Harrison Akins

Amid these rising tensions with the Congress leadership, the Maharaja began to warm to the idea of Kashmiri independence under the influence of Kak, as it became increasingly clear the British would soon depart India. With the most strident and popular opposition to his rule so closely associated with Congress, he could not fathom the possibility of acceding to the Indian Union under a Congress-dominated government and retaining his sovereignty. Joining a Congress-ruled India, in his mind, necessarily meant abrogating his vested political authority and interests. Likewise, once the decision to establish Pakistan was made, accession to the Muslim state was not a path the Hindu ruler would consider. Nehru pointed to Kak as influencing the Maharaja’s thinking and contributing to the numerous problems within the state, arguing that he had fomented communal friction to weaken the National Conference and keep Kashmir out of India. In June 1947, he advised Mountbatten that Kak, who had ‘succeeded in antagonizing every decent element in Kashmir and in India as a whole,’ needed to be removed from his position with Abdullah and other political prisoners immediately released.

After announcing Partition, Mountbatten departed for Jammu and Kashmir to assess the political inclinations of the state. During this visit, the Maharaja was ‘very elusive,’ and the only times Mountbatten was able to converse with him at any length were on car rides together. The Viceroy pressured him to decide to accede to either Pakistan or India, which state was a matter of a choice for the Maharaja. Mountbatten assured him that if he ultimately chose Pakistan the State Department would not view this as an ‘unfriendly act’ toward India. In the meantime, the Maharaja should enter into a standstill agreement with both states. Kashmiri independence, Mountbatten counseled, was not a realistic option. On the final day of the visit, Mountbatten hoped to meet once more with the indecisive Hari Singh and urge him to a make a quick decision on accession. However, the Maharaja missed his scheduled meeting with the Viceroy by feigning an illness, even though the Maharaja himself had suggested the timing of their final meeting; he used the same ploy to avoid an earlier meeting with Nehru. After his visit, Mountbatten informed Nehru that it was the Maharaja’s desire that no Congress or Muslim League members should visit Jammu and Kashmir until his final decision had been announced, fearing such a visit could foment unrest among the state’s subjects. Nehru reluctantly agreed. Mountbatten’s visit was followed by a flurry of letters from Indian political leaders pushing for the princely state to accede to India. In early July 1947, Patel wrote to the Maharaja advocating for Abdullah’s release from prison and stressed that he and the other Congress leaders had no quarrel with the princely states. The Congress, he assured Singh, was ‘not only not your enemy, as you happen to believe, but there are in the Congress many strong supporters of your State.’ He stressed that Kashmir’s interests lay ‘in joining in Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay. Its past history and traditions demand it, and all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision. On the same day, Patel wrote to Kak pushing the same. Menon, on the other hand, felt that the matter of Kashmir’s accession shouldn’t be pushed by either India or Pakistan. He recognized that it was possible that a majority Muslim state like Kashmir would not be able to be kept out of Pakistan for long and argued that the situation should ‘find its natural solution. Menon was sensitive to the Maharaja’s frustrations with the frequent lobbying of Indian leaders and though that such pressure might backfire.