Twas A Great Victory

Brig. Rajiv Williams (retd)

Kargil is in the Ladakh region of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, which has since been divided into two Union Territories (UT) i.e., Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. The UT of Ladakh has two districts, Kargil and Leh, with Kargil including the towns of Dras (10,800 feet), the coldest inhabited town in the world, and Kargil. It is around the mountainous heights of Dras and Kargil where most battles were fought in the Kargil War of 1999 under the Indian code name Operation Vijay and Pakistan code name Operation Badr.

The National Highway (NH) from the Kashmir Valley to Leh crosses Zoji La (11,525 feet) after which it enters Ladakh. It goes along the towns of Dras and Kargil and thereafter to Leh, approximately 220 kilometres further away from Kargil. The terrain in Ladakh is mountainous and rugged, with several peaks, marked as points on the map, which delineate the Line of Control (LC) between India and Pakistan. These geolocations were accepted by India and Pakistan and the document signed by the two representatives at the Shimla Accord of 1972. This NH at some places near Dras and Kargil is under the observation of Pakistani troops deployed across the LC and at times movement of convoys along the road was interdicted by Pakistan’s long range artillery guns.

Pakistan Occupation of the Heights

It is important to understand the reasons for Pakistan Army’s sponsoring of terrorists and its occupation of the area of conflict around Dras and Kargil. While infiltration and terrorist activities continued in Kashmir and Jammu region of the state in 1998, no major inimical activities were observed in Ladakh, which should have been a cause of concern for the intelligence agencies. Post Op Vijay, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) claimed that a warning was sounded about a possible ingress in the area, but the input was never shared with the military commanders, neither at the tactical nor strategic level.

The change in the Pakistani Army leadership, with Gen. Parvez Musharraf taking over from Gen. Jehangir Karamat on 3 October 1998, against the advice of the latter as Musharraf was junior to two other officers, should have raised an alarm for all Indian intelligence agencies. After all, Gen. Musharraf was close to Gen. Zia–ul–Haq, a former chief of the Pakistan Army and later the dictator President of Pakistan. Gen. Zia–ul–Haq was also a proponent of Operation Topac, aimed at dismembering India. Gen. Musharraf’s ambitious plan was to embark upon a mission aligned to the strategic thought of Op Topac. This noticeable change in the chief from a comparatively quiet and seemingly accommodative Karamat to Musharraf, should have been noticed by those responsible. I remember the General’s body language and dress code, in a televised meeting chaired by Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, soon after the visit of then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Lahore and the signing of the Lahore Accord. The body language of Gen. Musharraf, with his shirt sleeves rolled three fourth length, in some way was depictive of arrogance.

Not too long after the Lahore bus trip, Musharraf launched a silent operation code named Operation Badr with the aim of initially occupying the heights east of Kashmir and subsequently attempting to capture large tracts of the Ladakh region. The commander Force Command Northern Area (FCNA) along with 10 Corps commander operationalised the plan and infiltrated the troops of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and other infantry regiments, disguised as civilians. They occupied the heights overlooking deep inside the Indian areas of Mushkoh, Dras, Bimbat, Kargil, Batalik, Biamah and Turtuk, close to the Nubra Valley, covering an expanse of approximately 474 kilometres in Ladakh.

How could they infiltrate unnoticed? How could they occupy heights, dominating areas, which overlooked the NH, wi