischaracterized both the laws and the nature of protests. But eventually, concerned about the national security implications, the government retracted the Farm Laws. Thus, between May 2019 and March 2020, India’s focus was on domestic priorities that assumed an international dimension.
VISHWA SHASTRA: INDIA AND THE WORLD
Dhruva Jaishankar
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