The Right Solution

S.K. Sood

Deploying CAPFs in J&K will be more effective and impactful

The militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) shows no signs of abetting any time soon. It has been waning and waxing periodically depending on the level of logistic support the militants receive from their handlers in Pakistan besides the levels of security that exist at any given time in the Union Territory (UT).

The militancy, which has been going on since the late Eighties, has compelled deployment of large number of security forces to contain it. Under the present arrangement both the Indian Army–especially the Rashtriya Rifles (RR)–as well as all Central Armed Forces (CAPFs) have been deployed to contain it.

It is necessary to note that deployment of the army for long duration to control internal security situation has adverse impact on its war-fighting capabilities because the small team operations that are the hallmark of anti–militancy operations are totally different from the defensive and offensive operations that are carried out against a conventional enemy.

Further, the nature of warfare that was witnessed during Operation Sindoor has demonstrated that modern war has changed drastically. The short and crisp engagement was dominated by drones and missiles to soften the enemy and destroy specific targets. There was no direct confrontation between infantry and armoured/mechanised arms of the army. However, their involvement cannot be dispensed with in future wars especially in a prolonged war because capture of land is important not only as a mark of victory but also as a negotiation tool after the war.

Additionally, one can perhaps not rule out sudden offensive from Pakistan because of the unpredictability of the Pakistani military and political leadership, besides the belligerence emanating from their nuclear status.  

The army therefore not only has to remain alert along the borders and the Line of Control (LC) in J&K but also keep training for future technology dominated battlefield environment in order to orient their troops as also for conventional warfare.

Continuous deployment of the army in internal security operations adversely impacts with their training for the war time role, thus further adversely affecting their war-fighting capabilities. These are the reasons that the army has steadfastly resisted deployment in Central India which is affected by Left-Wing Extremism (LWE). However, large-scale prolonged commitment of troops in anti-militancy operations in J&K not only leaves the LC thinly held but also hampers the training regimen of the army for their war-time role.

It is therefore important to ensure that the army is gradually de-inducted from its anti–militancy role in J&K and deployed for its actual war-time role. This must be done during the peacetime because it might be too late if done shortly before or after the hostilities start. It will leave very less time for troops to orientate with their area of deployment.

The RR was raised in 1990 with the specific role of addressing the challenges posed by the growing violence and militancy in J&K during the Nineties. The force consists of units raised by pooling troops from different regiments, arms and services of the army. Even though this force has done a commendable work in J&K, it reduces the effective war-fighting strength of the army by 80,000 troops. This coupled with the fact that reportedly no recruitment was carried out in the army for over three years after Covid further reduces its fighting strength. It is therefore important to release all available troops including those of RR back to the army for its main task of war fighting.

However, the vacuum created by the army an