The Clash of the Egos

The special session of the Parliament on Operation Sindoor exposed the limitation of India’s foreign policy, driven as it is by the objective of projecting Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a strong leader, instead of furthering India’s national interests. This objective suffered a setback after Operation Sindoor.

Before explaining the three key operational failings of Operation Sindoor, it should be understood that between nuclear armed India and Pakistan, the air war will determine the outcome of the campaign. While the firing of long-range missiles and drones by both sides will cause destruction of military and civilian infrastructure, apart from collateral damage, it will not determine the outcome of the war. Instead, it could raise the possibility of nuclear signalling by Pakistan since it has an elongated geography with numerous high value targets close to the border. The side which achieves limited, or total air superiority, quickly will help its army to move fast to occupy enemy territory. For this reason, the air battle of May 6-7 night was important.

The biggest failing of Operation Sindoor was the timidity of military leaders, allowing the political leadership to determine operational matters. For example, India’s naval attaché in Indonesia, Captain Shiv Kumar disclosed that IAF was told to fire its missiles into Pakistan’s Punjab without first silencing Pakistan’s air defences. At a time when the Pakistan Air Force had adequate warning of the impending attack, this was a shocking lapse. Then, India formally asking for an end to hostilities within half hour of its operations not only showed a lack of political will to fight, but also that the political leadership was in operational control with the IAF leaders watching helplessly. This, and other issues which insiders know but are afraid to talk about, led to IAF fighter loses, whose numbers no one is willing to disclose.

The other operational shortcoming was that the Indian military was unaware that it would not be fighting the Pakistan military but a one-front-reinforced war. This meant Pakistan military fully supported by PLA’s non-kinetic capabilities and combat support needed for war surge. This was a big support for the Pakistan military considering neither the US nor Russia helped the Indian military with its round the clock surveillance capabilities by its constellation of satellites namely, GPS (Global Positioning System) and GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System). After Sindoor, news came that to boost its real time surveillance for military actions, the Indian military was in talks for commercial satellite imagery from a US based company called Maxar Technologies amongst others.

The third failing was of the IAF being unmindful of PAF’s new war concept called Multi Domain Operations (MDO). MDO are done by a digital ecosystem where space, air and ground assets and fighters are integrated by data link allowing free information flow amongst them. This ecosystem is ideal for firing of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. So, instead of PAF’s J-10C doing a one-on-one engagement with IAF’s Rafale, it used the MDO in what is called a ‘system of systems’ approach. The J-10C got the information feed from airborne assets and on getting the target coordinates through it, the fighter fired its PL-15 BVR missile while keeping its own radar off so as not to disclose its location. The PL-15 with a range of over 200km initially flew on a pre-programmed trajectory using its inertial n