Twas A Great Victory

Brig. Rajiv Williams (retd)

Kargil is in the Ladakh region of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, which has since been divided into two Union Territories (UT) i.e., Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. The UT of Ladakh has two districts, Kargil and Leh, with Kargil including the towns of Dras (10,800 feet), the coldest inhabited town in the world, and Kargil. It is around the mountainous heights of Dras and Kargil where most battles were fought in the Kargil War of 1999 under the Indian code name Operation Vijay and Pakistan code name Operation Badr.

The National Highway (NH) from the Kashmir Valley to Leh crosses Zoji La (11,525 feet) after which it enters Ladakh. It goes along the towns of Dras and Kargil and thereafter to Leh, approximately 220 kilometres further away from Kargil. The terrain in Ladakh is mountainous and rugged, with several peaks, marked as points on the map, which delineate the Line of Control (LC) between India and Pakistan. These geolocations were accepted by India and Pakistan and the document signed by the two representatives at the Shimla Accord of 1972. This NH at some places near Dras and Kargil is under the observation of Pakistani troops deployed across the LC and at times movement of convoys along the road was interdicted by Pakistan’s long range artillery guns.

Pakistan Occupation of the Heights

It is important to understand the reasons for Pakistan Army’s sponsoring of terrorists and its occupation of the area of conflict around Dras and Kargil. While infiltration and terrorist activities continued in Kashmir and Jammu region of the state in 1998, no major inimical activities were observed in Ladakh, which should have been a cause of concern for the intelligence agencies. Post Op Vijay, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) claimed that a warning was sounded about a possible ingress in the area, but the input was never shared with the military commanders, neither at the tactical nor strategic level.

The change in the Pakistani Army leadership, with Gen. Parvez Musharraf taking over from Gen. Jehangir Karamat on 3 October 1998, against the advice of the latter as Musharraf was junior to two other officers, should have raised an alarm for all Indian intelligence agencies. After all, Gen. Musharraf was close to Gen. Zia–ul–Haq, a former chief of the Pakistan Army and later the dictator President of Pakistan. Gen. Zia–ul–Haq was also a proponent of Operation Topac, aimed at dismembering India. Gen. Musharraf’s ambitious plan was to embark upon a mission aligned to the strategic thought of Op Topac. This noticeable change in the chief from a comparatively quiet and seemingly accommodative Karamat to Musharraf, should have been noticed by those responsible. I remember the General’s body language and dress code, in a televised meeting chaired by Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, soon after the visit of then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore and the signing of the Lahore Accord. The body language of Gen. Musharraf, with his shirt sleeves rolled three fourth length, in some way was depictive of arrogance.

Not too long after the Lahore bus trip, Musharraf launched a silent operation code named Operation Badr with the aim of initially occupying the heights east of Kashmir and subsequently attempting to capture large tracts of the Ladakh region. The commander Force Command Northern Area (FCNA) along with 10 Corps commander operationalised the plan and infiltrated the troops of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and other infantry regiments, disguised as civilians. They occupied the heights overlooking deep inside the Indian areas of Mushkoh, Dras, Bimbat, Kargil, Batalik, Biamah and Turtuk, close to the Nubra Valley, covering an expanse of approximately 474 kilometres in Ladakh.

How could they infiltrate unnoticed? How could they occupy heights, dominating areas, which overlooked the NH, without any indication? How could the Indian Army and all intelligence sources available at their disposal, fail to identify the tell-tale signs of the existence of the Pakistan military? How could the periodical Indian reconnaissance missions on ground and air, fail to detect any unfamiliar movement or dugouts/ sangars/ gun emplacements? How could the survival of the infiltrators, at those heights close to the towns of Dras and Kargil go undetected? These are the questions which have yet to be answered and the failure to pick up the threads leading to the intelligence failure has yet to be acknowledged with some seriousness. Was the factor of accountability lost to time because of the supposed victory of Op Vijay, Op Safed Sagar and Op Talwar, launched by the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy?

Gaps and Gaps

Gaps in Deployment: The reason given for non-detection of infiltration was that there were large gaps which existed in the deployment of Indian troops on the LC from Mushkoh Valley to the Nubra Valley. Quite understandable with the limited resources available to 121 independent Infantry Brigade, yet difficult to comprehend the ‘why’ on a scale. Afterall, there are methods for keeping such gaps under surveillance by patrolling and aerial surveillance. As commander of the Dras brigade, immediately after the war, I walked and flew over most of the heights which were once occupied by the infiltrators in the Kargil conflict and I quizzed myself as to how such infiltration could go unnoticed.

Gaps in Military-Civil Relations: What came out as a stark revelation was the gap that existed between the military and the civilians in the area. The local shepherds grazing their cattle on the hill tops around Tololing had reported seeing unfamiliar faces atop the mountains to the Indian military camps near Dras. However, their observation was dismissed, and they were threatened with dire consequences if they dared to come ag