India’s ties with France go beyond weapon-platforms sale
Shreeram Chaulia
In July 2020, as the first consignment of the state-of-the-art 4.5 Generation French-made Rafale fighter jets arrived in India, Prime Minister Modi hailed them by evoking a Sanskrit hymn that translates as follows: ‘There is no greater blessing than protecting the nation, protecting the nation is a virtuous deed and protecting the nation is the best yagna [sacrifice]. There is nothing beyond this. Touch the sky with glory. Welcome.’ The touchdown of the Rafales at that moment aroused national cheering in India because the Galwan Valley clash with the Chinese PLA had occurred just a few weeks ago. France had honoured India’s urgent need for beefing up its offensive capabilities by delivering the ‘beauty and beast’ flying machines to the Indian Air Force on an accelerated time-frame.
So strategically impactful was the speedy induction and deployment of the Rafale aircraft near the LAC, where Indian forces were engaged in a stand-off with the PLA, that the Chinese scrambled to bring their most advanced J-20 fighter aircraft to areas close to eastern Ladakh the moment Indian Rafales were in the vicinity. China even made an attempt to contain the strategic impact of the French induction into the Indian Air Force by spinning the narrative that ‘the Rafale is only a third-plus generation fighter jet, and does not stand much of a chance against a stealth, fourth generation one like the J-20.’ R.K.S. Bhadauria, the then Chief of Air Staff of India, publicly responded with confidence: ‘Rafale fighter jets had caused worries in the Chinese camp.’
While the Rafales may not have altered the overall balance of power between India and China, they have been battlespace game-changers, and one cannot underestimate their deterrent effect in preventing further Chinese aggression at the LAC. French aircraft like Rafale and Mirage have partially addressed the shortage of squadrons of advanced jets in the Indian Air Force. French combat aircraft have also remade India’s defence matrix through their massive valuation in the recipient country’s foreign defence procurements. The order for 36 Rafales jet for the Indian Air Force, which was initially placed in 2016, cost $8.8 billion. The 2023 order for 26 additional Rafales (marine version) for the Indian Navy amounted to approximately $6 billion more. Acquisition of Scorpene diesel-electric submarines for the Indian Navy to be manufactured in India would generate contracts worth around $5 billion for French defence companies. Many other sophisticated French-manufactured and co-developed weapons are expected to come into play to boost India’s national security capabilities in years to come, and keep the French defence industry humming.
France is well aware that the Indian arms bazaar is a competitive buyer’s market, and knows that it has to respond to India’s aim to move away from buyer-seller relationship to co-designing and co-producing. The ‘Horizon 2047’ roadmap, which set goals for the strategic partnership until the centenary of bilateral relations in 2047, mentioned ‘building sovereign defence capabilities together’ and committed to ‘cooperation in advanced aeronautical technologies by supporting the joint development of a combat aircraft engine.’ Reportedly, if the USA had agreed to 80 per cent transfer of technology (ToT) in the joint production of jet engines for fighter aircraft, France had offered 100 per cent ToT for a more powerful engine. The 2024 Roadmap for Indo-French Defence Industrial Partnership went further and laid the foundation for ‘not only fulfilling the defence needs of the Indian armed forces but also to provide a reliable source of defence supplies to other friendly countries.’
As mentioned in Chapter 4, France stormed the Indian defence market and grabbed the second spot with 30 per cent of India’s total arms imports, just behind the traditional supplier Russia, which commanded 36 per cent of the market share during the periods ranging from 2014-18 to 2019-23. What gives France an edge as a defence partner is its undeniably high quality of weapons, combined with relatively lower costs, flexibility of terms, willingness to transfer know-how, and membership of the Western alliance system that insulates it from international pressures and economic sanctions. It is not uncommon for Western policymakers and commentators from France’s allied nations to applaud France-India defence cooperation on grounds that it is reducing India’s dependence on Russia and slowly drawing India closer to the West. Recommendations from American think tanks that the USA should ‘quietly discuss best practices for effective defense cooperation with India with like-minded mutual partners like France, Israel, and the UK’ and formulate a joint Western strategy to wean India away from Russia, indicate how France’s status as a NATO member and a Western power redounds to its defence partnership with India.
Characteristically, France itself has not chastised India for failing to denounce Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or to join Western sanctions against Russia. In 2022, General Stephane Mille, Chief of the French Air and Space Force, even flew in an India Russian-origin Sukhoi jet fighter while his Indian counterpart flew in a French Rafale during joint military exercise to showcase the interoperability of the two militaries. Given the legacy value and separate importance of Russia to India, France has no qualms about military cooperations with India that will inevitably involve some Russian weaponry or the other.
Bilateral trust does play a role in India’s choice of France as a main vector for its military modernization and diversification away from Russia. But the deal-clincher has been technical superiority of French weapons in specialized domains. India’s armed forces have picked France over its competitors after conducting test trials. For example, France’s Dassault, the maker of Rafale, beat the Russian Mikoyan, the American Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the multinational European Eurofighter, and the Swedish Saab in technical evaluations to bag the lucrative fighter jet contract for the Indian Air Force. The Rafale’s marine version also outcompeted inter alia Boeing’s F/A 18 Super Hornet for the Indian Navy because France gave ‘all the necessary clearances and modifications to integrate stand-off nuclear weapons’ on the Rafales, while ‘there is no way that the Americans would allow the integration of any nuclear weapons delivery system with the Super Hornet.’ If supreme national interests mean something, then France often fits the bill for India compared to its other friends.
Ultimately, it boils down to similarity of national circumstances and goals under the common umbrella of an independent foreign policy. In 2022, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jayashankar lauded France as a key partner in defence and security and ‘a trusted collaborator in countering security challenges from the seabed to space, from cyber to oceans.’ He praised France as ‘among the foremost countries as India seeks to build industrial self-reliance in the defence sector, with a sense of urgency and priority.’ He added that in this pursuit, ‘we draw inspiration from the national self-sufficiency France has itself built. A year later, the French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire talked up ‘France’s commitment to being India’s foremost partner for investing in the sectors of the future.’ He declared that ‘developing together the technologies that will anchor our nations’ independence tomorrow, such as artificial intelligence or supercomputers, is the new frontier for our strategic partnership.’ Be it past, present or future, the vision of strategic autonomy has been the guiding light in the France-India friendship.
FRIENDS: INDIA’S CLOSEST STRATEGIC PARTNERS
Shreeram Chaulia
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